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Summary 
An industry is constantly in evolution. Competitors, innovators, or other industry stakeholders 
can introduce new, ‘unknown’ resources or capabilities that increase the basis of competition in an 
industry. Resources and capabilities that form the basis of industry competition and that drive firm 
performance are called ‘strategic industry factors’ (Amit and Schoemaker 1993). I define the 
introduction of new strategic industry factors as ‘strategic industry factor innovation’. Examples 
include Pfizer introducing new patents and technological knowhow, or Intel building strong brand 
equity while standing on the shoulders of giant computer manufacturers. However, there are also 
strategic industry factor innovations associated with ‘known’ resources and capabilities. When 
considering new business models like Netflix, Zara, Dell, iPod/iTunes, amongst many others, the 
innovation is not always bringing ‘new’ resources or capabilities to the industry. Instead, these 
examples show that new combinations of existing, ‘known’ resources and capabilities can also be 
difficult for incumbents to react against or for new entrants to successfully launch. 
In this dissertation I bundle three studies that relate to the concepts of strategic industry factors 
and strategic industry factor innovation. Theory states that firm performance is determined from the 
overlap between a firm’s resource bundle and what resources are needed to compete in its product 
market(s). It reflects the close interconnection between a firm’s resources and its products (Penrose 
1959; Wernerfelt 1984). The concept of a firm’s dynamic capability builds further on the idea of 
developing an appropriate resource bundle to be competitive with respect to an industry’s strategic 
factors (e.g., Helfat et al. 2007; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997). In a first study, entitled “Growth 
Implications of Within-Industry Diversification: a Paradox between Resource Creation and 
Leverage”, I use these ideas to theorize and model how diversification across product markets in a 
single industry relates to firm growth. Thereby I link diversification closely to the underlying resource 
mechanisms that are initiated by deploying a dynamic capability while entering new product 
markets. I show that within-industry diversification leads to firm growth, based on underlying 
resource mechanisms such as resource creation, leverage, and configuration. Another key 
contribution is that I empirically show a simultaneous, negative reciprocity between resource 
creation and leverage which constitutes a core paradox when deploying a dynamic capability.  
In a second part of this dissertation, I focus on a particular type of strategic industry factor 
innovation, i.e., new business models. Despite a surge in research on new business models in both 
popular press and academia, it is still surrounded with a high level of uncertainty because of its often 
disruptive character towards both the demand and supply side in an incumbent industry. I target 
two main areas of uncertainty related to new business models. First, there is a lack of knowledge on 
how to successfully launch a business model. For every innovator with a new business model, there 
are numerous copycats launching the same business model in a particular geographic market. 
However, there are large differences in success across market launches of the same business model. 
The second study, entitled “Success Drivers of Launching a Business Model”, addresses the lack of 
empirical and theoretical guidance on how ventures can succeed when launching a business model. I 
focus on four market entry decisions, i.e., entry timing, product adaptation, scale of entry, and 
strategic control, that influence the business model’s value drivers and ability to create and capture 
value. I find important main and interaction effects on how these entry decisions impact the survival 
chances of the launched business model. Thereby I argue it is important to treat the business model 
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as a separate unit of analysis, different from industry, firm, product, or technology. Moreover, I 
theoretically and empirically show that there are not only differences but also an interplay between 
the business model and a product market strategy, which holds important consequences for the 
market entry literature.  
Second, there is lack of knowledge on how firms can reduce their uncertainty with respect to 
launching a business model. Especially for incumbents, it is difficult deciding when to enter the new 
market niche related to a business model innovation. Incumbents face severe financial and 
managerial risks related to a lack of information on the new market niche. I focus on entry timing 
because of its important short- and long-term performance implications (Gielens and Dekimpe 2001; 
Green, Barclay, and Ryans 1995), and because the second study reveals important main and 
interaction effects of entry timing on newly launched business model’s survival chances. In the third 
study, entitled “Learning and Signals Across Firms and Markets: Identifying Entry Spillover Types 
and Moderators”, I study what information signals actually influence an incumbent’s entry timing 
decision and how these signals influence that decision. I focus on information signals related to 
previous market niche entries. I model different types and moderators of entry spillover, i.e., 
previous market niche entries that influence a focal market niche entry decision. I make a strong 
contribution to the market entry and scanning literature by taking into account signals from both 
served and non-served geographic environments and by modelling the actual instead of potential 
influence of signals on firm decision-making. I find that incumbents’ entry timing is influenced by 
three different types of entry spillover. I show the existence of a type of entry spillover that is 
neglected in the literature, i.e., across firm across market entry spillover, that embodies an indirect 
effect among non-directly competing firms across different geographic markets. Also, I model and 
find particular firm and market characteristics that moderate entry spillover across firms respectively 
markets. It implies that entry spillover is non-linear, heterogeneous, and asymmetric.  
For each study I develop a unique, longitudinal data set based on secondary data sources. I 
collect data across various countries in two different industries. For studies 1 and 2, I model the 
collected data using the ‘classical’ maximum likelihood estimation method, and use a three-stage 
least squares growth model (study 1), and a Cox Proportional Hazards survival model (study 2). For 
study 3, I use a simulated maximum likelihood estimation based on Metropolis-Hastings algorithms, 
i.e., a Markov Chain Monte Carlo method, for a Bayesian hazard entry timing model. Another 
important methodological contribution includes the development of a time-varying, continuous, and 
indirect measure of product market relatedness to closely link diversification decisions with 
underlying resource mechanisms in study 1 which can be easily applied in different industry 
contexts. Also, I develop in study 3 a realistic and flexible entry timing model that accounts for a 
possibly non-monotonic event rate, a permanent survivor fraction, and potentially asymmetric 
spillover effects.  
With this dissertation, I make some important theoretical and managerial contributions. Study 1 
provides theoretical and empirical argumentation for a link between within-industry diversification 
and growth performance. Also, study 1 contributes to the dynamic capability literature by 
empirically identifying a core paradox that is taking place when deploying a dynamic capability. 
Moreover, I contribute to the resource-based theory by further exploring and developing the link 
between a firm’s resources and products. Managerial practice benefits through the insights on how 
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firms can grow by diversification while being aware of negative, internal frictions that form 
constraints at different levels in the organization. Study 2 adds to the literature on business models, 
innovation, and market entry by focusing on how ventures can successfully launch a business model 
in an existing industry and by acknowledging that business models are a different unit of analysis, 
distinct from the product, technology, firm, or industry. It spurs further research on how business 
model innovation is different from other types of innovation. Moreover, study 2 enables managers, 
entrepreneurs, and public authorities to better foresee and predict success and failure in new, 
disruptive market niches following business model innovation. Study 3 contributes to the market 
entry, scanning, and signaling literature by showing which information signals actually (instead of 
potentially) influence a firm’s market entry decision while taking into account signals from both 
served and non-served geographic environments. Also, I identify the co-existence of both direct and 
indirect signals related to market entry. Moreover, I detect firm and market characteristics that 
increase signal strength and I model the influence of signals on firm behavior more realistically 
taking into account characteristics of signal senders and receivers. My research informs managers to 
develop a better scanning system to capture all relevant information signals, both strong and weak, 
without creating data overload.  
After this summary (and the summary in Dutch hereafter), I first proceed with an introduction in 
which I specify previous research findings across the relevant research domains, existing literature 
gaps, and how I address these gaps in the three studies in this dissertation. Second, I explain the 
research design and methodology I applied to conduct the different studies. Third, I include study 1, 
2, and 3 in paper format. Fourth, I give an overview of the main findings and contributions. Fifth, I 
conclude with some future research opportunities.  
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Samenvatting 
Een industrie is voortdurend in beweging. Concurrenten, innovators, of andere stakeholders 
introduceren nieuwe, ‘onbekende’ productiefactoren of competenties die het concurrentieniveau in 
een industrie verhogen. Productiefactoren en competenties die de concurrentiebasis uitmaken in 
een industrie en bedrijfsprestaties bepalen worden ‘strategische industriefactoren’ genoemd (Amit 
and Schoemaker 1993). Ik definieer de introductie van nieuwe strategische industriefactoren als 
'strategische industriefactor innovatie'. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn o.a. Pfizer die nieuwe patenten en 
technologische knowhow introduceert, of Intel die een sterk merk opbouwt dankzij samenwerking 
met computergiganten. Er zijn echter ook strategische industriefactor innovaties die gebruik maken 
van 'bekende' productiefactoren en competenties. Bij nieuwe bedrijfsmodellen zoals die van Netflix, 
Zara, Dell, iPod / iTunes, e.a., is de innovatie niet altijd het brengen van 'nieuwe' productiefactoren 
of competenties in de industrie. In plaats daarvan laten deze voorbeelden zien dat nieuwe 
combinaties van bestaande, 'bekende' productiefactoren en competenties ook moeilijk kunnen zijn 
voor bestaande bedrijven om op te reageren of voor nieuwkomers om succesvol te lanceren. 
In dit proefschrift bundel ik drie studies die betrekking hebben op de concepten van strategische 
industriefactoren en strategische industriefactor innovatie. De theorie zegt dat bedrijfsprestaties 
worden bepaald op basis van de overlap tussen de verzameling productiefactoren van een bedrijf 
(cf., hieronder worden zowel productiefactoren als competenties begrepen) en de middelen nodig 
om te concurreren in de productmarkt (en). Het weerspiegelt de nauwe koppeling tussen de 
productiefactoren van een bedrijf en haar producten (Penrose 1959; Wernerfelt 1984). Het concept 
‘dynamische competentie’ van een bedrijf bouwt verder op het idee dat bedrijven, om succesvol te 
zijn, een gepaste bundel productiefactoren moeten ontwikkelen op basis van de strategische 
factoren van een industrie (bvb. Helfat et al. 2007; Teece, Pisano en Shuen 1997). In een eerste 
studie met als titel "Diversificatie Binnen een Industrie en Bedrijfsgroei: Een Paradox Tussen de 
Creatie en het Opnieuw Aanwenden van Productiefactoren”, gebruik ik deze ideeën om een 
theorie en model te ontwikkelen met betrekking tot hoe diversificatie in productmarkten binnen een 
industrie kan leiden tot bedrijfsgroei. Daarbij link ik diversificatie nauw met de onderliggende 
processen die worden gebruikt bij het aanwenden van een dynamische competentie om de gepaste 
productiefactoren te hebben bij het binnentreden van nieuwe productmarkten. Ik toon aan dat 
diversificatie binnen een industrie leidt tot bedrijfsgroei waarbij de groei gebaseerd is op de 
onderliggende processen van een dynamische competentie, zijnde de creatie, het opnieuw 
aanwenden, en de configuratie van productiefactoren. Een andere belangrijke bijdrage is dat ik 
empirisch aantoon dat er een simultane, negatieve wederkerigheid bestaat tussen het creëren en 
opnieuw aanwenden van productiefactoren wat een belangrijke paradox vormt bij de inzet van een 
dynamische competentie. 
In het tweede deel van dit proefschrift richt ik me op een bepaald type van strategische 
industriefactor innovatie, met name innovatie van bedrijfsmodellen. Ondanks de sterke aandacht 
voor onderzoek naar nieuwe bedrijfsmodellen in zowel de populair-wetenschappelijke als 
academische wereld, heerst er nog altijd grote onzekerheid wanneer een nieuw bedrijfsmodel 
geïntroduceerd wordt en dit vanwege het vaak ontwrichtende karakter van het nieuwe 
bedrijfsmodel aan zowel vraag-als aanbodzijde van de gevestigde industrie. Ik richt me op twee 
belangrijke deelgebieden met betrekking tot nieuwe bedrijfsmodellen. Ten eerste is er een gebrek 
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aan kennis over hoe je een bedrijfsmodel succesvol kunt lanceren. Voor elke innovator met een 
nieuw bedrijfsmodel zijn er meerdere copycats die hetzelfde bedrijfsmodel in een bepaalde 
geografische markt lanceren. Er zijn echter grote verschillen qua succes overheen introducties van 
hetzelfde bedrijfsmodel. De tweede studie met als titel "Succes Drivers bij het Lanceren van een 
Bedrijfsmodel”, onderzoekt empirisch en theoretisch hoe ventures kunnen slagen bij lanceren van 
een bedrijfsmodel. Ik focus op vier belangrijke introductiebeslissingen bij het binnentreden op een 
markt, met name introductietiming, productaanpassing, productieschaal, en strategische controle. 
Deze beslissingen hebben een belangrijke invloed op de onderliggende waardedimensies van een 
bedrijfsmodel, en de mogelijkheid van een bedrijfsmodel om waarde te creëren en capteren. Ik vind 
belangrijke lineaire en niet-lineaire effecten van deze introductiebeslissingen op de 
overlevingskansen van een bedrijfsmodel. Een belangrijk punt hierbij is dat het bedrijfsmodel als een 
afzonderlijke eenheid van analyse moet worden behandeld, verschillend van industrie, bedrijf, 
product, of technologie. Bovendien maak ik theoretisch en empirisch de suggestie dat er niet alleen 
verschillen zijn, maar ook een wisselwerking is tussen het bedrijfsmodel en een productmarkt 
strategie, wat belangrijke gevolgen heeft voor de literatuur rond marktintroducties. 
Ten tweede is er een gebrek aan kennis over hoe bedrijven hun onzekerheid kunnen 
verminderen met betrekking tot het lanceren van een bedrijfsmodel. Vooral voor gevestigde 
bedrijven is het moeilijk om te beslissen wanneer een nieuwe marktniche, gerelateerd aan een 
bedrijfsmodelinnovatie, binnen te treden. Voor bestaande bedrijven zijn er ernstige financiële -en 
managementrisico's verbonden aan een gebrek aan informatie over de nieuwe marktniche. Ik focus 
op introductietiming vanwege de belangrijke korte-en lange-termijn implicaties op bedrijfsprestaties 
(Gielens en Dekimpe 2001; Green, Barclay, en Ryans 1995), en omdat de tweede studie belangrijke 
effecten van introductietiming op de overlevingskansen van een bedrijfsmodel blootlegt. In de derde 
studie met als titel "Kennis en Signalen Overheen Bedrijven en Markten: Het Identificeren van 
Marktintroductie Spillover Types en Moderators”, bestudeer ik welke informatiesignalen 
daadwerkelijk de introductietiming van een bestaand bedrijf in de nieuwe marktniche beïnvloeden 
en hoe deze signalen die beslissing beïnvloeden. Ik focus op de informatiesignalen die slaan op 
eerdere introducties in de marktniche. Ik giet verschillende types en moderators van 
marktintroductie spillover, dat wil zeggen vorige introducties in de marktniche die invloed 
uitoefenen op een huidige introductie in de marktniche, in een model. Ik maak een sterke bijdrage 
tot de marktintroductie literatuur en de literatuur met betrekking tot het scannen van de markt door 
rekening te houden met signalen van markten waarin een bedrijf zowel aanwezig als niet aanwezig 
is, en door het modelleren van de werkelijke in plaats van de potentiële invloed van signalen op 
bedrijfsbeslissingen. De derde studie onderzoekt of de introductietiming van bedrijven wordt 
beïnvloed door drie verschillende types van marktintroductie spillover. Ik ontdek zowel conceptueel 
als empirisch het bestaan van een nieuw type marktintroductie spillover, namelijk marktintroductie 
spillover overheen bedrijven en overheen markten wat impliceert dat er een indirect effect is onder 
niet-rechtstreeks concurrerende bedrijven overheen verschillende geografische markten. Ook vind ik 
bedrijfs-en marktkenmerken die marktintroductie spillover overheen bedrijven respectievelijk 
markten versterken of afzwakken. Het impliceert dat marktintroductie spillover niet-lineair, 
heterogeen, en asymmetrisch is. 
Voor elke studie ontwikkel ik een unieke, longitudinale dataset op basis van secundaire 
gegevensbronnen. Ik verzamel gegevens overheen verschillende landen in twee verschillende 
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industrieën. Voor studies 1 en 2 modelleer ik de gegevens met behulp van de 'klassieke' maximum 
likelihood schattingsmethode, en gebruik ik een three-stage least squares (3SLS) groeimodel (studie 
1), en een Cox proportional hazards overlevingsmodel (studie 2). Voor studie 3 gebruik ik een 
gesimuleerde maximum likelihood schatting op basis van Metropolis-Hastings algoritmes, dat zijn 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo methodes, om een Bayesiaans hazard model te schatten. Een andere 
belangrijke methodologische bijdrage omvat de ontwikkeling van een tijdsafhankelijk, continu, en 
indirect meetinstrument in studie 1 om de verwantschap tussen productmarkten te meten wat kan 
dienen om diversificatiebeslissingen nauwer in verband te brengen met onderliggende processen 
van productiefactoren binnen een dynamische competentie. Ook ontwikkel ik in studie 3 een 
realistisch en flexibel hazard model dat rekening houdt met een eventueel niet-monotone event 
rate, een mogelijk permanente fractie van de populatie dat overleeft, en potentieel asymmetrische 
spillover effecten. 
Met dit proefschrift maak ik een aantal belangrijke theoretische en praktische management 
bijdragen. Studie 1 geeft een theoretische en empirische onderbouwing voor een verband tussen 
diversificatie binnen een industrie en bedrijfsgroei. Ook draagt studie 1 bij tot de dynamische 
competentie literatuur door het empirisch identificeren van een paradox die plaatsvindt bij het 
uitoefenen van een dynamische competentie. Bovendien draagt dit proefschrift bij tot de resource-
based theorie door het verder verkennen en ontwikkelen van het verband tussen productiefactoren 
en producten van een bedrijf. De managementpraktijk kan gebruik maken van de inzichten over hoe 
bedrijven kunnen groeien door diversificatie en het op de hoogte zijn van de negatieve, interne 
wrijvingen op verschillende niveaus in de organisatie bij het uitoefenen van een dynamische 
competentie. Studie 2 draagt bij tot de literatuur over bedrijfsmodellen, bedrijfsmodelinnovatie, en 
introducties op de markt door te focussen op hoe ventures met succes een bedrijfsmodel kunnen 
lanceren in een bestaande industrie en door te erkennen dat een bedrijfsmodel een andere eenheid 
van analyse is dat verschilt van product, technologie, bedrijf of industrie. Het spoort aan tot verder 
onderzoek over de manier waarop bedrijfsmodelinnovatie anders is dan andere vormen van 
innovatie. Bovendien stelt studie 2 managers, ondernemers, en overheden beter in staat succes en 
falen bij nieuwe, ‘verstorende’ marktniches gerelateerd aan bedrijfsmodelinnovatie, te voorspellen. 
Studie 3 draagt bij tot de literatuur van marktintroducties, marktscanning en- signalering door te 
laten zien welke informatie effectief (in plaats van potentieel) de beslissing tot marktintroductie bij 
een bedrijf kan beïnvloeden, rekening houdend met signalen van geografische omgevingen waarin 
het bedrijf zowel actief als niet actief is. Bovendien ontdek ik bedrijfs- en marktkenmerken die de 
signaalsterkte beïnvloeden en ik modelleer ook de invloed van signalen op bedrijfsgedrag meer 
realistisch, rekening houdend met de kenmerken van signaalzenders en- ontvangers. Mijn onderzoek 
informeert managers omtrent een beter scanningssysteem om alle relevante informatiesignalen, 
zowel sterke als zwakke, vast te leggen zonder een overdaad aan data nodig te hebben. 
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Introduction 
Strategic industry factors and diversification 
Strategic industry factors are a set of resources and capabilities that have become the prime 
determinants of firm performance in an industry. They are industry-specific, subject to ex-ante 
uncertainty, and developed at industry level through complex interactions among various 
stakeholders (e.g., competitors, suppliers, and customers) and environmental factors (e.g., 
technology and regulation). Strategic industry factors can be referred to as factors driving 
competition in an industry (Ghemawat 1991). Examples of strategic industry factors could include 
brand equity, technological capability, control of distribution channels, buyer-seller relationships, 
etc. Strategic industry factors are also the prime determinants of firm performance. Firm 
performance is determined by the overlap between a firm’s resources and capabilities, and the 
strategic industry factors (Amit and Schoemaker 1993). Thereby, it is important to not only 
appreciate the value of possessing a particular resource or capability (Barney 1991), but also the 
value of complementarities among resources and capabilities when configuring a bundle of 
resources and capabilities at the firm level (Milgrom and Roberts 1990; 1995; Rumelt 1984).  
Determining firm performance based on the overlap between a firm’s resource bundle1 and 
what is needed to compete in its product market(s) draws back to the close interconnectedness 
between resources and products. When offering a product, a firm makes use of the services of  
particular resources in its resource bundle. To realize economic value, resources need to be 
productively linked with particular products that are sold in the market. The correspondence 
between a firm’s resource bundle and its product market(s) implies that, given a product that a firm 
offers, one can infer the existence of the corresponding resources within the firm needed to offer 
that product (Lee 2008). It is said that a firm’s resource bundle and product market portfolio are two 
sides of the same coin (Wernerfelt 1984). However, there is a distinction between resources and the 
services they can provide (Penrose 1959). Resources are not product-specific which means that they 
can be relevant for various product markets (Danneels 2007; Penrose 1959; Prahalad and Hamel 
1990; Teece 1982). Therefore, if two product markets are related, the underlying resources are likely 
to overlap, even though one may not pinpoint exactly what the overlapping resources are (Lee 
2008). Based on this close link between products and resources, I use product market relatedness to 
identify resource-based view (RBV)-related arguments on how product market diversification 
influences firm growth. 
Previous research shows that dynamic capabilities are relevant in explaining product market 
diversification (e.g., Danneels 2007; 2011). When entering a product market, a firm needs to 
underpin its offering in that market with a reconfigured resource bundle consisting of both newly 
created resources that are specialized towards that product market and existing resources that are 
leveraged across different product markets (Helfat and Lieberman 2002). The concept of a firm’s 
dynamic capability helps translating the idea of developing an appropriate resource bundle to be 
competitive with respect to an industry’s strategic factors to the firm level. It is in line with the RBV 
                                                          
1
 For ease of expression I consider in what follows a firm’s resource bundle as all assets, resources, and 
capabilities that firm owns or has access to.  
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that relates a firm’s competitive advantage primarily to its resources and capabilities it possesses 
(e.g., Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993). However, a dynamic capability stresses the importance of 
changing a firm’s resource bundle to build a competitive advantage and especially sustain it over the 
long term. A resource bundle consists of assets, resources, and capabilities that a firm can deploy to 
offer products in its product market(s). A dynamic capability is a firm’s capability to change its 
resource bundle purposefully (Helfat et al. 2007). Like other capabilities, a dynamic capability is a 
complex bundle of skills and accumulated knowledge, exercised through organizational processes 
that enables a firm to coordinate activities and make use of its assets (Day 1994). Unlike other 
capabilities, its purpose is to actually alter a firm’s resource bundle (e.g., Danneels 2011; Eisenhardt 
and Martin 2000; Helfat et al. 2007; Teece 2007). For example, a dynamic capability can be deployed 
to create new resources, leverage existing resources, and (re)configure them in the firm’s resource 
bundle. Possessing a dynamic capability does not necessarily imply enhanced performance 
(Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Helfat et al. 2007; Zahra, Sapienza, and Davidsson 2006). A dynamic 
capability only implies that the firm is intentionally doing something differently, but not necessarily 
better, than before. For example, the use of a dynamic capability when based on incorrect cause-
effect assumptions may harm rather than help performance outcomes (Zahra et al. 2006).  
How can firms deploy dynamic capability to grow when diversifying? 
Although there is a large number of studies on firms’ dynamic capability and the link between 
the RBV and diversification, I target some important gaps that limit our understanding of how firms 
can actually deploy dynamic capability to grow when diversifying. First, there is a large body of 
literature on diversification, but it mainly focuses on diversification across industries and it has 
difficulties showing a clear link between diversification and performance (For a review, see, e.g., 
Hoskisson and Hitt 1990; Palich, Cardinal, and Miller 2000). Second, the RBV is prominently used to 
explain diversification, its antecedents and its outcomes (Lockett and Thompson 2001; Wan et al. 
2011). However, fine-grained measures of relatedness that closely link diversification with 
underlying arguments of the RBV are missing in the literature. Moreover, previous work lacks an 
adequate approach to deal with the endogeneity between resources and relatedness in the 
relationship between diversification and performance. Also, resources are bundled within firms. 
Linking resources with firm performance without taking into account the bundled nature of 
resources at firm level leads to potentially biased results. Third, the theory on dynamic capability 
suggests an influence of dynamic capability on firm performance, but a widespread call for empirical 
research whether and how dynamic capability is related to firm performance is still open (Barreto 
2010; Helfat et al. 2007; Hoopes and Madsen 2008). Fourth, despite increasing attention for the 
internal processes related to deploying a dynamic capability, i.e., its so-called microfoundations 
(Eisenhardt, Furr, and Bingham 2010; Teece 2007), there is little empirical research to date on the 
internal processes of dynamic capability that goes beyond case studies (Danneels 2011).  
Study 1, “Growth Implications of Within-Industry Diversification: A Paradox Between Resource 
Creation and Leverage”, is an empirical study of the growth implications of dynamic capability 
deployment in the context of within-industry diversification. I closely link and explain diversification 
with concepts from both the RBV and the dynamic capability literature. To adequately link within-
industry diversification to firm growth, I focus on both diversification level and diversification 
activity. Diversification level relates more to a ‘static’ condition. Therefore, I link it with a ‘static’ RBV 
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concept, i.e., resource fit. Diversification activity relates more to a ‘dynamic’ process. Therefore, I 
link it with ‘dynamic’ concepts related to a dynamic capability, i.e., resource creation and resource 
leverage. I posit that a firm’s dynamic capability can positively influence growth by creating new 
resources and configuring a firm’s resource bundle to have resource fit, but that there is a paradox 
at the core of a firm’s dynamic capability. Striving for both resource creation and resource leverage 
is needed for growth, but I argue they also have a negative reciprocity between each other, which 
has negative, indirect growth effects. This negative reciprocity stems from the contradicting focus 
and effect of resource creation and resource leverage. On the one hand, resource leverage focuses 
on exploiting existing resources, creating efficiencies among existing resources, and building more 
co-specialization and linkages among resources. That stimulates structure and inertia among 
resources which hurts a firm’s ability to create new resources. On the other hand, resource creation 
focuses on exploring new resources that also need integration with other, existing resources. That 
demands flexibility among resources to (temporarily) de-link existing, co-specialized resources which 
hurts a firm’s ability to leverage resources. Also, I try to empirically identify an important, new 
dimension of diversification beyond a firm’s control that can increase growth, i.e., market 
structuration. In study 1, I measure the relative importance of resource creation, resource leverage, 
resource fit, and market structuration on growth performance together with a simultaneous 
reciprocity between resource creation and leverage.  
Strategic industry factor innovation 
Industry stakeholders, environmental factors, and a firm’s own resources and capabilities can 
change over time (e.g., Porter 1991; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997). So can strategic industry 
factors. I define ‘strategic industry factor innovation’ as an innovation introducing one or more new 
strategic industry factors, or a new combination of strategic industry factors. A new strategic 
industry factor can be a ‘known’ or an ‘unknown’ resource or capability. The distinctive character of 
a strategic industry factor innovation is the change in the set of prime determinants of firm 
performance and not the ‘novelty’ character of the resources or capabilities introduced. Business 
model innovation is an example of strategic industry factor innovation that stresses the innovative 
character of a new combination of often existing resources and capabilities, rather than coming up 
with completely new resources and capabilities as such.  
How to successfully launch a business model? 
A business model defines how a focal firm creates value for customers and how that value is 
appropriated across itself and its partners (Day 2011; Sorescu et al. 2011; Teece 2010). A business 
model can be represented by a system of interconnected and interdependent activities that 
transcends the focal firm (Zott and Amit 2010). Business models can be a potential source of 
competitive advantage (Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart 2010; Markides and Charitou 2004; Zott and 
Amit 2007; 2008). The business model is a major focal point of innovation (e.g., Casadesus-Masanell 
and Zhu 2013; Economist Intelligence Unit 2005; Hamel 2000; IBM Global Business Services 2012; 
Kim and Mauborgne 1997; Markides 1997; Mitchell and Coles 2003; Slywotzky 1996; Teece 2010). 
One can innovate the existing business model by adding novel or deleting standard activities, by 
linking or sequencing activities in novel ways, or by changing one or more parties that perform any 
of the activities (Amit and Zott 2012). To qualify as a business model innovation, the new business 
model should materially alter the value creation and appropriation logic, and it should be a new-to-
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the-world business model that is reflected in new content, structure, governance, and/or value 
driver combinations of the activity system (Sorescu et al. 2011).  
Despite its prevalence in both popular press and academia, there is a very important gap in the 
literature on business models that I want to address in this dissertation, i.e., that there is no 
empirical or theoretical guidance in the literature on how ventures can successfully launch a 
business model. Business models and their innovation are on top of the executive priority list as they 
hold great promise for differentiation and performance benefits. Many business model innovations, 
e.g., Netflix, Zara, and Southwest Airlines amongst others, are featured and praised for their success. 
Also, for every innovator with a new business model, there are often copycats launching the same 
business model in a particular geographic market. However, there are often large differences in 
success across market launches of the same business model. In study 2,” Success Drivers of 
Launching a Business Model “, I identify four market entry decisions, i.e., entry timing, product 
adaptation, scale of entry, and strategic control, that may influence the business model’s value 
drivers and ability to create and capture value. I hypothesize main and interaction effects on how 
these entry decisions impact the survival of the launched business model. Thereby I argue it is 
important to treat the business model as a separate unit of analysis, different from industry, firm, 
product, or technology. Moreover, I posit there are not only differences but also an interplay 
between the business model and a product market strategy, which can hold important 
consequences for the market entry literature.  
Drivers of incumbent launch timing 
Innovative business models creating new market niches in an industry pose significant threats 
for incumbents. Deciding when to enter such a new market niche is far from easy for incumbents. 
Entry timing can have important short- and long-term performance implications (Gielens and 
Dekimpe 2001; Green, Barclay, and Ryans 1995). Moreover, in study 2 of my dissertation I argue 
there are important main and interaction effects of entry timing on a business model’s launch 
success. However, incumbents face severe financial and managerial risks related to a lack of 
information on the new market niche. Therefore, firms need to adequately scan their environment 
to actively search and especially structure information to prepare, guide and defend their decisions. 
Environmental scanning is the means through which managers perceive external events and trends 
(Culnan 1983; Hambrick 1982). It has the task of reducing perceived strategic uncertainty (Daft, 
Sormunen, and Parks 1988). Various literature streams suggest that environmental scanning is 
important for firms to create and sustain a competitive advantage. Previous research on market 
orientation (e.g., Hult, Ketchen, and Slater 2005; Kohli and Jaworski 1990), absorptive capacity 
(Cohen and Levinthal 1990), dynamic capabilities (Teece 2007), and organizational vigilance (Day and 
Schoemaker 2006; Fiol and O'Connor 2003; Levinthal and Rerup 2006) all suggest that firms should 
actively scan their environment to identify, anticipate, and respond adequately to market 
opportunities or threats. Also, scanning can provide a firm with an information advantage based on 
the firm’s ability to perceive important signals in its environment before competitors do so (Dutton 
and Freedman 1984). Moreover, scanning is also gaining importance because there are more and 
more situations where there are problems of data overload and accelerated market complexity (Day 
2011).  
19 
 
Previous research on scanning focuses on developing and managing an adequate scanning 
system, describing scanning activities based on scanning mode, frequency, scope, and top 
management involvement, and studying the alignment between environmental characteristics and a 
firm’s scanning system design (e.g., Aaker 1983; Aguilar 1967; Culnan 1983; Daft, Sormunen, and 
Parks 1988; Elenkov 1997; Hambrick 1982; Hambrick and Mason 1984; Yasai-Ardekani and Nystrom 
1996). However, there are two important remaining gaps in the literature that make it difficult for 
firms to adequately scan their environment, especially when the information is geographically 
dispersed and firms lack time and money to conduct extensive scanning activities. First, previous 
research on scanning seems to assume that the relevant environmental boundaries coincide with 
the product-geographic scope of the firm (Yasai-Ardekani and Nystrom 1996) or with the perceived 
impact of events on a firm’s own performance (Aaker 1983; Daft, Sormunen, and Parks 1988; Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978). However, with increasingly global competition and blurring industry boundaries, 
the relevant geographic environment to scan might be much broader than what initially is expected. 
Second, whereas previous research focuses on listing all possible information sources and stressing 
the importance of applying a broad scanning scope with high frequency when uncertainty is high, 
little is known on what information sources are actually influencing firms’ decisions. Consequently, 
previous research provides little help for firms how to grasp what information signals in its 
environment are most relevant, especially when these firms have limited resources but ever 
increasing data dispersion and complexity.  
In study 3, “Learning and Signals Across Firms and Markets: Identifying Entry Spillover Types 
and Moderators”, I study what information signals actually influence a focal industry incumbent’s 
decision when to enter a new market niche and how these signals influence that decision, while 
taking into account signals from both served and non-served geographic environments. I focus on 
information signals related to previous market niche entries. I define entry spillover as signals 
related to a previous market niche entry by a particular firm in a particular market that influence the 
focal firm’s entry decision for that market niche in a focal market. Scanning here involves gathering 
and monitoring information on previous market niche entries. A market niche entry is done by a 
particular firm in a particular market. Therefore, I can relate information signals from previous 
market niche entries to both firms and markets, and their respective characteristics.  
Types of entry spillover 
I suggest there are three different types of entry spillover based on the two main information 
dimensions firms relate to a market niche entry, i.e., information tied to the entering firm and 
information tied to the market. Previous research suggests there are entry spillovers that take place 
within firms across markets, and entry spillovers that take place across firms within markets. Firms 
can search within their firm boundaries for information and own experiences with the new market 
niche in other markets (e.g., Mitra and Golder 2002). The theory on multinational enterprises 
specifically states that firms active in multiple markets build one organization in order to transfer 
knowledge more efficiently across markets (Kogut and Zander 1993; 2003). Also, firms look at 
competitors’ entries as signals of market attractiveness to guide a focal market entry decision 
(Bowman and Gatignon 1995; Gielens and Dekimpe 2007; King and Tucci 2002). It appears there is 
social pressure for a firm’s decision-makers to conform to imitation behavior (Abrahamson 1991; 
Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Fiol and O'Connor 2003).  
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However, based on theoretical and empirical observations, I argue there is also a third type of 
entry spillover, i.e., across firms across markets. First, organizational theory establishes that firms 
learn from own experiences and other firms’ experiences (Levitt and March 1988). It has been 
suggested that the ability of firms to learn from each other is not noticeably restricted by national 
markets (Baldwin and Krugman 1988), i.e., that international inter-organizational learning networks 
might exist (Tregaskis 2003). Second, firms become increasingly internationally active in multiple 
markets. Therefore, incumbents should anticipate market entries by firms that are yet unknown, and 
start monitoring them. Also, higher international presence implies that competitors are finding 
themselves more and more in overlapping markets (Gielens, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2012). The higher 
the number of overlapping markets between competitors, the more multimarket competition and 
the more competitive effects across markets can occur. Whether multimarket contact leads to more 
(Porter 1980), less (Bernheim and Whinston 1990; Feinberg 1985), or more strategic competition 
(Kang, Bayus, and Balasubramanian 2010), all outcomes imply that firms monitor multimarket 
competitors more than other competitors.  
Moderators of entry spillover 
When firms scan previous market niche entries, they need to structure all these information 
signals to capture the essence. I argue that firms focus on information signals from particular firms in 
particular markets more than from other firms or markets. It implies that entry spillover is 
heterogeneously distributed across firms and markets. Previous research indicates that entry 
spillover can differ in strength. For example, firms can transfer knowledge more easily across similar 
markets  (e.g., Gielens and Dekimpe 2007; Mitra and Golder 2002) and firms are more inclined to 
imitate similar firms (e.g., Debruyne and Reibstein 2005). However, I argue there can be other 
dimensions than similarity that moderate entry spillover. Based on signaling theory, spillover 
strength could differ also depending on characteristics of the sender and the receiver of the 
information signal. It implies that other firm and market characteristics could simultaneously 
influence entry spillover and that entry spillover is asymmetric. Asymmetric spillover means that 
entries by firm F1 (in market M1) can have more or less influence on entries by firm F2 (in market 
M2), than that entries by firm F2 (in market M2) have on entries by firm F1 (in market M1). 
To structure entry spillover’s heterogeneity and asymmetry, I split a spillover process in three 
main dimensions. For every spillover, there is a source, a receiver, and a distance to overcome. The 
source firm is the firm that enters the new market niche previous to a focal firm’s decision and the 
source market is the market in which that source firm enters that new market niche. The receiver 
firm is the focal firm and the receiver market is the market in which the focal firm might enter the 
new market niche. The distance to overcome is the physical or ‘mental’ distance between source 
and receiver firm, or between source and receiver market. The spillover dimension related to the 
source is ‘sphere of influence’ of the source towards potential receivers. Sphere of influence 
embodies how well senders of information are able to capture the attention of potential receivers 
with respect to the information that is conveyed. The spillover dimension related to the receiver is 
‘receptivity’ of the receiver towards external information. Receptivity embodies how well potential 
receivers of information are able or open to capturing information. The spillover dimension related 
to distance to overcome is the ‘proximity’ between senders and receivers. I posit that sphere of 
influence, proximity and receptivity amplify the entry spillover effect of previous entries on a focal 
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incumbent’s time to enter the new market niche. I identify several firm characteristics that influence 
firms’ proximity, sphere of influence, or receptivity. Similarly, I identify several market characteristics 
that influence markets’ proximity, sphere of influence, and receptivity. 
Research design and methodology 
The overall framework of this dissertation is depicted in figure 1. I applied the following 
methodology for the different research projects. In study 1, I study growth implications of product 
market diversification within a single industry. I develop a time-varying, continuous, and indirect 
measure of product market relatedness which allows to link diversification decisions with underlying 
resource-based mechanisms when deploying dynamic capability. I focus on the service industry and  
collect data on Belgian, Dutch and U.K. market research agencies for the period 1990-2005. I track 
their presence across 33 product markets and estimate a system of three equations of respectively 
firm growth, resource creation, and resource leverage. I use a three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
estimation approach, while accounting for simultaneity, endogeneity, and firm-level unobserved 
heterogeneity. I also apply a selection correction mechanism for non-survival. The estimation 
approach allows to estimate growth implications of diversification while controlling for the 
simultaneity of decision-making with respect to resource creation and resource leverage. Moreover, 
it allows to model causal relationships between the variables of interest and firm growth. Also, I can 
develop unbiased parameter estimates in the presence of endogeneity. Given the focus on a single 
industry I have no cross-industry noise coming from differing industry-specific shocks to supply and 
demand. Also, the data represent a diverse, complete picture of the market research industry by 
including big, multinational firms and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), as well as start-
ups and older firms.  
 
Figure 1: research design 
In study 2 I study success drivers of a business model launch. Therefore, I model market entry 
decisions’ influence on a venture’s survival after its business model launch. I estimate the model 
Antecedents 
Study 3:  
-entry spillover 
-Bayesian hazard 
Study 2:  
-business model launch 
-Cox PH 
Entry decisions Performance 
Study 1:  
-diversification 
-3SLS 
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using the Cox Proportional Hazards method. The context involves the free daily newspaper business 
model innovation that appeared in the existing paid daily newspaper industry. This new business 
model allows customers to take the daily newspaper for free instead of paying a subscription or per-
issue fee. Ad revenues are the only revenue stream for the publisher. The free daily newspaper is 
mainly distributed in high-traffic commuter zones and in public transportation systems, e.g., through 
self-service racks or by hand distributors in railway, subway and bus stations. Its target customers 
are daily commuters using public transportation. I sampled 29 countries across Europe and Canada 
where free daily newspapers have been introduced between 1995 and 2010. Across these countries, 
I identified a census of 155 free daily newspaper ventures. I collected and analysed longitudinal data 
on these free daily newspaper ventures’ launch and survival, market entry decisions, and venture 
and market characteristics. Data sources include websites, newspaper articles, industry organization 
secondary databases, and industry expert interviews.  
In study 3, I model market entry spillover types and moderators that influence an incumbent’s 
entry timing in a new market niche created by business model innovation. I model when incumbents 
enter a new market niche based on previous market niche entries, i.e., market entry spillover. Also, I 
include firm and market characteristics as moderators of entry spillover across firms respectively 
markets. I develop a Bayesian hazard model that accounts for a possibly non-monotonic event rate, 
a permanent survivor fraction, and potentially asymmetric spillover effects. I estimate the model 
using a flexible Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method known as the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) 
algorithm. This algorithm allows to generate samples from the posterior distribution without the 
form of the posterior density being known analytically. The context is similar to study 2, but the 
sample now involves incumbent publishers of paid daily newspapers that are confronted with the 
new market niche, i.e., the free daily commuter newspaper market (e.g., Metro, 20 Minutes). I 
collected data on 163 incumbent newspaper publishers in 14 European markets for the period 1995-
2010. The unit of analysis is the incumbent publisher-market combination.  
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1.1 Abstract 
Firm growth is a key concern of managers and investors. We investigate the growth implications 
of a firm’s within-industry product diversification level and activity. Therefore, we closely link 
diversification with concepts from both the resource-based view and the dynamic capability 
literature. We argue and show that a firm’s dynamic capability can positively influence growth by 
creating new resources and configuring a firm’s resource bundle to have resource fit. However, we 
find a paradox that is at the core of a firm’s dynamic capability. Striving for both resource creation 
and resource leverage is needed for growth, but they also have a negative reciprocity between each 
other, which has negative, indirect growth effects. Also, we empirically identify an important, new 
dimension of diversification beyond a firm’s control that increases growth, i.e., market structuration. 
We measure the relative importance of resource creation, resource leverage, resource fit, and 
market structuration for growth performance together with a simultaneous reciprocity between 
resource creation and leverage. We analyse longitudinal data on the presence of market research 
firms in various product markets in three countries and use three-stage least squares estimation 
while accounting for endogeneity, simultaneity and selection bias. We discuss important theoretical, 
methodological and managerial contributions.  
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1.2 Introduction 
Firm growth is a central topic in strategy research and a key managerial concern. Companies that 
grow slower than GDP are five times less likely to survive the next business cycle compared to firms 
that grow faster than GDP (Baghai, Smit, and Viguerie 2007). Also, investors pay premiums for high-
growth firms. However, achieving consistent growth is extremely hard. For example, recent research 
indicates that among big firms, only 4% out of nearly 5,000 achieve a net income growth of at least 
5% for five consecutive years (McGrath 2012).  
An important growth strategy for firms is to diversify across product markets. However, we 
identify some important theoretical and methodological gaps in the literature that lead to 
potentially biased results when estimating growth implications of diversification. First, there is a 
large body of literature on diversification, but it mainly focuses on diversification across industries 
and it has difficulties showing a clear link between diversification and performance (For a review, 
see, e.g., Hoskisson and Hitt 1990; Palich, Cardinal, and Miller 2000). Because industry relatedness is 
based on SIC categories that are sometimes randomly delineated and industrial conglomerates often 
operate through holding structures with separate entities per industry, studies taking a cross-
industry approach often fail to capture the true resource drivers of relatedness and diversification. 
Also, although any growth measure is based on both the level and change in the growth subject, 
studies on diversification’s growth implications often fail to include both diversification level and 
diversification activity to explain growth performance. Second, the resource-based theory is 
prominently used to explain diversification, its antecedents and its outcomes (Lockett and 
Thompson 2001; Wan et al. 2011). However, fine-grained measures of relatedness that closely link 
diversification with underlying arguments of the resource-based view (RBV) are missing in the 
literature. Moreover, previous work lacks an adequate approach to deal with the endogeneity 
between resources and relatedness in the relationship between diversification and performance. 
Also, resources are bundled within firms. Linking resources with firm performance without taking 
into account the bundled nature of resources at firm level leads to potentially biased results. 
The following research questions are remaining. First, does within-industry product 
diversification lead to growth? Second, what is the relative influence of diversification activity 
compared to level of diversification on firm growth? Third, what are the underlying resource 
mechanisms of diversification that lead to growth? To address these gaps and subsequent research 
questions, we explain growth implications of product market diversification by focusing on a single 
industry, by relating both diversification level and diversification activity to growth while applying 
underlying theoretical arguments of the RBV and dynamic capabilities literature, and by developing a 
fine-grained relatedness measure in line with the close relationship between resources and product 
market relatedness.  
First, we focus on within-industry product diversification. Recently, there is more attention for 
within-industry diversification in which firms enter different market niches within a single industry 
(e.g., Stern and Henderson 2004; Tanriverdi and Lee 2008). In this study, we define a market niche as 
a product market. Although there can be important differences between within-and across-industry 
diversification (Li and Greenwood 2004), staying within the boundaries of one industry can alleviate 
some of the previously mentioned problems when studying performance implications of 
diversification. Compared to defining industry boundaries based on SIC categories, focusing on a 
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single industry enables us to define market niche boundaries more appropriately based on business 
activities and industry-driven market structuration. This leads to a relatedness measure that can 
capture underlying resource logic better. Also, when diversifying across industries, a prevalent 
organizational structure is the holding unit with a set of -- often loosely -- coupled firms that are 
active each in a different industry.  In such a structure, it is hard to imagine having one, well-
integrated resource bundle shared across industries. A single industry is a more meaningful context 
in which one, well-integrated resource bundle can reside in a single firm. Therefore, a single industry 
is better able to take a holistic approach focused on resource bundles instead of individual 
resources.  
Second, we relate diversification level and diversification activity to growth with the help of 
underlying theoretical arguments of the RBV respectively dynamic capabilities literature. Whereas 
the RBV literature is more static and thus more suitable to explain growth implications of a firm’s 
level of diversification, we argue it is key to understand how dynamic capabilities work to 
understand how a firm’s diversification activity can lead to growth. A dynamic capability is a firm’s 
capability to create, leverage, and configure elements of its resource bundle purposefully without 
necessarily implying enhanced performance (Helfat et al. 2007). A firm’s resource bundle consists of 
its assets, resources, and capabilities. Previous research shows that dynamic capabilities are relevant 
in explaining product diversification (e.g., Danneels 2007; 2011). When entering a product market, a 
firm needs to underpin its offering in that market with a reconfigured resource bundle consisting of 
both newly created resources that are specialized towards that product market and existing 
resources that are leveraged across different product markets (Helfat and Lieberman 2002).  
We posit that both resource creation and resource leverage can lead to growth. However, the 
key to understanding the role of a dynamic capability towards growth is that there lies a paradox in 
striving for both resource creation and resource leverage. This paradox stems from the contradicting 
focus and effect of resource creation and resource leverage. On the one hand, resource leverage 
focuses on exploiting existing resources, creating efficiencies among existing resources, and building 
more co-specialization and linkages among resources. That stimulates structure and inertia among 
resources which hurts a firm’s ability to create new resources. On the other hand, resource creation 
focuses on exploring new resources that also need integration with other, existing resources. That 
demands flexibility among resources to (temporarily) de-link existing, co-specialized resources which 
hurts a firm’s ability to leverage resources.  More resource creation is likely to hurt resource 
leverage and vice versa. But firms seem to need both and have to decide on both simultaneously 
when diversifying.  
In a similar vein, previous research states that firms need to balance exploitation of existing 
resources and continuous development of new resource positions in order to obtain optimal growth 
(Pettus 2001; Teece et al. 1997). But in diverse literature streams, it is suggested that creation 
decreases leverage and leverage makes creation more difficult. See for example previously studied 
tensions between efficiency and flexibility (Adler, Goldoftas, and Levine 1999; Mckee, Varadarajan, 
and Pride 1989), organizational change and activity system fit (Siggelkow 2001), architectural 
innovation and product component fit (Henderson and Clark 1990), and firm adaptation and 
organizational element fit (Levinthal 1997).  
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Third, we develop a fine-grained relatedness measure in line with the close relationship between 
resources and product market relatedness. We build a time-varying, continuous, and indirect 
measure of product market relatedness. A time-varying relatedness measure is important to capture 
the dynamics of an industry (Tanriverdi and Lee 2008) and changes in diversification over time 
(Ramanujam and Varadarajan 1989). Also, within-industry diversification is assumed to be related, 
so within-industry relatedness embodies the degree of relatedness which is best measured 
continuously (Li and Greenwood 2004). Moreover, an indirect measure has the advantage it 
increases external validity (Bryce and Winter 2009).  
A key feature of our product market relatedness measure is that it is based on the joint 
occurrences of different product markets in firms’ product market portfolios. Aggregating joint 
occurrences of product markets across firms within an industry indicates how related those product 
markets are. It also corresponds to how similar those product markets are in their need for 
particular resources and how relevant a firm’s resource bundle is to underpin those product markets 
(Lee 2008). When offering a product, a firm makes use of the services of  particular resources in its 
resource bundle. To realize economic value, resources need to be productively linked with particular 
products that are sold in the market. The correspondence between a firm’s resource bundle and its 
product markets implies that, given a product that a firm offers, one can infer the existence of the 
corresponding resources within the firm needed to offer that product. It is said that a firm’s resource 
bundle and product market portfolio are two sides of the same coin (Wernerfelt 1984). However, 
there is a distinction between resources and the services they can provide (Penrose 1959). 
Resources are not product-specific which means that they can be relevant for various product 
markets (Danneels 2007; Penrose 1959; Prahalad and Hamel 1990; Teece 1982). Therefore, if two 
product markets are related, the underlying resources are likely to overlap, even though one may 
not pinpoint exactly what the overlapping resources are (Lee 2008). Based on this close link between 
products and resources, we use product market relatedness to identify RBV-related arguments on 
how product market diversification influences firm growth. 
We apply the following methodology. We estimate a system of three equations of respectively 
firm growth, resource creation, and resource leverage. We use a three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
estimation approach. We account for simultaneity, endogeneity, and firm-level unobserved 
heterogeneity. We also apply a selection correction mechanism for non-survival. Our estimation 
approach has several advantages. It allows us to estimate growth implications of diversification 
while controlling for the simultaneity of decision-making with respect to resource creation and 
resource leverage. Moreover, it lets us model causal relationships between our variables of interest 
and firm growth. Also, we can develop unbiased parameter estimates in the presence of 
endogeneity.  
We collect data on Belgian, Dutch and U.K. market research agencies for the period 1990-2005. 
We track their presence across 33 product markets. Our sample and industry context are 
appropriate for several reasons. First, the data stem from a mature service industry for which we 
capture a large number of product market entries. Given our focus on a single industry we have no 
cross-industry noise coming from differing industry-specific shocks to supply and demand. Second, 
our data set spans 16 years of data in which there are both turbulent and stable periods. 
Environmental changes include the introduction of internet research and online research methods 
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around 1995, and the start of a global recession and a wave of mergers and acquisitions in the 
industry around 2000. We control for these changes by introducing fixed time effects and a dummy 
indicating whether a firm is involved in a merger or acquisition. Third, our data set is a mix of big, 
multinational firms and SMEs as well as start-ups and older firms. That way our data set presents a 
diverse, complete picture of the market research industry. We control for firm size and age.  
With this study, we offer important theoretical and methodological contributions. First, we 
contribute to the diversification literature. We provide theoretical and empirical argumentation for a 
link between within-industry diversification and growth performance. Also, we show the importance 
of an adequate relatedness measure that needs to link aspects of diversification with underlying 
theoretical logic to explain the outcomes of diversification. We show how an indirect method based 
on a firm’s product market portfolio can be applied to measure product market relatedness that 
reveals information on a firm’s resource bundle. Moreover, we not only include firms’ diversification 
level, but also firms’ diversification activity. Prior research on diversification focuses on firms’ 
presence across markets, i.e., diversification level, based on decisions taken before the period in 
which growth performance is appraised. Our study incorporates both static and dynamic aspects of 
diversification and is therefore better suited to link diversification to growth performance. Second, 
we contribute to the dynamic capabilities literature. We identify a core paradox that is taking place 
when deploying a dynamic capability, i.e., a paradox between creating and leveraging resources. 
Previous research suggests a dynamic capability involves finding a balance between two opposing 
forces (Eisenhardt, Furr, and Bingham 2010; Helfat et al. 2007). We build further on that by 
explaining a paradox between two resource altering activities that form the core of a dynamic 
capability. We explain the paradox in terms of processes and in terms of managerial mental activity. 
Also, we contribute by making decisions with an impact on resources and dynamic capabilities more 
tangible and measurable. Moreover, our main findings help identify how a dynamic capability can 
lead to growth and what the possible pitfalls are. Third, we contribute to the resource-based theory. 
In line with previous work by Wernerfelt (1984) and Lee (2008), we further explore and develop the 
link between a firm’s resources and products. We add to the relevance of the resource-based theory 
for explaining diversification and firm growth. We also make measuring a firm’s resource bundle 
more tangible.  
This study also offers managerial contributions. First, we provide insights on how to grow in a 
relatively ‘safe’ within-industry environment. Thereby, we focus on the importance of dynamic 
capabilities and describe the resource trade-offs firms have to make. We show that managers can 
capture growth opportunities through diversification and a dynamic capability, but that managers 
should be aware of the dynamic capability’s negative internal effects. Our study helps managers 
identifying possible causes for these negative effects in the form of different constraints at different 
levels within the organization. Second, this study and its outcomes are informative for multiple 
organizational functions, i.e., functions related to product portfolio management, resource and 
process management, and top management decision-making. Third, our methodology used is easily 
replicable, also across industries. It provides firms with an actionable method to benefit from 
diversification. Also, we provide a convenient method for managers to build active knowledge on 
how their product market portfolio is in congruence with their available resource bundle.  
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The paper is organized as follows. First, we focus on the conceptual background and develop 
appropriate hypotheses. Second, we describe our data set and variable operationalization. Third, we 
specify our model and estimation method. Fourth, we present our results, check for their 
robustness, and discuss our contributions. We conclude with some limitations and areas for further 
research. 
 
1.3 Conceptual background and hypothesis development 
1.3.1 Within-industry diversification 
Within-industry diversification deals with firms entering different market niches within a single 
industry. Previous research considers market niches that refer to product lines (Stern and Henderson 
2004) or product lines within particular geographic areas (Li and Greenwood 2004). In this study, we 
focus on diversification across product markets in a single industry within country borders. Previous 
research observes that within-industry diversification can contribute to performance in terms of 
product and organizational survival (Cottrell and Nault 2004; Stern and Henderson 2004), 
profitability (Li and Greenwood 2004), and sales growth and market share (Tanriverdi and Lee 2008). 
However, diversification per se does not lead to higher performance (Li and Greenwood 2004; 
Tanriverdi and Lee 2008).  
Reasons for possible performance contributions of within-industry diversification mentioned are 
exploiting excess productive resource capacity, resource synergy creation in the form of economies 
of scope, mutual forbearance, and market structuration (Cottrell and Nault 2004; Davis and Thomas 
1993; Farjoun 1994; Li and Greenwood 2004; Markides and Williamson 1994; Robins and Wiersema 
1995; Stern and Henderson 2004; Tanriverdi and Lee 2008). The RBV is prominently used to explain 
diversification, its antecedents and its outcomes (Lockett and Thompson 2001; Wan et al. 2011). 
However, fine-grained measures of relatedness that closely link diversification with underlying 
arguments of the RBV are missing. Also, previous work lacks an adequate approach to deal with the 
endogeneity between resources and relatedness in the relationship between diversification and 
performance. Moreover, linking resources with firm performance without taking into account the 
bundled nature of resources at firm level leads to potentially biased results. There is increased 
attention to seeing resources in relation to other resources within configurations, instead of focusing 
on individual resources. This is in line with a general RBV idea of resource bundles (Rumelt 1984), 
and with concepts such as resource complementarities and co-specialization (Dierickx and Cool 
1989; Teece 1986; Teece et al. 1997). More generally, it is in line with a renewed appeal of research 
on fit (Peteraf and Reed 2008; Porter and Siggelkow 2008; Zajac, Kraatz, and Bresser 2000).  
Instead of focusing merely on the RBV, which is often denoted as ‘static’ (Priem and Butler 
2001a; Priem and Butler 2001b), we also relate diversification with the literature on dynamic 
capabilities. There are two important reasons. First, to adequately link within-industry diversification 
to firm growth, we need to focus on both diversification level and diversification activity. On the one 
hand, diversification level relates more to a ‘static’ condition. Therefore, we link it with a ‘static’ RBV 
concept, i.e., resource fit. On the other hand, diversification activity relates more to a ‘dynamic’ 
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process. Therefore, we link it with ‘dynamic’ concepts related to a dynamic capability, i.e., resource 
creation and resource leverage. Second, to capture empirically the underlying resource-based 
arguments of diversification, we need to identify what happens when changes occur in a firm’s 
resource bundle when diversifying. Spurred by the dynamic capabilities literature, there is increasing 
attention for the internal dimensions of a firm’s resource bundle and how it works. Previous 
research tries to disentangle dynamic capability and identifies different internal dimensions that 
might have different performance implications (Danneels 2011; Helfat et al. 2007; Sirmon et al. 
2011; Teece 2007). Also, it has been suggested that possible tensions among internal dimensions are 
at the core of dynamic capability’s performance potential (Eisenhardt et al. 2010). In our study we 
identify resource creation and resource leverage as two important dimensions of a dynamic 
capability, and argue we need to study their growth implications separately. However, we also 
suggest there is an internal paradox between resource creation and leverage based on constraints 
that have been studied in various domains such as learning, managerial capacity, and organizational 
structure.  
1.3.2 Dynamic capability and growth 
A dynamic capability is a firm’s capability to change its resource bundle purposefully (Helfat et 
al. 2007). A firm’s resource bundle is its set of assets, resources, and capabilities. Like other 
capabilities, a dynamic capability is a complex bundle of skills and accumulated knowledge, exercised 
through organizational processes that enables a firm to coordinate activities and make use of its 
assets (Day 1994). Unlike other capabilities, its purpose is to actually alter a firm’s resource bundle 
(e.g., Danneels 2011; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Helfat et al. 2007; Teece 2007). For example, a 
dynamic capability can be deployed to create new resources, leverage existing resources, and 
(re)configure them in the firm’s resource bundle. Possessing a dynamic capability does not 
necessarily imply enhanced performance (Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Helfat et al. 2007; Zahra, 
Sapienza, and Davidsson 2006). A dynamic capability only implies that the firm is intentionally doing 
something differently, but not necessarily better, than before. For example, the use of a dynamic 
capability when based on incorrect cause-effect assumptions may harm rather than help 
performance outcomes (Zahra et al. 2006).  
When diversifying across product markets, firms deploy a dynamic capability for two main 
purposes: resource creation and resource leverage. Resource creation allows firms to sense, seize or 
even shape opportunities, and to align with their external environment (Teece 2007). In line with 
evolutionary thinking, dynamic capability deals with creating appropriate resources to fully capture 
market opportunities in possibly changing environments. Performance then indicates how well a 
firm adapts to its environment by possessing resources that are valuable, rare, non-inimitable, non-
substitutable, and appropriable (Barney 1991; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997). Resources have been 
categorized into two types: market-related and technology-related (Mitchell 1992). When entering a 
product market, resource creation can refer to creating new technology-related resources and/or 
market-specific resources to underpin the firm’s offering in that market and to enable the firm to 
capture the growth potential of the market (Danneels 2002; Teece 1986; Tripsas 1997). Examples of 
technology-related new-to-create resources include new production processes and new patents. 
Examples of market-related new-to-create resources include new customer relationships, brand-
specific reputation, and knowledge of customer needs and preferences. When entering a market, a 
firm always has to create new resources, be it technology-related, or market-specific, or both. Two 
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product markets with exactly the same technology-related and market-specific characteristics would 
be the same product markets per definition.  
We argue that creating resources increases firm growth in two ways. First, creating new 
resources when entering product markets increases a firm’s potential and ability to capture 
previously untapped market opportunities. Also, growing a firm’s resource bundle enhances its 
value, ambiguity, in-imitability, and appropriability which should lead to better performance (Barney 
1991). When creating market-specific resources such as customer relationships, goodwill, and brand 
reputation, firms can access new customers with new or existing technology which increases firm 
growth (Danneels 2002; 2007). Similarly, when creating technology-related resources such as 
knowhow, patents, and production facilities, firms can build new products to offer to new or existing 
customers which increases firm growth. Second, creating new resources for newly entered product 
markets can increase firm value in important ways. It acts as important learning opportunity for 
firms because it increases flexibility through exploring new things and decreases the probability for 
competency traps (March 1991). Also, it creates valuable firm options for future deployment in 
newly entered product markets. It is said that a firm’s value lies in its combinative potential of 
deploying new and existing resources in its resource bundle for innovation in existing markets or for 
addressing new markets (Kogut and Kulatilaka 2001).  Therefore, we hypothesize the following.  
H1a: Resource creation increases firm growth. 
Next to creating new resources, a dynamic capability can also be deployed to leverage existing 
resources for new product markets. Leveraging existing resources when entering product markets 
means that firms can share and redeploy existing resources to offer and compete in both existing 
and newly entered product markets. For example, firms can sometimes redeploy marketing 
expertise, brands, and sales forces in multiple product markets (Capron and Hulland 1999). Also, 
customer knowledge can be shared and redeployed when understanding and serving multiple 
product needs of the same customer base (Farjoun 1998). It is said that resources that can be shared 
across different product markets are fungible (Danneels 2007; Mahoney and Pandian 1992; Penrose 
1959; Teece 1982). When trying to leverage resources across different product markets, firms are 
focused on creating fit or alignment among technology-related and market-specific resources in 
their resource bundle. Firms also (re)configure their resource bundle to achieve (higher) fit among 
their resources which is expected to positively influence firm performance (Helfat et al. 2007; 
Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland, and Gilbert 2011; Teece 2007).  
We argue that both resource leverage related to a firm’s diversification activity in the focal time 
period, and the level of resource fit related to the level of a firm’s diversification across product 
markets can enhance firm growth. Resource fit signifies the relevance of a firm’s resource bundle to 
target and compete in the various product markets in its product market portfolio. Higher resource 
fit means a higher overlap among the resources needed for a firm’s various product markets and 
thus refers to a higher relatedness among product markets in a firm’s product market portfolio. 
Higher overlap indicates a firm possesses more of the resources that are important to offering 
particular products, and lacks less of the resources that are vital to offering its products. That 
increases its resource bundle’s overall effectiveness. Higher overlap also indicates that a firm’s 
resource bundle is more relevant for competing in its product markets. It means a firm’s resources 
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are more helpful in underpinning its products and can be leveraged more often, and that the firm is 
less over-resourced with irrelevant resources.  
We discuss three main advantages of higher resource fit that can add to firm growth. First, there 
is a learning advantage. Higher resource fit implies that firms can use similar or related technical, 
managerial or customer knowledge when targeting and competing in their markets. Building upon 
relevant and complete market knowledge, firms have to learn less and can learn faster when 
entering a new market. This learning advantage can lead firms to capture the growth potential 
associated with the new market faster and more effectively. For example, research on industry 
diversification shows resource and knowledge similarities between diversifiers’ original and target 
industries (Farjoun 1994; Montgomery and Hariharan 1991). Diversifying entry is influenced by 
resource relatedness (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt 1991). Also, there is a positive relationship 
between resource relatedness and diversification performance (Kor and Leblebici 2005; Levinthal 
and Wu 2010). For example, research on international market entry suggests that the expected and 
actual performance of a firm in a new market can depend on learning advantages in the form of 
near-market knowledge and managerial experience in similar countries (Barkema, Bell, and Pennings 
1996; Gielens and Dekimpe 2001; Gielens and Dekimpe 2007; Johnson and Tellis 2008; Mitra and 
Golder 2002). Another example is that when redeploying technological knowledge in new markets, 
serving customers in the newly entered markets is often different from serving existing customers 
(Danneels 2007). However, when the newly entered market is very similar to a firm’s existing 
markets, customers can be similar to existing customers or existing customers can even be present 
in both new and existing markets. Firms are then able to redeploy existing customer relationships 
and customer knowledge.  
Second, there is an efficiency advantage. Previous research shows that striving for fit can have 
measurable efficiency consequences (Peteraf and Reed 2007). We discuss two efficiency advantages 
from resource fit that can have implications for firm growth. First, possessing only relevant resources 
means that a firm is not over-resourced with irrelevant ones. Over-resourcing is unproductive and 
can even be counter-productive when resources hinder each other. Irrelevant resources decrease a 
firm’s ability to capture growth opportunities fast. Irrelevant resources do not help firms competing 
in their markets. However, they add to a firm’s cost base, and slow down identification and 
development of relevant resources, because they also demand time and efforts for development, 
maintenance, and/or divestment. Second, fungible resources that are relevant across several 
product markets can add to a firm’s efficiency. Firms can often leverage existing, fungible resources 
across different markets. Resource leverage has been linked to growth (Helfat and Raubitschek 
2000). Fully exploiting available resources’ fungibility means that firms can capture growth 
opportunities faster because they do not have to create all resources needed to compete in a 
particular product market. Firms often diversify to utilize excess resource capacity and to benefit 
from economies of scope when the demand for the services from these input factors is limited and 
an efficient factor market is absent (Kor and Leblebici 2005; Penrose 1959; Rumelt 1982; Teece 
1982). That way, firms capture efficiencies through exploiting available resources over a larger 
product market portfolio. It implies that firms capture all possible growth potential related to their 
existing resource bundle.  
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Third, there is a complementarity advantage. High resource fit implies having more 
complementary resources. If two resources are aligned and relevant to each other, they strengthen 
each other and are said to be complementary. The value of two complementary resources combined 
is more than the sum of their individual values (Milgrom and Roberts 1990; Milgrom and Roberts 
1995). A higher combined value of a firm’s resources refers to a higher effectiveness of the firm’s 
resources in underpinning its market offering. A higher value of its resources can enlarge the size of 
the potential market and subsequently the firm’s potential growth. Moreover, if a firm has a more 
complete set of complementary resources, especially market-related complementary resources, it is 
better equipped to appropriate the value it created (Teece 1986). Also, including more 
complementarities among resources increases the difficulty for competitors to imitate (Rivkin 2000). 
Resources’ value, appropriability and in-imitability contribute to the firm’s ability to capture growth 
opportunities.  
We argued that both resource leverage which is related to diversification activity, and the level 
of resource fit which is related to diversification level can enhance firm growth. Therefore, we 
hypothesize the following.  
H1b: Resource leverage increases firm growth.  
H1c: Resource fit increases firm growth.  
However, complementarities and fit can change over time. Previous research indicates that 
complementary relationships among a firm’s resources or activities can change due to industry 
evolutions such as radical technological innovations, changing consumer trends, and shocks across 
distribution channels (Lee et al. 2010; Porter and Siggelkow 2008; Rothaermel and Hill 2005; 
Siggelkow 2001; Tripsas 1997). Research on fit has long held a static orientation applying a cross-
sectional approach. However, there is increasing demand for more dynamics (Miles and Snow 1994; 
Venkatraman 1989; Zajac et al. 2000). Recent empirical studies on fit taking dynamics into account 
include Lee et al. (2010) and Peteraf and Reed (2007; 2008), amongst others.  
Within a single industry, market structuration leads to changes in complementary relations (Li 
and Greenwood 2004). Market structuration is the process whereby initially separate market niches 
mature into ‘related’ market niches with supporting institutional infrastructures. The relatedness of 
market niches is a function of social processes and beyond the control of individual firms. The social 
processes involved are inter-firm learning (e.g., through competitive imitation, personnel flows, 
trade associations, etc.), creation of support structures (e.g., lawyers, suppliers of raw material, 
venture capitalists, etc.), and legitimization (e.g., through market analyst publications). The benefits 
of market structuration are collective, but firms obviously need to be present in market niches to 
profit from their relatedness. Li and Greenwood (2004) state that  the greater the number of firms 
concurrently operating in the same market niches, the more related that set of market niches 
becomes due to an increased efficiency and legitimacy of that particular market niche portfolio. It is 
based on the notion that markets are not ‘out there’, but are cognitively constructed by the 
interactive behaviours of producers (Harrison 1981). In this study, we take product markets as 
market niches. Because market structuration increases product market relatedness and thus a firm’s 
resource bundle relevance for underpinning its product market portfolio, we hypothesize that 
market structuration positively influences firm growth. 
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H1d: Market structuration increases firm growth.  
1.3.3 Resource creation and resource leverage: a paradox 
There seems to be a paradox though in simultaneously attempting to accomplish resource 
creation and resource leverage. On the one hand, resource leverage focuses on exploiting existing 
resources, creating efficiencies among existing resources, and building more co-specialization, 
linkages, and fit among resources. Focusing on resource fit stimulates structure and inertia among 
resources which hurts a firm’s ability to create new resources. On the other hand, resource creation 
focuses on exploring new resources that also need integration with other, existing resources. That 
demands flexibility among resources to (temporarily) de-link existing, co-specialized resources which 
hurts a firm’s resource fit. We posit there is a paradox such that both resource creation and resource 
leverage can add to growth, but also hurt each other. Not acknowledging this paradox can confound 
performance outcomes in two important ways. First, adding resources can have a positive, direct 
growth effect, but can negatively influence resource fit which results in a negative, indirect growth 
effect. For example, even given the large number of customers who are familiar with buying their 
computer over the internet after the arrival of Dell in the PC industry, adding a direct sales channel 
over the internet presented challenges for HP because it was incompatible with its extensive 
network of distributors. A direct internet channel would bring additional sales, but would at the 
same time demotivate and upset its distribution network and thereby have a negative impact on 
HP’s performance. Second, leveraging resources and increasing resource fit can have a positive, 
direct growth effect, but could restrict resource creation which can have a negative, indirect growth 
effect. For example, an airline buying and operating only one type of aircraft benefits from 
standardizing training and maintenance needs. However, it also limits the airline’s ability to adjust to 
changing customer demands in terms of in-flight accommodation and long- versus short-haul flights.  
To describe and understand why this paradox between resource creation and resource leverage 
emerges, we look at different constraints within firms.  
Organizational learning constraints 
Organizational learning is constrained. Organizations learn by focusing on either exploration or 
exploitation (March 1991). Exploitation involves using the resources a firm already has and 
exploration leads to adding new resources (Sitkin and Sutcliffe 1994). However, applying both 
learning modes simultaneously is extremely hard to do for at least two reasons. First, exploration 
and exploitation have contradicting implications with regard to breaking and creating linkages 
among resources (Danneels 2002). For example, when entering new markets, firms are focused on 
exploring and creating new market-related resources which involves de-linking existing market-
related resources from existing complementary, technology-related resources. De-linking 
complementary resources harms resources’ fit and implies moving away from a focus on resource 
configuration. When exploiting existing markets, firms are focused on integrating existing resources 
and coordinating co-specialization by (re-)linking resources to create fit which implies moving away 
from creating resources.  
Second, exploration and exploitation are nested learning experiences that can substitute each 
other (Levinthal and March 1993). Being nested means that learning occurs at different but 
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interrelated levels simultaneously. For example, a business firm learns both which markets to enter 
and how to effectively compete in these markets. But increasingly learning how to compete 
effectively in existing markets decreases the need to explore new markets, and vice versa. Because 
of their nested relationship, exploration and exploitation can substitute each other. For example, 
refining an existing technology substitutes for identifying a better one. And creating close ties with 
existing customers substitutes for exploring new customer relationships. Therefore, increasing 
resource fit substitutes for finding new, better resources. Similarly, finding new, better resources 
substitutes for the need to increase resource fit. 
Managerial capacity constraints 
Managerial capacity is constrained in several ways. First, managers have only a limited amount 
of time to divide between resource creation and resource configuration (amongst other things). 
Focusing on both can thus be difficult. Limited managerial capacity with respect to time is identified 
as a limitation to firm growth (Penrose 1959).  
Second, a manager’s resource cognition can be a limitation to growth. Resource cognition 
involves identifying resources and assessing their fungibility potential (Danneels 2011). Managerial 
beliefs and mental models underpin a manager’s cognition and decision-making (Adner and Helfat 
2003). But managers’ mental models and beliefs often fall victim to inertia (Hambrick and Mason 
1984). Because managers have an important role to play in organizational learning (Mom, Van Den 
Bosch, and Volberda 2007), their mental inertia might also not be beneficial to balancing exploration 
and exploitation activities. Previous research shows that firms focusing on internal fit and existing 
mental models have difficulties creating and configuring new resources, especially when their 
internal fit relationships are stable (Siggelkow 2001). Also, focusing on tight fit among resources can 
hold firms captive in a reinforcing feedback loop between their actions and cognition without 
enough attention for resource creation (Danneels 2003).  
Third, high resource fit implies more complementarities among resources in a firm’s resource 
bundle that can render managers unwilling to change for at least three reasons. First, highly 
complementary systems are well-oiled, efficient systems in which change seems unnecessary. When 
changing one or more elements, one can not only loose more than the individual value of that 
element (Milgrom and Roberts 1995), but it is also difficult to assess upfront the impact on other 
complementary relationships in the system (Porter and Siggelkow 2008). Also, previous simulation 
work shows that changing complementary systems in search for a higher fit implies a performance 
drop at least in the short-term which is not appealing to managers, even when ultimately resulting 
perhaps in higher performance (Levinthal 1997). The more complementarities present in a firm’s 
current system, the higher and steeper the short term drop in performance. Second, highly fitted 
systems have many ambiguities making it difficult to distinguish among different elements. That 
makes it hard to adapt or replicate that system (Hoopes and Madsen 2008; Rivkin 2000; Teece 
2007). The more complementary relationships in a firm’s resource bundle, the more difficult to 
disentangle which resources are affected by what change. Also, the more complementarities among 
resources in a resource bundle, the more value can be attributed to their combination relative to 
their individual contribution. That makes it harder for managers to make a calculated guess on what 
resources are driving performance in what manner which results in higher fear to make wrong 
decisions. Third, highly fitted systems consist of complementary relationships that cannot be 
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changed easily. For example, in service firms, partners’ knowledge of particular clients is used in 
combination with the firm’s specialized knowledge to perform services for its clients (Helfat 1997; 
Hitt et al. 2001). Client-specific knowledge and firm’s specialized knowledge are said to be co-
specialized (Teece 1986). Building these types of client relationships is based on experience and 
accumulated efforts, and demands time and commitment. Also, client-specific information is often 
not easily transferred to other relationships. Moreover, partners are human resources that are 
constrained by time and space. Therefore, opportunity costs and co-specialization of complementary 
resources constrain firms in their ability to change.  
Structural constraints 
Organizational structures are constrained. Rigidity within organizational structures arises when 
firms try to accommodate competing goals of organizational efficiency and flexibility (Thompson 
1967). Striving for both efficiency and flexibility within organizations creates negative tensions that 
can hurt performance (Brown and Eisenhardt 1998; Brown and Eisenhardt 1997; Eisenhardt et al. 
2010; Tushman and O'Reilly III 1996; Uzzi 1997). Fit among resources bears upon stability and 
continuity to create and maintain the appropriate linkages that bind them together. For example, 
one is cautious changing cross-departmental task forces and middle managers linking R&D and 
marketing too suddenly and too heavily given a potential loss of precious knowledge on 
complementary resources such as valuable market knowledge or distribution channel relationships. 
Also, such organizational knowledge is typically not built overnight but requires some time 
investment. However, changing the linkages is needed when integrating new resources (Taylor and 
Helfat 2009). Resource creation involves temporarily delinking and re-linking resources (Danneels 
2007). Delinking and re-linking implies a temporal misfit, i.e., a decrease in fit. Although stability and 
change might be complementary in the long run, they are likely to be conflicting in the short-run 
(Farjoun 2010). The more a firm is focused on resource creation, the more it breaks up valuable 
linkages, the less time it has to develop appropriate linkages and the less it can develop 
complementarities. The more a firm is focused on resource fit, the less it wants to break up valuable 
linkages and the more it wants to develop and maintain appropriate linkages and resulting 
complementarities. Based on previous discussion we hypothesize the following.  
H2: Resource leverage decreases resource creation. 
H3: Resource creation decreases resource leverage.  
1.3.4 Controls 
We control for the following firm level variables. First, we control for firm age and firm size 
which can influence growth (Delmar, Davidsson, and Gartner 2003). Young and small firms are 
expected to grow faster than more mature, larger firms (Bahadir, Bharadwaj, and Parzen 2009). Also, 
firm size can influence both the relatedness and performance of firms (Tanriverdi and Lee 2008). 
Large firms offer more extensive product lines (Sorenson 2000), have more synergy exploitation 
opportunities, and suffer more from managerial diseconomies (Nayyar 1993). Firm age is associated 
with within-industry diversification strategies and firms’ performance (Stern and Henderson 2004). 
The effect of firm size and age on resource creation and resource leverage is less predictable, but we 
expect an effect because older and bigger firms tend to have higher inertia.  
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Second, we control for firms with a strategy focused on being a generalist versus attaining 
specialist status in their respective product markets. Firms largely focused on specialist status could 
capture higher margins leading to higher growth. However, their specialist focus means they are less 
focused on diversification. Not controlling for these differences in product market strategy between 
generalists and specialists could introduce bias in our results.  
Third, inorganic growth is controlled for by including a dummy indicating whether a firm has 
been part of a merger or acquisition in the past two years. This dummy also controls for possible 
growth effects by deploying a dynamic capability related to accessing external resources through a 
merger or acquisition (Danneels 2011). 
Fourth,  competitive intensity is added to the model, as it is an important variable in industrial 
organization theory to explain firm growth (Bahadir et al. 2009). Firms experiencing higher 
competitive intensity in their various product markets have lower growth compared with firms in 
less competitively intensive product markets (Ang 2008). Firms under higher competitive pressure 
can also feel pushed to enter new product markets in search for less competition and the need to 
increase their resource fit to enhance their resource bundle’s relevance. Adding competitive 
intensity also controls for possible distorting performance effects of within-industry diversification 
due to multi-market competition (Li and Greenwood 2004).  
Fifth, we add the influence of lagged resource fit on both resource creation and resource 
leverage. A high level of resource fit could make it harder for firms to further increase fit. The higher 
a firm’s level of resource fit, the less opportunities might be available for related market entry. Also, 
we can expect firms to go after highly related markets first. For example, the Uppsala model of 
international market entry states that firms internationalize first towards more related markets that 
are similar to their home country (Johanson and Vahlne 1977). Therefore, we expect that lagged 
resource fit negatively influences resource creation and resource leverage.  
We also control for country and year fixed effects. 
 
1.4 Data and variable operationalization 
1.4.1 Data 
We test our hypotheses in a single-industry in a service context. We collect data on individual 
market research agencies that are member of ESOMAR, a worldwide industry organization. Our data 
source is a set of yearly directories covering the period 1990-2005. It comprises information on 
firms’ general characteristics and their presence in 33 product markets. Product markets in the 
market research industry can broadly refer to particular research solutions (advertising research, 
pricing studies, etc.), market sectors (financial services, retail/wholesale, etc.), or research methods 
(focus groups, telephone interviews, etc.). The result is an unbalanced data set with 3,091 
observations from in total 275 firms. Our unit of analysis is the firm or country-level subsidiary of 
multi-country firms. The data set contains Belgian, Dutch, and U.K. firms. Because we have an 
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unbalanced data set based on a near-census sample from a major industry organization, chances for 
sample selection bias are low.  
1.4.2 Variable operationalization 
Firm growth is measured as the two-year rate of firm size growth in terms of number of 
employees (See equation 1). We take the natural log of number of employees. We focus on two-year 
growth to reflect the long-term character of entering product markets. We focus on growth in 
number of employees instead of sales or assets for the following reasons. First, in professional 
service firms such as in consulting, law, or accounting, human capital is the most important form of 
capital (Kor and Leblebici 2005; Malos and Campion 1995). Firm growth is then most essentially 
captured by the growth in number of employees (Weinzimmer, Nystrom, and Freeman 1998). 
Second, deployment of resources and exploiting market opportunities is primarily embedded in the 
skills and tacit knowledge of a firm’s employees (Sirmon and Hitt 2003). Third, different growth 
indicators based on for example employees versus sales, are attributes of the same underlying 
theoretical concepts of growth and therefore tend to be correlated (Weinzimmer et al. 1998).   
GROWTH,	,
 = (),,		(),,(),,         (1) 
Resource creation is measured as the number of actual product market entries that a firm 
undertakes over a period of two years. With every product market entry, a firm needs to build 
certain market-related resources (e.g., knowledge of customer needs and preferences, purchasing 
procedures, sales access to customers, and customer goodwill), or technology-related resources 
(e.g., knowledge of new product technology, appropriate production processes), or both (Danneels 
2002; 2007). The more markets a firm enters, the more such resources that need to be created. 
However, there will also be some existing resources that a firm can leverage when entering new 
product markets (Penrose 1959). For example, a firm can offer new products to existing customers 
while leveraging existing customer-related resources, a firm can offer existing products to new 
customers while leveraging existing technology-related resources, and a firm can always leverage 
existing supporting resources such as financial resources and organizational culture when offering 
new products to new customers. We outline in the next section how we measure resource leverage 
by making use of the relatedness among various product markets and a firm’s specific choices what 
markets to enter. Notwithstanding that resource creation and resource leverage might overlap 
partly due to the way we try to measure them, from our Pearson correlations table (See table 2) we 
see that our measures for resource creation and resource leverage measure separate things and are 
different enough to make inference on their effects.  
We measure resource leverage, average level of resource fit, and market structuration based on 
a fine-grained measure of product market relatedness in combination with a firm’s product market 
presence and entry choices. We measure product market relatedness as follows. Inspired by 
previous work by Lee (2008) and Bryce and Winter (2009), we develop a product market relatedness 
index based on product markets’ joint occurrence within the industry. The product market 
relatedness index for the combination of product markets x and z is given in Equation 2. The 
relatedness between product markets’ x and z is based on their joint occurrence in the product 
market portfolios of all firms in all countries in year t (See equation 2). P,,	,
 is a dummy indicating 
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firm i’s presence in product market x in country j in year t. In our data set a market research agency 
can be present in at least 1 and maximum 33 product markets. From the industry-level product 
market relatedness index we calculate a firm-specific product market portfolio relatedness as the 
sum of the relatedness among all product markets present in a firm’s product market portfolio, 
which signifies the fit of the resources in its resource bundle that underpins its product market 
portfolio. Equation 3 shows the calculation of a firm’s resource fit based on product market portfolio 
relatedness where  !"#,$,%& represents the product market portfolio of firm i in country j in year t. 
R,',
 =		 ∑ ∑ 	
*+,,,*,,,,∑ *+,,,-./0 		
1/02/0
3∑ ∑ +,,,1/02/0 3∑ ∑ ,,,,1/02/0
  with i,j = 1,2,…,33    (2) 
FIT,	,
 =	∑ ∑ R,',
6'	789		:	 ;<.,=,>&'	:	 ;<.,=,>& 	      (3) 
From the relatedness among product markets and a firm’s product market choices, we 
operationalize our key variables. We measure resource leverage as the change in a firm’s product 
market portfolio relatedness induced by that firm’s diversification activity in the period we assess its 
growth performance (See equation 4). The relatedness among product markets in a firm’s product 
market portfolio reflects the relevance of the firm’s resource bundle to underpin that product 
market portfolio. When entering product markets, i.e., diversification activity, a firm that increases 
its product market portfolio relatedness also increases its resource bundle relevance and resource fit 
which means the firm can leverage existing resources for the new markets entered. Because we only 
want to include effects on resource leverage by the focal firm’s decisions, we exclude possible 
market structuration effects on a firm’s overall product market portfolio relatedness and use the 
lagged level of product markets’ relatedness.  
We measure a firm’s average level of resource fit as the two-year average level of its total 
product market relatedness captured by its product market portfolio choices (See equation 5). We 
use total product market relatedness instead of number of product markets in which the firm is 
present (although they are highly related) as our measure for level of resource fit, because the 
former is more closely related to a firm’s resource bundle and the fit among the resources in the 
bundle.  
We measure market structuration as a firm’s change in total relatedness driven by changes at 
aggregated industry level (cf. R,',
 is measured at industry level) (See equation  6). Our measure for 
market structuration reflects the change in a firm’s total product market relatedness that is driven 
beyond a firm’s own control, i.e., it is driven by all firms in the industry and their choices with 
respect to their product market portfolio.  
 
LEVERAGE,	,
 = 
∑ ∑ R,',
C6'	789		:	 ;<.,=,>&D	:	 ;<.,=,>& − ∑ ∑ R,',
C6'	789		:	 ;<.,=,>&'	:	 ;<.,=,>&   (4) 
AVGFIT,	,
 =		∑ ∑ F+,,,+G,	HIJ	+	K	LMN.,=,>O,	K	LMN.,=,>O 			∑ ∑ F+,,,0+G,	HIJ	+	K	LMN.,=,>0O,	K	LMN.,=,>0OC   (5) 
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STRUCTURATION,	,
 =  ∑ ∑ R,',
6'	789		:	 ;<.,=,>&'	:	 ;<.,=,>& 	− 	∑ ∑ R,',
C6'	789		:	 ;<.,=,>&'	:	 ;<.,=,>&
            (6) 
Our approach for inferring resource bundle relevance and resource fit based on a firm’s product 
market portfolio choices aggregated at industry level has several advantages. First, we develop a 
time-varying, dynamic approach. Having a dynamic, time-varying relatedness measure is important 
as relatedness and industries can change over time (e.g., Lee et al. 2010; Li and Greenwood 2004; 
Tanriverdi and Lee 2008). Also, research on fit increasingly demands longitudinal approaches for 
measuring fit (e.g., Peteraf and Reed 2007; 2008). Moreover, following the large literature stream on 
dynamic capabilities, it has become imperative to consider a firm’s resource bundle dynamic (e.g., 
Helfat et al. 2007; Teece 2007; Teece et al. 1997). Not only resources can change, but also a resource 
bundle’s configuration can be altered (e.g., Danneels 2011; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). Second, we 
build continuous measures. Within-industry diversification is assumed to be related, so within-
industry relatedness embodies degree of relatedness which is best measured continuously (Li and 
Greenwood 2004). Third, we infer resource bundle relevance and resource fit indirectly from a firm’s 
product market portfolio. Indirect measures have important advantages that increase external 
validity (Bryce and Winter 2009). We don’t have to exhaustively list all individual resources possibly 
relevant because we infer a firm’s resource bundle’s aggregated relevance based on product market 
presence. Product market presence is much more visible than individual resources. There is a much 
lower chance of neglecting relevant product markets instead of neglecting relevant individual 
resources. Also, we don’t have to make any assumptions regarding the form of fit relationships 
among resources because we infer fit merely from the joint occurrence of product markets across 
firms. Moreover, we avoid a tautological approach when measuring relatedness as it is not based on 
performance. Previous research uses product adoption patterns to measure fit (Arora 1996; Athey 
and Stern 1998). In a similar vein, we use product market entry patterns. Measuring relatedness 
based on joint occurrence of product market presence across firms is also consistent with the 
conceptualization of intra-firm business activity coherence, such as Teece’s (1994) ‘survivor 
principle’, which dictates that economic competition will lead to the disappearance of relatively 
inefficient organizational forms. The survivor principle states that if corporations engage in activity A 
almost always engage in activity B, that these activities are highly related. Also, it is in line with prior 
research stating that whether relatedness actually occurs depends upon the density of firms 
involved (Li and Greenwood 2004).  
Firm level control variables are measured as follows. Firm age is the natural log of years since 
firm foundation. Firm size is the two-year lagged natural log of number of employees. A firm’s 
generalist focus is the two-year average of 1 minus the number of self-claimed product market 
specializations relative to the number of product markets in which the firm is present. We include a 
dummy indicating whether a firm has been part of a merger or acquisition in the last two years. 
Competitive intensity is measured as the two-year average of the Hirsch-Herfindahl Index of all the 
product markets in which the firm is present in a particular year and country based on number of 
employees. We also include dummies to control for country and year fixed effects.  
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1.5 Model estimation and specification 
We estimate a system of three equations specifying respectively firm growth, resource creation 
and resource leverage as dependent variables. Resource creation and resource leverage also occur 
as endogenous, independent variables. Because we have a system of equations including 
endogenous variables we use a three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation procedure (Greene 2003; 
Hayashi 2000). Ordinary least squares (OLS) would produce inconsistent parameter estimates 
because of the endogeneity among variables. Error terms across equations are also correlated, thus 
a 3SLS approach is more efficient than a two-stage least squares approach.  
A 3SLS approach consists of three stages. First, we regress our endogenous variables resource 
creation and resource leverage on a set of exogenous instrumental variables being their own lags 
and the lagged scope of the firm. We use appropriate instrumental variables that are correlated with 
their endogenous variables, much less correlated with other endogenous variables and the 
dependent variable firm growth, and not included in the main equation. We use fixed-effects 
regression to account for firm-specific unobserved heterogeneity and within-firm correlation across 
observations over time. Second, we replace our endogenous variables with their predicted values 
from the first stage and estimate our three equations separately. We calculate cross-equation 
correlation among errors. Third, we estimate our system of equations simultaneously while 
accounting for the cross-equation error correlation.  
We include a sample selection correction in our growth equation for two reasons. First, we want 
to control for non-survival. Second, we control for the fact that failure of firms precludes their ability 
to grow whatever decisions they might take. A selection correction variable eliminates an important 
form of omitted variable bias that can create inconsistent estimates (Greene 2003). We model the 
probability that a firm does not survive till next year by estimating a logistic regression that accounts 
for repeated firm observations. We regress the odds of firm failure on resource creation and 
resource leverage. When correcting for selection bias it is also recommended to include an 
instrumental variable that is not present in the main equation (Puhani 2000). As instrumental 
variable we use a dummy indicating whether the firm is active in multiple countries. We include the 
predicted odds of non-survival  from our logistic regression in our system’s growth equation.  
The three equations below together with Figure 1 detail our model specification. The unit of 
analysis is firm-country level. Subscripts refer to firm i, country j, and year t. We use lagged resource 
fit as control variable in our resource creation and resource leverage equations. Reasons include the 
following. First, an already high level of fit could make it harder for firms to increase it. Second, when 
regressing a change variable it is normal practice to include the base level as control variable. Third, 
we can expect firms to go after highly related markets first. Fourth, the higher a firm’s product 
market portfolio relatedness, the less opportunities might be available for future, related market 
entry. We also include lagged market structuration as control variable in our resource creation 
equation. It is possible that an aggregated industry-level confirmation of previous managerial 
judgment gives managers more confidence for new research creation.  
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Growth equation: 
GROWTH,	,
	 = α0+ α1 CREATIONT ,	,
 + α2 LEVERAGET ,	,
+ α3 AVGFIT,	,
	 + α4 STRUCTURATION,	,
 + 
α5 SURVT ,	,
 + α6 AGE,	,
+ α7 SIZE,	,
C+ α8 GENERALIST,	,
 + α9 MA,	,
+ α10 CI,	,
  + ∑ W$	COUNTRY$$:	{Z[\]#^_,`[%a[b\cdef}  + ∑ W% 	YEAR%Chhi%jkki + ε,#,$,% 
Resource creation equation:
 
CREATION,	,
 = β0 + β1 LEVERAGET ,	,
 + β2 FIT,	,
C + β3 STRUCTURATION,	,
C+ β4 AGE,	,
 +  
β5 SIZE,	,
C+ β6 GENERALIST,	,
+ β7 MA,	,
+ β8 CI,	,
+ εC,#,$,% 
Resource leverage equation: 
LEVERAGE,	,
 = γ0+ γ1 CREATIONT m,	,
 + γ2 FITm,	,
C + γ3 AGEm,	,
 + γ4 SIZEm,	,
C+ γ5 GENERALISTm,	,
+ 
γ6 MAm,	,
+ γ7 CIm,	,
+ εn,#,$,% 
 
GROWTH,	,
	= firm growth; CREATION,	,
	 = resource creation; LEVERAGE,	,
 = resource 
leverage;  AVGFIT,	,
	= average level of resource fit; STRUCTURATION,	,
 = market 
structuration; SURVT ,	,
 = predicted odds of firm failure; FIT,	,
C = two-year lagged resource 
fit; AGE,	,
 = Firm age; SIZE,	,
C= two-year lagged firm size; GENERALIST,	,
= focus on 
being a generalist versus specialist; MA,	,
= Merger & Acquisition dummy; CI,	,
= 
Competitive Intensity; COUNTRY$  = Country dummies; YEAR%= Year dummies  
‘Please insert figure 1 about here’ 
 
1.6 Results and discussion 
1.6.1 Results 
Tables 1 and 2 show the main descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for all dependent, 
independent, control and instrumental variables. There is no sign of multicollinearity issues.  
‘Insert table 1 and 2 about here’ 
Table 3 shows the standardized coefficient estimates, standard errors and p-values for all three 
equations. We also report the importance of each estimate based on its relative squared 
standardized coefficient in percentages (RSSCP). We observe the following.  
First, results from the growth equation support hypotheses H1a, H1c, and H1d that resource 
creation, level of resource fit, and market structuration positively influence firm growth. Our results 
do not indicate a significant growth effect of resource leverage, i.e., no support for H1b. Variables 
related to resource bundle relevance and resource fit have an accumulated RSSCP value of more 
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than 20%, whereas resource creation has 8% RSSCP. A higher RSSCP refers to a higher relative 
impact of the respective variables. Control variables are in line with expectations. There are negative 
growth influences from the odds of non-survival, firm age and firm size. Conducting a merger or 
acquisition positively influences firm growth. Firm size is an important determinant of firm size 
growth (RSSCP: 42%). 
Second, results from the resource creation equation support hypothesis H2. Resource leverage 
has a negative influence on resource creation. Its RSSCP value is more than 20%. Also, we see 
significant control variables. A firm’s lagged resource fit negatively influences resource creation 
whereas a lagged market structuration positively influences resource creation. We note that firm 
age, firm size and a focus on being a generalist positively influence resource creation.  
Third, results from the resource leverage equation show that resource creation negatively 
influences resource leverage which supports hypothesis H3. All control variables also show 
significant results. The control variable lagged level of resource fit negatively influences resource 
leverage with an RSSCP value of more than 78%. Firm age, firm size, focus on being a generalist, and 
a merger or acquisition dummy positively influence resource leverage. Competitive intensity has a 
negative influence.  
In sum, our results support almost all our hypotheses. There are positive growth consequences 
of resource creation, level of resource fit, and market structuration. We also observe the negative 
reciprocity between resource creation and resource leverage which, in combination with direct 
growth effects of resource creation and level of resource fit, constitutes a paradox when deploying a 
dynamic capability.  
‘Insert table 3 about here’ 
However, different firms might cope differently with the observed paradox when deploying their 
dynamic capability. Table 4 and 5 show model results when investigating firms’ dynamic capability 
heterogeneity along different contingencies. We focus on important contingencies such as a firm’s 
product market scope, age and focus on being a generalist versus specialist. We choose scope 
because experience in exercising a dynamic capability might add to a firm’s knowledge on how to 
effectively and efficiently exercise that capability. Previous research indicates for example that more 
frequent deployment of dynamic capability can add to their learning (Zott 2003) and that underlying 
routines and processes of capabilities work better the more they have been exercised (Helfat et al. 
2007). We choose age and generalist focus because both can have important but different effects on 
firm inertia. For example, routines become more entrenched as an organization ages which can 
increase inertia (Hannan 1998; Hannan, Polos, and Carroll 2004; Nelson and Winter 1982). Also, age 
and generalist focus are significant in both our resource creation and resource leverage equations.  
For each contingency we categorize firms in a low versus high category based on the sample 
median for specific country-year combinations. We further estimate in all equations the effects of 
our main variables for each category. Split-sample estimation was not preferred because of the high 
loss of information due to small samples and the inability to estimate control variables across 
categories. We prefer categories instead of continuous measures for our contingencies because of 
the lower complexity and lower multicollinearity when not having to include three-way interactions.  
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Table 4 shows the standardized estimates, standard errors and p-values when estimating our 
three equations while categorizing firms based on a high versus low generalist focus and a narrow 
versus broad market scope. We observe the following. First, resource creation is significantly adding 
to growth only when the firm has a narrow product market scope. Second, we see that firms with a 
broader scope and thus higher experience in terms of deploying their dynamic capability deal better 
with the observed reciprocity in the sense that they have a significantly positive influence of 
resource creation on resource leverage and a significantly negative but low effect of resource 
leverage on resource creation. Third, results show a significantly negative effect of lagged resource 
fit on both resource creation and resource leverage across all categories. Fourth, having a high focus 
on being a generalist together with a narrow scope is a firm’s worst position with low growth and a 
significantly and highly negative reciprocity between resource creation and resource leverage.  
Table 5 shows the standardized estimates, standard errors and p-values when estimating our 
three equations while categorizing firms based on a high versus low age and a narrow versus broad 
market scope. We observe the following. First, resource creation is again only directly adding to 
growth when the firm has a narrow product market scope. Second, firms with a broader scope have 
again a significantly positive influence of resource creation on resource leverage and a significantly 
but low negative effect of resource leverage on resource creation. Third, results show a significantly 
negative effect of lagged resource fit on both resource creation and resource fit across all categories. 
Fourth, having a high age together with a narrow scope is a firm’s worst position with low growth 
and a significantly and highly negative reciprocity between resource creation and resource leverage.  
‘Insert table 4 and 5 about here’ 
1.6.2 Robustness checks 
We conducted two important robustness checks. First, it is essential to check results for 
different growth specifications. We check for other growth measures such as absolute change in firm 
size, mean-centred firm size growth, market share growth in terms of firm size and absolute level of 
firm size, but there are no meaningful differences with results from our main model. Second, growth 
implications of resource creation and level of diversification are robust when leaving out 
methodological adaptations for endogeneity, simultaneity and selection correction. However, the 
negative reciprocity between resource creation and resource leverage disappears. That is obvious 
because these decisions are taken simultaneously when deciding which new markets to enter. Only 
leaving out the selection correction control variable does not change our reciprocity results 
meaningfully. 
1.6.3 Theoretical and methodological contributions 
Our most important theoretical and methodological contributions are related to the 
diversification literature and the literature on dynamic capabilities. First, we contribute to the 
diversification literature. We provide theoretical and empirical underpinnings for a link between 
within-industry diversification and growth performance by including arguments and measures from 
the RBV and dynamic capabilities literature. For example, important arguments include the close link 
between resources and products, resource fungibility, and the paradox between resource creation 
and resource leverage when deploying a dynamic capability. Also, we develop an adequate 
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relatedness measure that links diversification with underlying resource logic to explain the outcomes 
of diversification. We show how an indirect method based on a firm’s product market portfolio can 
be applied to measure product market relatedness that reveals information on a firm’s resource 
bundle relevance and fit. Besides being indirect, other important characteristics of our relatedness 
measure are that it is time-varying, continuous, and non-tautological. Moreover, we not only include 
firms’ diversification level, but also firms’ diversification activity. Resource creation and resource 
leverage are related to a firm’s own diversification activity and resource fit is related to a firm’s level 
of diversification. Our study thus incorporates both static and dynamic aspects of diversification and 
is therefore better suited to link diversification to growth performance. Also, we empirically identify 
market structuration as an important new growth dimension of diversification. Market structuration 
is related to the industry’s overall diversification activity. Although market structuration is beyond a 
firm’s control, it has implications for a firm’s growth when diversifying. The main findings are that 
resource creation, resource fit, and market structuration are important determinants of firm growth 
when diversifying across product markets within an industry. However, to understand growth 
performance of firms, it is key to acknowledge the negative reciprocity between resource creation 
and resource leverage which we identify as a core tension when deploying a dynamic capability.  
Second, we contribute to the dynamic capabilities literature. We contribute to the theoretical 
and empirical questions whether and how dynamic capabilities influence firm growth. Some have 
argued that growth happens to firms randomly instead of being related to intended strategic 
actions, which questions central concepts in the literature such as core competencies, managerial 
capacity constraints, and dynamic capabilities (Geroski 2000; Geroski 2005). The theory on dynamic 
capabilities suggests an influence of dynamic capability on firm growth but a widespread call for 
empirical research whether and how dynamic capability is related to firm growth is still open (Helfat 
et al. 2007). With this study, we help filling this gap in the literature and provide a common strategic 
decision context in which dynamic capability can offer guidance to growth aspirations. We show that 
firms can grow non-randomly through deploying their dynamic capability. Dynamic capability 
deployment involves resource creation to add new resources to a firm’s resource bundle, resource 
leverage to share existing resources across product markets, and resource configuration to create fit 
among a firm’s resources. Our results show that both resource creation and resource fit have a 
direct, positive influence on firm growth.  
However, our key finding here is that we identify a core paradox that is taking place when 
deploying a dynamic capability, i.e., a paradox between creating and leveraging resources. Previous 
research suggests a dynamic capability involves finding a balance between two opposing forces 
(Eisenhardt et al. 2010; Helfat et al. 2007). We build further on that by explaining and empirically 
assessing a paradox between two core processes when deploying a dynamic capability. We 
empirically show a simultaneous, negative reciprocity between resource creation and resource 
leverage which has an indirect, negative impact on firm growth. This negative reciprocity denotes a 
paradox at the heart of the dynamic capability concept. When deploying a dynamic capability, firms 
create new resources, leverage existing ones, and configure their resources to achieve fit, which 
creates positive performance consequences. However, resource creation and leverage also hurt 
each other which creates indirect, negative performance consequences. We suggest that learning, 
managerial and organizational constraints form the basis for this negative reciprocity. A firm is 
constrained by its limited learning ability to simultaneously exploit existing and explore new 
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resources. A firm’s managers are constrained by their limited time availability, and their limited and 
inert resource cognition. An organization is constrained in its limited ability to simultaneously focus 
on both flexibility and efficiency.  
However, firms that can cope with this paradox find a way for growth through a dynamic 
capability. Indeed, some firms are affected more by this paradox than others. A firm’s dynamic 
capability seems to be heterogeneous. Our results on three firm contingencies, i.e., product market 
scope, age and focus on being a generalist versus a specialist, show that firms more experienced in 
deploying their dynamic capability are less affected by the reciprocity between resource creation 
and resource leverage. But that comes only at a time when deploying that dynamic capability, i.e., 
entering a new product market, is less of an option for those firms to grow because they have 
already entered many markets. Results also show that firms should avoid a narrow product market 
scope while not being specialized in its product markets, or a narrow product market scope at a 
relatively high age.  
Our empirical results on firms’ dynamic capability heterogeneity are only a start for discussion. 
We suggest that herein lies an important and fruitful research avenue for more empirical work on 
dynamic capabilities. Previous research on microfoundations of dynamic capability can help the 
discussion. Teece (2007) identifies various routines and processes undergirding dynamic capability, 
i.e., so-called microfoundations. These microfoundations relate to resource cognition and underlying 
processes to sense and seize market opportunities and to (re)configure complete resource bundles. 
His listing of several important microfoundations can help identifying appropriate sources of a firm’s 
dynamic capability heterogeneity in function of the type of dynamic capability and the empirical 
context. Eisenhardt et al. (2010) focus on microfoundations dealing with a firm’s trade-off between 
efficiency and flexibility. They pay significant attention on how to bridge the cognitive and structural 
contradiction when simultaneously striving for efficiency and flexibility. Their listing of several ways 
how managers can deal with that contradiction can spur further empirical research on how to 
achieve performance-enhancing dynamic capability heterogeneity.  
Also, we contribute by making decisions with an impact on resources and dynamic capability 
more tangible and measurable. We show how an indirect method based on a firm’s product market 
portfolio can be applied to study a firm’s dynamic capability and measure resource fit non-
tautologically. The idea of using a firm’s product market portfolio to infer characteristics of its 
resource base is not new. Our empirical, indirect approach for measuring resource bundle relevance 
and resource fit is attractive for several reasons. First, we have a lower chance of neglecting relevant 
resources, their complementarities, and changes in their complementarities. Second, we avoid a 
tautological approach for measuring fit because we do not measure fit based on increased 
performance. Third, our indirect approach is easily applied in various contexts, across time periods 
and across firms. However, we acknowledge that our indirect approach should be complemented 
with more research trying to measure the dynamics of resources and their complementarities more 
directly. We are convinced both direct and indirect approaches are needed.  
1.6.4 Managerial contributions 
This study also offers at least two important managerial contributions. First, we provide insights 
on how to grow in a relatively ‘safe’ within-industry environment. Our results show that if managers 
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want to capture growth opportunities associated with new product market entry, they need to focus 
on three important aspects of a dynamic capability, i.e., resource creation, resource leverage, and 
the negative reciprocity between the two. New market-related or technology-specific resources 
have to be created in order to successfully target and compete in a product market. At the same 
time, managers should try to make use of fungible resources that can be shared across different 
product markets to benefit from existing knowledge, increased efficiencies and valuable 
complementarities. However, we identify and describe a core paradox when deploying a dynamic 
capability. We show that both resource creation and resource fit lead to growth, but that managers 
should be aware of the negative reciprocity between creating and leveraging resources. Our study 
helps managers identifying possible causes for these negative effects in the form of different 
constraints at different levels within the organization. We discuss constraints with respect to 
organizational learning, managerial capacity, and organizational structure. That way, our study and 
its outcomes are informative for multiple organizational functions, i.e., functions related to product 
portfolio management, resource and process management, and top management decision-making. 
Second, our methodology used is easily replicable across business units, industries, or 
environmental contexts. It provides firms with an actionable method to benefit from diversification. 
Also, we provide an easy approach for managers to build active knowledge on how their product 
market portfolio is in congruence with their available resource bundle. Our results on the influence 
of resource fit on firm growth suggests that active knowledge and management of product market 
complementarities together with benchmarking your own product market portfolio versus 
competitors’ are worthwhile things to do.  
 
1.7 Limitations and conclusion 
We conclude with our main findings. First, we show that within-industry diversification leads to 
firm growth. Second, we find that both a firm’s diversification activity and level of diversification add 
to growth, with the relative influence of level of diversification being highest. Also, we empirically 
identify an important, new dimension of diversification that increases growth, i.e., market 
structuration, being the aggregated diversification activity of all firms at industry level that has an 
influence on product market relatedness. Third, based on the RBV and dynamic capabilities 
literature, we theoretically and empirically identify underlying resource mechanisms of within-
industry diversification that lead to growth. We find that, when deploying a dynamic capability to 
diversify across product markets, resource creation and resource fit add to firm growth with 
resource fit relatively seen more influential. However, we detect and discuss a paradox when 
deploying such a dynamic capability. We observe a negative and simultaneous reciprocity between 
resource creation and resource leverage which hurts firm growth indirectly. There is firm 
heterogeneity with respect to dynamic capability’s growth consequences and internal reciprocity. 
We investigate firm heterogeneity based on three important firm contingencies. Finally, this study 
has important contributions for theory, methodology, and managerial practice.  
However, there are some limitations that deserve further attention. First, we restrict our sample 
to one particular industry and focus on within-industry diversification. It would add to the 
generalizability of our study’s results when the hypotheses are tested in other types of industries 
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and also in a cross-industry diversification context. Our measures and methodology can be easily 
applied in other industries without loss of conceptual meaning. Our choice for a single industry is 
appropriate though, because our measures for resource leverage, level of resource fit, and market 
structuration are based on product market relatedness, industry evolutions, and social processes 
which are industry-specific. Second, our focus on a firm’s product market portfolio additions to 
measure resource creation and leverage might neglect other forms of change in a firm’s resource 
bundle such as deleting resources and accessing external resources that can have an impact on firm 
growth. Integrating simultaneous firm decisions on product market exits and resource deletions 
leaves ample room for further research but is beyond the scope of this study. Accessing external 
resources through for example mergers or acquisitions is controlled for in our estimations. Third, 
previous work considers many different dimensions of a firm’s environment, such as its velocity, 
complexity, ambiguity, and unpredictability, when modelling a firm’s trade-off between efficiency 
and flexibility (Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham 2009). Also, the effect of within-industry 
diversification on firm performance is contingent upon environmental change induced by 
competitive activity (Stern and Henderson 2004). Notwithstanding we include market structuration 
that is a reflection of industry evolutions, and our country and time fixed effects are not significantly 
related to growth, further exploring the role of different dimensions of a firm’s context on the 
appropriateness of deploying a dynamic capability seems interesting. Our empirical identification 
and growth consequences of market structuration imply that market structuration is also an 
appropriate environmental dimension that needs to be taken into account in future studies.  
 
1.8 Reference list 
Adler, Paul S., Barbara Goldoftas, and David I. Levine (1999), "Flexibility versus Efficiency? A Case 
Study of Model Changeovers in the Toyota Production System," Organization Science, 10(1), 
43-68. 
Adner, Ron and Constance E. Helfat (2003), "Corporate Effects and Dynamic Managerial 
Capabilities," Strategic Management Journal, 24(10), 1011-25. 
Ang, Siah H. (2008), "Competitive Intensity and Collaboration: Impact on Firm Growth Across 
Technological Environments," Strategic Management Journal, 29(10), 1057-75. 
Arora, Ashish (1996), "Testing for Complementarities in Reduced-form Regressions: a Note," 
Economic Letters, 50(1), 51-5. 
Athey, Susan and Scott Stern (1998), "An Empirical Framework for Testing Theories about 
Complementarity in Organizational Design," Working papers - National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Baghai, Mehrdad, Sven Smit, and S. Patrick Viguerie (2007), "The Granularity of Growth," McKinsey 
Quarterly, 43(2), 40-51. 
Bahadir, S. Cem, Sundar Bharadwaj, and Michael Parzen (2009), "A Meta-Analysis of the 
Determinants of Organic Sales Growth," International Journal of Research in Marketing, 
26(4), 263-75. 
53 
 
Barkema, Harry G., John H. J. Bell, and Johannes M. Pennings (1996), "Foreign Entry, Cultural 
Barriers, and Learning," Strategic Management Journal, 17(2), 151-66. 
Barney, Jay (1991), "Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage," Journal of 
Management, 17(1), 99-120. 
Brown, Shona L. and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt (1998), Competing on the Edge: Strategy as Structured 
Chaos. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
Brown, Shona L. and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt (1997), "The Art of Continuous Change: Linking 
Complexity Theory and Time-paced Evolution in Relentlessly Shifting Organizations," 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(1), 1-34. 
Bryce, David J. and Sidney G. Winter (2009), "A General Interindustry Relatedness Index," 
Management Science, 55(9), 1570-85. 
Capron, Laurence and John Hulland (1999), "Redeployment of Brands, Sales Forces, and General 
Marketing Management Expertise Following Horizontal Acquisitions: A Resource-Based 
View," Journal of Marketing, 63(2), 41-54. 
Chatterjee, Savan and Birger Wernerfelt (1991), "The Link between Resources and Type of 
Diversification: Theory and Evidence," Strategic Management Journal, 12(1), 33-48. 
Cottrell, Tom and Barrie A. Nault (2004), "Product Variety and Firm Survival in the Microcomputer 
Software Industry," Strategic Management Journal, 25(10), 1005-25. 
Danneels, Erwin (2002), "The Dynamics of Product Innovation and Firm Competences," Strategic 
Management Journal, 23(12), 1095-121. 
Danneels, Erwin (2003), "Tight-Loose Coupling with Customers: The Enactment of Customer 
Orientation," Strategic Management Journal, 24(6), 559-76. 
Danneels, Erwin (2007), "The Process of Technological Competence Leveraging," Strategic 
Management Journal, 28(5), 511-33. 
Danneels, Erwin (2011), "Trying to Become a Different Type of Company: Dynamic Capability at 
Smith Corona," Strategic Management Journal, 32(1), 1-31. 
Davis, Jason P., Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, and Christopher B. Bingham (2009), "Optimal Structure, 
Market Dynamism, and the Strategy of Simple Rules," Administrative Science Quarterly, 
54(3), 413-52. 
Davis, Rachel and L. G. Thomas (1993), "Direct Estimation of Synergy: A New Approach to the 
Diversity-Performance Debate," Management Science, 39(11), 1334-46. 
Day, George S. (1994), "The Capabilities of Market-driven Organizations," Journal of Marketing, 
58(4), 37-52. 
Delmar, Frédéric, Per Davidsson, and William B. Gartner (2003), "Arriving at the High-Growth Firm," 
Journal of Business Venturing, 18(2), 189-216. 
Dierickx, Ingemar and Karel Cool (1989), "Asset Stock Accumulation and Sustainability of Competitive 
Advantage," Management Science, 35(12), 1504-11. 
54 
 
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M., Nathan R. Furr, and Christopher B. Bingham (2010), "Microfoundations of 
Performance: Balancing Efficiency and Flexibility in Dynamic Environments," Organization 
Science, 21(6), 1263-73. 
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. and Jeffrey A. Martin (2000), "Dynamic Capabilities: What Are They?," 
Strategic Management Journal, 21(10-11), 1105-21. 
Farjoun, Moshe (1994), "Beyond Industry Boundaries: Human Expertise, Diversification and 
Resource-related Industry Groups," Organization Science, 5(2), 185-99. 
Farjoun, Moshe (1998), "The Independent and Joint Effects of the Skill and Physical Bases of 
Relatedness in Diversification," Strategic Management Journal, 19(7), 611-30. 
Farjoun, Moshe (2010), "Beyond Dualism: Stability and Change as a Duality," Academy of 
Management Review, 35(2), 202-25. 
Geroski, Paul A. (2000), "The Growth of Firms in Theory and Practice," in Competence, Governance, 
and Entrepreneurship, Nicolai Foss and Volker Mahnke, eds. Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 168-86. 
Geroski, Paul A. (2005), "Understanding the Implications of Empirical Work on Corporate Growth 
Rates," Managerial and Decision Economics, 26(2), 129-38. 
Gielens, Katrijn and Marnik G. Dekimpe (2001), "Do International Entry Decisions of Retail Chains 
Matter in the Long Run?," International Journal of Research in Marketing, 18(3), 235-59. 
Gielens, Katrijn and Marnik G. Dekimpe (2007), "The Entry Strategy of Retail Firms into Transition 
Economies," Journal of Marketing, 71(2), 196-212. 
Greene, William H. (2003), Econometric Analysis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Hambrick, Donald C. and Phyllis A. Mason (1984), "Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection 
of Its Top Managers," Academy of Management Review, 9(2), 193-206. 
Hannan, Michael T. (1998), "Rethinking Age Dependence in Organizational Mortality: Logical 
Formalizations," American Journal of Sociology, 104(1), 126-64. 
Hannan, Michael T., Laszlo Polos, and Glenn R. Carroll (2004), "The Evolution of Inertia," Industrial & 
Corporate Change, 13(1), 213-42. 
Harrison, C. White (1981), "Where Do Markets Come From?," American Journal of Sociology, 87(3), 
517-47. 
Hayashi, Fumio (2000), Econometrics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Helfat, Constance E. (1997), "Know-how and Asset Complementarity and Dynamic Capability 
Accumulation: The Case of R&D," Strategic Management Journal, 18(5), 339-60. 
Helfat, Constance E., Sydney Finkelstein, Will. Mitchell, Margaret A. Peteraf, Harbir Singh, David J. 
Teece, and Sidney G. Winter (2007), Dynamic Capabilities: Understanding Strategic Change 
In Organizations. Blackwell Publishing. 
55 
 
Helfat, Constance E. and Marvin B. Lieberman (2002), "The Birth of Capabilities: Market Entry and 
the Importance of Pre−History," Industrial & Corporate Change, 11(4), 725-60. 
Helfat, Constance E. and Ruth S. Raubitschek (2000), "Product Sequencing: Co-evolution of 
Knowledge, Capabilities and Products," Strategic Management Journal, 21(10/11), 961-79. 
Henderson, Rebecca M. and Kim B. Clark (1990), "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of 
Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms," Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 35(1), 9-30. 
Hitt, Michael A., Leonard Biermant, Katsuhiko Shimizu, and Rahul Kochhar (2001), "Direct and 
Moderating Effects of Human Capital on Strategy and Performance in Professional Service 
Firms: A Resource-Based Perspective," Academy of Management Journal, 44(1), 13-28. 
Hoopes, David G. and Tammy L. Madsen (2008), "A Capability-Based View of Competitive 
Heterogeneity," Industrial & Corporate Change, 17(3), 393-426. 
Hoskisson, Robert E. and Michael A. Hitt (1990), "Antecedents and Performance Outcomes of 
Diversification: A Review and Critique of Theoretical Perspectives," Journal of Management, 
16(2), 461-509. 
Johanson, Jan and Jan-Erik Vahlne (1977), "The Internationalization Process of the Firm: A Model of 
Knowledge Development and Increasing Foreign Markets Commitments," Journal of 
International Business, 8(1), 23-32. 
Johnson, Joseph and Gerard J. Tellis (2008), "Drivers of Success for Market Entry into China and 
India," Journal of Marketing, 72(3), 1-13. 
Kogut, Bruce and Nalin Kulatilaka (2001), "Capabilities as Real Options," Organization Science, 12(6), 
744-58. 
Kor, Yasemin Y. and Huseyin Leblebici (2005), "How do Interdepencies among Human-Capital 
Deployment, Development, and Diversification Strategies Affect Firms' Financial 
Performance?," Strategic Management Journal, 26(10), 967-85. 
Lee, Chi-Hyon, N. Venkatraman, Hüseyin Tanriverdi, and Bala Iyer (2010), "Complementarity-Based 
Hypercompetition in the Software Industry: Theory and Empirical Test, 1990-2002," 
Strategic Management Journal, 31(13), 1431-56. 
Lee, Gwendolyn K. (2008), "Relevance of Organizational Capabilities and its Dynamics: What to Learn 
from Entrants' Product Portfolios about the Determinants of Entry Timing," Strategic 
Management Journal, 29(12), 1257-80. 
Levinthal, Daniel A. (1997), "Adaptation on Rugged Landscapes," Management Science, 43(7), 934-
50. 
Levinthal, Daniel A. and James G. March (1993), "The Myopia of Learning," Strategic Management 
Journal, 14(S2), 95-112. 
Levinthal, Daniel A. and Brian Wu (2010), "Opportunity Costs and Non-Scale Free Capabilities: Profit 
Maximization, Corporate Scope, and Profit Margins," Strategic Management Journal, 31(7), 
780-801. 
56 
 
Li, Stan X. and Royston Greenwood (2004), "The Effect of Within-Industry Diversification on Firm 
Performance: Synergy Creation, Multi-Market Contact, and Market Structuration," Strategic 
Management Journal, 25(12), 1131-53. 
Mahoney, Joseph T. and J. Rajendran Pandian (1992), "The Resource-Based View Within the 
Conversation of Strategic Management," Strategic Management Journal, 13(5), 363-80. 
Malos, Stanley B. and Michael A. Campion (1995), "An Options-Based Model of Career Mobility in 
Professional Service Firms," Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 611-44. 
March, James G. (1991), "Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning," Organization 
Science, 2(1), 71-87. 
Markides, Constantinos C. and Peter J. Williamson (1994), "Related Diversification, Core 
Competences, and Corporate Performance," Strategic Management Journal, 15(S2), 149-65. 
McGrath, Rita G. (2012), "How the Growth Outliers Do It," Harvard Business Review, 90(1/2), 110-6. 
Mckee, Daryl O., Rajan P. Varadarajan, and William M. Pride (1989), "Strategic Adaptability and Firm 
Performance: A Market-Contingent Perspective," Journal of Marketing, 53(3), 21-35. 
Miles, Raymond E. and Charles C. Snow (1994), Fit, Failure and the Hall of Fame. New York: 
Macmillan. 
Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts (1990), "The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, 
Strategy, and Organization," American Economic Review, 80(3), 511-28. 
Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts (1995), "Complementarities and Fit: Strategy, Structure, and 
Organizational Change in Manufacturing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19(2-3), 
179-208. 
Mitchell, Will (1992), "Are More Good Things Better, or Will Technical and Market Capabilities 
Conflict When a Firm Expands?," Industrial & Corporate Change, 1(2), 327-46. 
Mitra, Debanjan and Peter N. Golder (2002), "Whose Culture Matters? Near-Market Knowledge and 
Its Impact on Foreign Market Entry Timing," Journal of Marketing Research, 39(3), 350-65. 
Mom, Tom J. M., Frans A. J. Van Den Bosch, and Henk W. Volberda (2007), "Investigating Managers' 
Exploration and Exploitation Activities: The Influence of Top-Down, Bottom-Up, and 
Horizontal Knowledge Inflows," Journal of Management Studies, 44(6), 910-31. 
Montgomery, Cynthia A. and S. Hariharan (1991), "Diversified Expansion by Large Established Firms," 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 15(1), 71-89. 
Nayyar, Praveen R. (1993), "Performance Effects of Information Asymmetry and Economies of Scope 
in Diversified Service Firms," Academy of Management Journal, 36(1), 28-57. 
Nelson, Richard R. and Sidney G. Winter (1982), An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Palich, Leslie E., Laura B. Cardinal, and C. Chet Miller (2000), "Curvilinearity in the Diversification-
Performance Linkage: An Examination of over Three Decades," Strategic Management 
Journal, 21(2), 155-74. 
57 
 
Penrose, Edith T. (1959), The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. New York: Wiley. 
Peteraf, Margaret and Randal Reed (2007), "Managerial Discretion and Internal Alignment Under 
Regulatory Constraints and Change," Strategic Management Journal, 28(11), 1089-112. 
Peteraf, Margaret and Randal Reed (2008), "Regulatory Reform and Managerial Choice: An Analysis 
of the Cost Savings from Airline Deregulation," Managerial & Decision Economics, 29(2/3), 
99-116. 
Pettus, Michael L. (2001), "The Resource-Based View as a Developmental Growth Process: Evidence 
from the Deregulated Trucking Industry," Academy of Management Journal, 44(4), 878-96. 
Porter, Michael and Nicolaj Siggelkow (2008), "Contextuality Within Activity Systems and 
Sustainability of Competitive Advantage," Academy of Management Perspectives, 22(2), 34-
56. 
Prahalad, C. K. and Gary Hamel (1990), "The Core Competence of the Corporation," Harvard Business 
Review, 68(3), 79-92. 
Priem, Richard L. and John E. Butler (2001a), "Is the Resource-Based "View" a Useful Perspective for 
Strategic Management Research?," Academy of Management Review, 26(1), 22-40. 
Priem, Richard L. and John E. Butler (2001b), "Tautology in the Resource-Based View and the 
Implications of Externally Determined Resource Value: Further Comments," Academy of 
Management Review, 26(1), 57-66. 
Puhani, Patrick A. (2000), "The Heckman Correction for Sample Selection and Its Critique," Journal of 
Economic Surveys, 14(1), 53-68. 
Ramanujam, Vasudevan and P. Varadarajan (1989), "Research on Corporate Diversification: a 
Synthesis," Strategic Management Journal, 10(6), 523-51. 
Rivkin, Jan W. (2000), "Imitation of Complex Strategies," Management Science, 46(6), 824-44. 
Robins, James and Margarethe F. Wiersema (1995), "A Resource-Based Approach to the 
Multibusiness Firm: Empirical Analysis of Portfolio Interrelationships and Corporate Financial 
Performance," Strategic Management Journal, 16(4), 277-99. 
Rothaermel, Frank T. and Charles W. L. Hill (2005), "Technological Discontinuities and 
Complementary Assets: A Longitudinal Study of Industry and Firm Performance," 
Organization Science, 16(1), 52-70. 
Rumelt, Richard (1982), "Diversification Strategy and Profitability," Strategic Management Journal, 
3(4), 359-69. 
Rumelt, Richard (1984), "Towards a Strategic Theory of the Firm," in Competitive Strategic 
Management, Robert Boyden Lamb, ed. Englewood-Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 556-70. 
Siggelkow, Nicolaj (2001), "Change in the Presence of Fit: the Rise, the Fall, and the Renaissance of 
Liz Claiborne," Academy of Management, 44(4), 838-57. 
58 
 
Sirmon, David G. and Michael A. Hitt (2003), "Managing Resources: Linking Unique Resources, 
Management, and Wealth Creation in Family Firms," Entrepreneurship: Theory & Practice, 
27(4), 339-58. 
Sirmon, David G., Michael A. Hitt, R. Duane Ireland, and Brett A. Gilbert (2011), "Resource 
Orchestration to Create Competitive Advantage: Breadth, Depth, and Life Cycle Effects," 
Journal of Management, 37(5), 1390-412. 
Sitkin, Sim B. and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe (1994), "Distinguishing Control from Learning in Total Quality 
Management: A Contingency Perspective," Academy of Management Review, 19(3), 537-64. 
Sorenson, Olav (2000), "Letting the Market Work for You: An Evolutionary Perspective on Product 
Strategy," Strategic Management Journal, 21(5), 577-92. 
Stern, Ithai and Andrew D. Henderson (2004), "Within-Business Diversification in Technology-
Intensive Industries," Strategic Management Journal, 25(5), 487-505. 
Tanriverdi, Hüseyin and Chi-Hyon Lee (2008), "Within-Industry Diversification and Firm Performance 
in the Presence of Network Externalities: Evidence From the Software Industry," Academy of 
Management Journal, 51(2), 381-97. 
Taylor, Alva and Constance E. Helfat (2009), "Organizational Linkages for Surviving Technological 
Change: Complementary Assets, Middle Management, and Ambidexterity," Organization 
Science, 20(4), 718-39. 
Teece, David J. (1982), "Towards an Economic Theory of the Multiproduct Firm," Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 3(1), 39-63. 
Teece, David J. (1986), "Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, 
Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy," Research Policy, 15(6), 285-305. 
Teece, David J. (1994), "Understanding Corporate Coherence: Theory and Evidence," Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, 23(1), 1-30. 
Teece, David J. (2007), "Explicating Dynamic Capabilities: The Nature and Microfoundations of 
(Sustainable) Enterprise Performance," Strategic Management Journal, 28(13), 1319-50. 
Teece, David J., Gary Pisano, and Amy Shuen (1997), "Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic 
Management," Strategic Management Journal, 18(7), 509-33. 
Thompson, James D. (1967), Organizations in Action. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Tripsas, Mary (1997), "Unraveling the Process of Creative Destruction: Complementary Assets and 
Incumbent Survival in the Typesetter Industry," Strategic Management Journal, 18(S1), 119-
42. 
Tushman, Micheal L. and Charles A. O'Reilly III (1996), "Ambidextrous Organizations: Managing 
Evolutionary and Revolutionary Change," California Management Review, 38(4), 8-30. 
Uzzi, Brian (1997), "Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of 
Embeddedness," in The Sociology of Economic Life, M. Granovetter and R. Swedberg, eds. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 207-38. 
59 
 
Venkatraman, N. (1989), "The Concept of Fit in Strategy Research: Toward Verbal and Statistical 
Correspondence," Academy of Management Review, 14(3), 423-44. 
Weinzimmer, Laurence G., Paul C. Nystrom, and Sarah J. Freeman (1998), "Measuring Organizational 
Growth: Issues, Consequences and Guidelines," Journal of Management, 24(2), 235-62. 
Wernerfelt, Birger (1984), "A Resource-Based View of the Firm," Strategic Management Journal, 
5(2), 171-81. 
Zahra, Shaker A., Harry J. Sapienza, and Per Davidsson (2006), "Entrepreneurship and Dynamic 
Capabilities: A Review, Model and Research Agenda," Journal of Management Studies, 43(4), 
917-55. 
Zajac, Edward, Matthew S. Kraatz, and Rudi K. F. Bresser (2000), "Modeling the Dynamics of Strategic 
Fit: a Normative Approach to Strategic Change," Strategic Management Journal, 21(4), 429-
53. 
Zott, Christoph (2003), "Dynamic Capabilities and the Emergence of Intraindustry Differential Firm 
Performance: Insights from a Simulation Study," Strategic Management Journal, 24(2), 97-
125. 
 
 
  
60 
 
1.9 Tables 
Table 1: descriptives 
Variable N Mean Std Minimum Median Maximum 
GROWTH,	,
 2145 .043 .149 -.569 0 1.414 CREATION,	,
 2241 2.690 3.465 0 2 29 
LEVERAGE,	,
 2227 .202 2.121 -11.791 0 11.790 
AVGFIT,	,
 2617 7.988 3.887 .034 8.197 15.212 
STRUCTURATION,	,
 2227 .092 .262 -.457 .007 1.365 
AGE,	,
 3091 2.608 .893 0 2.708 4.407 
SIZE,	,
C 2166 3.206 1.426 .693 2.890 9.222 
GENERALIST,	,
 2626 .801 .184 0 .804 1 
MA,	,
 2629 .027 .162 0 0 1 
CI,	,
 2629 .227 .077 .079 .204 0.448 
Country Belgium 3091 .161 .368 0 0 1 
Country Netherlands 3091 .228 .419 0 0 1 
Country UK 3091 .611 .488 0 1 1 
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Table 2: Pearson correlations 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 GROWTH,	,
 1               
2 CREATION,	,
 .064* 1              
3 LEVERAGE,	,
 .087* .370* 1             
4 AVGFIT,	,
 -.039 -.045* .114* 1            
5 STRUCTURATION,	,
 .053* .167* -.093* .130* 1           
6 FIT,	,
C -.079* -.186* -.287* .903* .107* 1          
7 STRUCTURATION,	,
C .031 .140* -.118* .086* -.029 .140* 1         
8 AGE,	,
 -.138* .011 -.021 .357* .023 .367* .040 1        
9 SIZE,	,
C -.157* .017 .006 .442* .025 .427* .055* .535* 1       
10 GENERALIST,	,
 -.032 -.063* .035 .141* .016 .118* -.073* -.049* -.178* 1      
11 MA,	,
 .023 -.003 .005 .218* .051* .219* .056* .198* .293* -.130* 1     
12 CI,	,
 -.003 -.017 -.093* .098* .116* .113* .259* .008 .012* .083* -.023 1    
13 CREATION,	,
C .061* .381* -.022 -.020 -.070* .000 .147* .012 .031 -.046 -.027 -.039 1   
14 SCOPE,	,
C -.078* -.174* -.267* .889* .088* .982* .134* .341* .385* .151* .198* .103* .029 1  
15 LEVERAGE,	,
C -.002 .078* -.240* .125* .016 .248* -.115* -.037 .051* .036 .024 -.030 .345* .248* 1 
* significant at .05 level 
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Table 3: Model estimates (3SLS) 
System R²: 0.1119 opqrst#,$,% upvwsxqy#,$,% zv{vpwov#,$,% 
Independent variables: Estimate SE p-value RSSCP estimate SE p-value RSSCP estimate SE p-value RSSCP CREATIONT ,	,
 0.087 0.006 0.008 8.41     -0.139 0.090 <.0001 5.76 LEVERAGET ,	,
 0.023 0.004 0.509 0.61 -0.418 0.116 <.0001 24.32     AVGFIT,	,
 0.111 0.002 0.012 13.77         STRUCTURATION,	,
 0.075 0.019 0.070 6.27         SURVT ,	,
 -0.097 0.342 0.004 10.53         FIT,	,
C     -0.687 0.043 <.0001 65.83 -0.512 0.020 <.0001 78.17 STRUCTURATION,	,
C     0.220 0.280 <.0001 6.76     AGE,	,
 -0.060 0.007 0.057 4.00 0.084 0.157 0.005 0.97 0.079 0.103 0.007 1.86 SIZE,	,
C -0.194 0.003 <.0001 41.78 0.105 0.071 0.001 1.53 0.166 0.047 <.0001 8.25 KF,	,
 -0.015 0.022 0.611 0.24 0.058 0.503 0.024 0.46 0.091 0.332 0.000 2.45 MA,	,
 0.051 0.019 0.065 2.88 0.027 0.452 0.301 0.10 0.050 0.300 0.050 0.74 CI,	,
 0.026 0.057 0.414 0.78 0.013 1.117 0.612 0.02 -0.096 0.716 <.0001 2.77 COUNTRY$ (Base: UK) 0 out of 2   0.82         YEAR% (Base: 1994) 0 out of 11   9.92         
INTERCEPT + 0.048 0.035  + 0.674 <.0001  + 0.551 0.001  
RSSCP: relative squared standardized coefficients in percentages (%)  
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Table 4: Model estimate heterogeneity in terms of focus on being a generalist versus product market scope (3SLS) 
System R²: 
0.2088 
Dependent variables: opqrst#,$,%   upvwsxqy#,$,%   zv{vpwov#,$,%   
 Independent variables: estimate SE p-value estimate SE p-value estimate SE p-value 
High-High* CREATIONT ,	,
 0.097 0.0100 0.2112    0.090 0.1183 0.0969 
 LEVERAGET ,	,
 0.020 0.0076 0.5106 -0.123 0.1933 <.0001    
 AVGFIT,	,
 0.225 0.0028 0.0431       
 STRUCTURATION,	,
 0.017 0.0241 0.6225       
 FIT,	,
C    -1.033 0.0462 <.0001 -1.245 0.0282 <.0001 
High-Low CREATIONT ,	,
 0.230 0.0096 0.0073    -0.483 0.1082 <.0001 
 LEVERAGET ,	,
 0.007 0.0076 0.8470 -0.316 0.1743 <.0001    
 AVGFIT,	,
 0.041 0.0031 0.5234       
 STRUCTURATION,	,
 0.033 0.0299 0.3308       
 FIT,	,
C    -0.622 0.0613 <.0001 -0.678 0.0302 <.0001 
Low-High CREATIONT ,	,
 0.019 0.0112 0.7930    0.121 0.1299 0.0158 
 LEVERAGET ,	,
 0.003 0.0082 0.9255 -0.046 0.2135 0.1678    
 AVGFIT,	,
 0.309 0.0029 0.0032       
 STRUCTURATION,	,
 0.082 0.0313 0.0064       
 FIT,	,
C    -0.758 0.0484 <.0001 -0.952 0.0306 <.0001 
Low-Low CREATIONT ,	,
 0.233 0.0073 0.0047    -0.400 0.0908 <.0001 
 LEVERAGET ,	,
 0.008 0.0061 0.8101 -0.282 0.1557 <.0001    
 AVGFIT,	,
 0.109 0.0027 0.0976       
 STRUCTURATION,	,
 0.039 0.0344 0.1816       
 FIT,	,
C    -0.767 0.0568 <.0001 -0.834 0.0264 <.0001 
SHARED** STRUCTURATION,	,
C    0.209 0.2841 <.0001    
 SURVT ,	,
 -0.090 0.3435 0.0069       
 AGE,	,
 -0.056 0.0066 0.0785 0.076 0.1539 0.0091 0.032 0.0900 0.2140 
 SIZE,	,
C -0.211 0.0035 <.0001 0.082 0.0708 0.0074 0.129 0.0418 <.0001 
 GENERALIST,	,
 0.027 0.0317 0.5032 0.102 0.6883 0.0036 0.196 0.4071 <.0001 
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 MA,	,
 0.029 0.0198 0.3000 0.019 0.4525 0.4554 0.029 0.2670 0.1963 
 CI,	,
 0.033 0.0579 0.3180 0.008 1.0964 0.7368 -0.094 0.6196 <.0001 
 COUNTRY$ (Base: UK) 0 out of 2         
 YEAR% (Base: 1994) 0 out of 11        
 INTERCEPT + 0.0526 0.2854 + 0.7886 <.0001 + 0.5295 <.0001 
*‘High-high’ block indicates the estimates for the category with a high focus on being a generalist and high scope.  
**‘Shared’ indicates the estimates for control variables across categories.  
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Table 5: Model estimate heterogeneity in terms of age and product market scope (3SLS) 
System R²: 
0.2015 
Dependent variables: opqrst#.$.%   upvwsxqy#.$.%   zv{vpwov#.$.%   
 Independent 
variables: 
estimate SE p-value estimate SE p-value estimate SE p-value 
High-High* CREATIONT ,	,
 0.057 0.0092 0.4365    0.095 0.1104 0.0673 
 LEVERAGET ,	,
 0.006 0.0069 0.8571 -0.122 0.1811 0.0003    
 AVGFIT,	,
 0.250 0.0026 0.0244       
 STRUCTURATION,	,
 0.070 0.0229 0.0424       
 FIT,	,
C    -1.072 0.0470 <.0001 -1.245 0.0274 <.0001 
High-Low CREATIONT ,	,
 0.177 0.0097 0.0268    -0.319 0.1088 <.0001 
 LEVERAGET ,	,
 0.005 0.0077 0.8715 -0.256 0.1746 <.0001    
 AVGFIT,	,
 0.059 0.0031 0.3421       
 STRUCTURATION,	,
 0.006 0.0375 0.8384       
 FIT,	,
C    -0.659 0.0590 <.0001 -0.774 0.0304 <.0001 
Low-High CREATIONT ,	,
 0.047 0.0135 0.5793    0.186 0.1485 0.0007 
 LEVERAGET ,	,
 0.012 0.0095 0.6906 -0.051 0.2407 0.0909    
 AVGFIT,	,
 0.234 0.0035 0.0319       
 STRUCTURATION,	,
 0.005 0.0338 0.8577       
 FIT,	,
C    -0.704 0.0491 <.0001 -0.932 0.0345 <.0001 
Low-Low CREATIONT ,	,
 0.246 0.0075 0.0039    -0.477 0.0921 <.0001 
 LEVERAGET ,	,
 0.009 0.0060 0.8021 -0.333 0.1566 <.0001    
 AVGFIT,	,
 0.086 0.0026 0.1821       
 STRUCTURATION,	,
 0.062 0.0286 0.0726       
 FIT,	,
C    -0.721 0.0604 <.0001 -0.694 0.0262 <.0001 
SHARED** ΔFIT
..	.
C    0.211 0.2852 <.0001    
 SURVT .	.
 -0.089 0.3489 0.0092       
 AGE.	.
 -0.019 0.0102 0.6942 0.107 0.2300 0.0144 0.114 0.1377 0.0033 
 SIZE.	.
C -0.204 0.0035 <.0001 0.089 0.0711 0.0038 0.140 0.0419 <.0001 
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 KF.	.
 -0.008 0.0229 0.7858 0.043 0.4973 0.0907 0.057 0.2913 0.0092 
 MA.	.
 0.050 0.0195 0.0762 0.031 0.4497 0.2251 0.038 0.2641 0.0886 
 CI.	.
 0.030 0.0577 0.3584 0.016 1.1061 0.5224 -0.088 0.6248 <.0001 
 COUNTRY$ (Base: UK) 0 out of 2         
 YEAR% (Base: 1994) 0 out of 11        
 INTERCEPT + 0.0562 0.2944 + 0.8886 <.0001 + 0.5784 <.0001 
*‘High-high’ block indicates the estimates for the category with a high age and high scope.  
**‘Shared’ indicates the estimates for control variables across categories. 
  
1.10  Figures 
Figure 1: model specification 
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Study 2 Success Drivers of Launching a Business Model 
Bart Devoldere*, Vlerick Business School 
Marion Debruyne, Vlerick Business School 
Ruud Frambach, VU Amsterdam 
2.1 Abstract 
Business models and their innovation are on top of the executive priority list as they hold great 
promise for differentiation and performance benefits. Many business model innovations are 
featured and praised for their success. Also, for every innovator with a new business model, there 
are often numerous copycats launching the same business model in a particular geographic market. 
However, we observe large differences in success across market launches of the same business 
model. This study addresses the lack of empirical and theoretical guidance on how ventures can 
succeed when launching a business model. We focus on four market entry decisions, i.e., entry 
timing, product adaptation, scale of entry, and strategic control, that influence the business model’s 
value drivers and ability to create and capture value, and find important main and interaction effects 
on how they impact survival of the launched business model. Thereby we argue it is important to 
treat the business model as a separate unit of analysis, different from industry, firm, product, or 
technology. Moreover, we theoretically and empirically indicate that there are not only differences 
but also an interplay between the business model and a product market strategy, which holds 
important consequences for the market entry literature. The context of this study involves the free 
daily newspaper business model introduced by Metro International early 1995, which disrupted the 
paid daily newspaper business model in many countries worldwide. We collect and analyse data on 
free daily newspaper ventures’ launch and survival, market entry decisions, and venture and market 
characteristics. We observe important first-mover advantages associated with launching the 
business model, while it is recommended to stay close to the product(s) as introduced by the 
business model innovator. Moreover, we observe that first-mover advantages are increased when 
launching big, and that late-mover disadvantages are exacerbated when launching with 
differentiated products. This study offers several contributions for theory, managerial practice, and 
policy makers.  
Key words: business model innovation, market entry, first-mover advantage, survival, newspaper 
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2.2 Introduction 
Business models take centre stage in many managerial and academic discussions. Many believe 
that a business model holds greater promise for differentiation and performance benefits compared 
to a product or technology. Across industries, business model innovation consistently scores very 
high on the CEO’s agenda (IBM Global Business Services 2006; 2012). Many business model 
innovations are featured and praised for their apparent success. Well-known examples include 
Netflix, Zara, Dell, iPod/iTunes, Southwest Airlines, ING Direct, etc. Previous research helps 
explaining how to define a business model (e.g., Baden-Fuller and Morgan 2010; Zott, Amit, and 
Massa 2011), and possible ways to innovate and build business models (e.g., Amit and Zott 2012; 
McGrath 2010).  
Just like product and process innovations, a business model innovation triggers copycats 
(Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu 2013; Teece 2010). For each innovator with a new business model, 
there are often numerous copycats trying to launch the same business model in their own 
geographic markets. A copycat business model refers to the same business model as the innovation 
at hand, but introduced by competitors in a particular geographic market or by the innovator itself in 
other geographic markets, after the original business model innovation was first launched. However, 
we see large differences in success across market launches of the same business model. This study 
addresses the lack of empirical and theoretical guidance on how ventures can succeed when 
launching a business model. Do you need to be a first mover in your market (e.g., Nespresso) or can 
you afford moving at a later stage (e.g., Amazon.com)? Do you need to launch an exact copy of the 
innovator’s business model (e.g., Microsoft’s Xbox) or should you try to innovate your business 
model as well (e.g., Nintendo’s Wii)? Is it better to reduce your commitment by sharing the risk (and 
control) with others (e.g., Next Issue Media) and/or should you make early, large-scale investment in 
the business model (e.g., Schibsted)?  
We focus on four market entry decisions, i.e., entry timing, product adaptation, scale of entry, 
and strategic control, that may impact the outcome of launching the business model and that are 
not pre-defined by the underlying business model. Based on these decisions’ influence on the 
business model’s value drivers and ability to create and capture value, we develop hypotheses on 
how they impact survival of the launched business model. We use numerous business examples  of 
possible effects these entry decisions can have on the business model’s performance potential, 
while integrating theoretical reasoning from mainly the resource-based view, transaction cost 
economics, systems theory perspective, signalling theory, and market entry literature. We argue that 
the business model constitutes a separate unit of analysis, different from industry, firm, product, or 
technology. Moreover, we posit there are not only differences but also an interplay between the 
business model and a product market strategy. When launching a business model, the outcome 
effects of particular launch decisions can thus not be copy-pasted from the product entry literature.  
Our context involves the advent of free daily newspapers, i.e., a business model innovation 
disrupting the paid daily newspaper industry. In February 1995, Metro International introduces the 
first free daily newspaper Metro in Stockholm, Sweden. We collect data from 29 countries across 
Europe and Canada where free daily newspaper ventures have been launched between 1995 and 
2010. For a census of 155 free daily newspaper ventures across these countries, we collect and 
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analyse data on free daily newspaper ventures’ survival, market entry decisions, and venture and 
market characteristics.  
This study offers several contributions. First, this study helps to fill the void of theoretical and 
managerial guidance on how to launch a business model. By focusing on the commercialization stage 
of a business model instead of the invention stage, we make an important shift towards better 
understanding how business models can provide (sustainable) competitive advantage in markets not 
immune for competitive dynamics.  
Second, we show that copycatting a business model is an important and viable innovation 
strategy. There can only be one business model innovator, and we show that it is not always the 
innovator who benefits the most from its innovation. Our results tell that business models should be 
launched with the appropriate launch decisions to be viable. We detect four key launch decisions, 
together with important interactions, that impact the survival of a business model. It should help 
both incumbents and new entrants that are confronted with new, disruptive markets and business 
models or designing them themselves, to be better able to foresee and predict success and failure in 
those new market niches.  
Third, we provide more information on the conceptual and empirical underpinnings of how to 
better delineate the differences (but also the interplay) between both the business model and a 
product market strategy. Business model innovation has an influence on the product market 
strategy, but product market strategy decision variables also have an influence on the (sustainable) 
competitive advantage associated with a business model. Therefore, this study shows that the 
market entry literature is also important at the level of the business model. We indicate that market 
entry decisions do not only play a role when launching new products or entering new geographic 
markets, but also when launching a business model. This can offer a new perspective on market 
entry decisions, also when applied to entering new product or geographic markets. Because market 
entry decisions also have an influence on the underlying business model’s performance potential, 
the underlying business model can influence what the outcome will be of particular market entry 
decisions taken for new product or geographic market entry. Therefore, trying to explain winning 
versus failing product introductions or new market entries might be put in a different perspective, 
when also incorporating the underlying business model in the analysis and taking into account the 
influence of entry decisions (or product and technology characteristics) on that same business 
model.  
Fourth, policy makers and wider society can benefit from this study. Policy makers benefit from 
a better understanding of how new markets and disruptive business model innovations operate, 
spread out and survive, in order to make more informed decisions whether it is appropriate to 
protect incumbent markets or not in the case of business model innovation. Also, we add to the 
discussion whether it would be suitable to provide possibilities to protect intellectual property 
derived from the business model. Moreover, the specific context of our study, the media industry, is 
a very important industry from a policy perspective because of its democratizing character and 
powerful public information channel.  
This paper proceeds as follows. First, we provide the conceptual background of a business 
model, business model innovation, and how various launch decisions can influence a business 
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model’s success. Second, we describe the context and methodology we applied in this study. Third, 
we discuss our empirical results and findings. Fourth, we conclude by listing some limitations that 
offer future research opportunities.  
 
2.3 Conceptual background 
2.3.1 Business model  
Previous research offers a plethora of possible business model definitions. For examples, see the 
special issue of Long Range Planning in 2010 on business models and a recent literature review by 
Zott et al. (2011). Most definitions contain the following elements: a customer value proposition, a 
profit model articulating revenue sources and cost constraints, key resources and processes, and the 
governance mechanism linking all stakeholders involved. Thereby, it is emphasized that these 
elements are not stand-alone but interdependent, i.e., they should create an integrated business 
model system in which the whole is more valuable than the sum of its parts (e.g., Johnson, 
Christensen, and Kagermann 2008; Magretta 2002; Morris, Schindehutte, and Allen 2005; Zott and 
Amit 2010). These interdependent elements together with the received literature point towards two 
key dimensions of a business model, i.e., defining the value creation for customers (that implicitly 
also incorporates the ability to deliver that value to customers) and the value appropriation for the 
focal firm and its partners (Day 2011; Sorescu et al. 2011; Teece 2010). A business model can be 
represented by a system of interconnected and interdependent activities that transcends the focal 
firm (Zott and Amit 2010). A business model as activity system articulates what activities are 
performed, how they are linked with each other, and how they are governed across different 
partners such as the focal firm, customers, suppliers, etc.  
Business models can be a potential source of competitive advantage (Casadesus-Masanell and 
Ricart 2010; Markides and Charitou 2004; Zott and Amit 2007; 2008). Previous research links a firm’s 
business model with financial performance measures such as revenue growth, profitability, market 
capitalisation, and equity growth (DeYoung 2005; Fisken and Rutherford 2002; Glick 2008; Zott and 
Amit 2007; 2008), and non-financial measures such as the ability to provide social value to 
stakeholders (Dahan et al. 2010; Yunus, Moingeon, and Lehmann-Ortega 2010). The activities that 
form the basis of a business model can enable value creation and appropriation by emphasizing one 
or multiple value drivers (Zott and Amit 2010). A firm can choose to focus on one particular value 
driver, but value drivers can also be mutually reinforcing, i.e., the presence of each value driver can 
enhance the effectiveness of any other value driver. In this study, we focus on the four value drivers 
as identified by Zott and Amit (2010). However, as previous research shows, it might well be that this 
list of value drivers is not exhaustive (Sorescu et al. 2011).  
A first value driver is novelty. Novelty-centered activity systems focus on new activities, new 
ways of linking activities, and/or new ways of governing activities. The activity system’s novelty 
captures the degree of innovation embodied in the business model (Amit and Zott 2012). For 
example, with the introduction of iPod/iTunes, Apple was the first electronics company that included 
music distribution as an activity (iTunes), linking it to the development of a listening device’s 
hardware and software (iPod), and digitizing it and thereby pushing many sub-activities of legal 
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music downloads to its customers (iTunes store). A second value driver is lock-in. Activity systems 
can be designed for lock-in, i.e., their power to keep third parties attracted as business model 
participants by creating switching costs or enhancing network externalities. For example, eBay’s 
activity system shows very strong positive network externalities. Because of the huge number of 
potential buyers (sellers), sellers (buyers) know that the odds to perform a trade at a convenient 
price on eBay are higher than anywhere else, so they keep coming back. In a similar vein, social 
networking sites such as Facebook and LinkedIn demand considerable time and effort from their 
members to personalize their web profile and build their networks. These investments form strong 
impediments to switching to other providers. A third value driver consists of emphasizing 
complementarities among activities. Complementarities are present whenever bundling activities 
within a system creates more value than running activities separately (Milgrom and Roberts 1995; 
Porter 1996). For example, commercial banks proved to be stronger in the recent financial crisis 
when they complemented deposit activities as a source of funding with lending activities. In the 
diamond business, polishing and distribution activities within a single business model creates value, 
because it enables the focal firm to produce tailor-made stones for each market segment’s specific 
demand. Complementarities not only create value, they also enhance an activity system’s value 
appropriation by increasing the difficulty for its imitation (Rivkin 2000). For example, whereas the 
activity system of Southwest Airlines is very visible and widely known, the many complementarities 
among its activities make that imitators are still struggling to reach similar success. A fourth value 
driver can be efficiency. Business models emphasizing efficiency are focused on achieving greater 
efficiency through reducing transaction costs. For example, third-party companies in the business 
process outsourcing industry, e.g., TCS, Wipro, Infosys, Satyam, and WNS, can flourish because firms 
want to standardize the interfaces between activities and lower transaction costs by outsourcing 
some activities to these third parties. Also, greater efficiency can be achieved when including specific 
activities, e.g., cross-docking and real-time point-of-sale information gathering at Wal-Mart, or 
deleting specific activities, e.g., on-board catering or seat assignment at Ryanair.  
A business model reflects transactions that connect activities both within and across firms. The 
business model concept includes network partners, other allies and the customer, making the 
business model particularly useful as a new unit of analysis in which the success of the organization 
is closely tied to the relationships the entity has with others in the network. The locus of value 
creation and appropriation, and thus the appropriate unit of analysis, spans firms’ and industries’ 
boundaries (Amit and Zott 2001). It implies that a business model transcends the focal firm, and that 
the business model is a different unit of analysis than the firm or industry. For some business 
models, focusing on boundary-spanning activities, such as customer -or supplier co-creation, that 
link different partners with the focal firm is even the key value creator. For example, Deutsche 
Telekom makes partnering and co-creation with both start-ups and large, established players a 
cornerstone of its business model.  
Although a business model creates and delivers value for customers in the form of products and 
the associated product market strategies, a business model is different from a product (Markides 
2006) and a product market strategy (Zott and Amit 2008). A product is anything that can be offered 
to a market that might satisfy a want or need (Kotler et al. 2009). A single business model can offer 
several products (e.g., internet banks offer various savings and investment products) and one 
product can be sold through different business models (e.g., both Amazon and Barnes & Noble sell 
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books). A product market includes the set of products judged to be substitutes and customers who 
seek similar patterns of product-related benefits. A product market strategy is the choices a firm 
makes on how to compete in a particular product market. Previous research considers different 
generic product market strategies. For example, there are product market strategies based on 
whether firms create value by emphasizing a low-cost versus a differentiated offering (Porter 1980), 
whether a firm’s scope is more geared towards generalism rather than specialism (Lambkin and Day 
1989), or whether a firm can be type-casted as a so-called prospector, defender, or analyser (Miles 
and Snow 1978). Typical elements of a product market strategy are decisions related to scope, cost-
to-deliver, and differentiation (Yarbrough, Morgan, and Vorhies 2011; Vorhies, Morgan, and Autry 
2009). However, a business model not only articulates how to create value which is similar to a 
product market strategy, but also how to appropriate that value offered to customers. A business 
model thus not only focuses on how to compete on the targeted product market(s), but also on how 
to compete on the associated factor market(s), and how both interconnect with each other. For 
example, a key characteristic of Google’s Android operating system is that it is open source. It 
attracts app developers and enables them to enhance and customize the app experience for 
customers. However, it can make the appropriation of value more difficult for Google, e.g., in the 
case of Facebook Home where Facebook develops a user interface and replaces the existing home 
screen on select smartphones.  
In standard economic and competitive market theory there is a lack of theoretical grounding for 
the concept of the business model and its place as unit of analysis (Teece 2010). Economic theory 
assumes away, both implicitly and explicitly, many real-life economic artefacts that occur in 
(imperfect) markets and that form the basis for the need to design a business model to create and 
capture value. For example, standard economic approaches assume zero transaction costs, 
homogeneous products, strong property rights, costless information transfer, perfect arbitrage, 
market existence for all products and inventions, and no innovation. One assumes that if value is 
delivered, customers will pay for it. That makes business models redundant because producers and 
suppliers can create and capture value simply through disposing their output at competitive market 
prices. Customers will buy if the price is less than the utility yielded and producers will supply if price 
is at or above all costs including an acceptable return to their capital. The price system resolves 
everything and business design issues don’t arise. However, perfect competition is not realistic. 
Products are not completely homogeneous, market entry and exit barriers do exist, innovation 
occurs, and there are transaction costs involved in performing activities across parties. Also, markets 
may not even exist or ready for particular activities or transactions, so entrepreneurs may have to 
build organizations and design business models in order to be able to perform them.  
The preceding discussion on the definition and the conceptual foundations of the business 
model, and its characteristics as a separate unit of analysis different from the firm, industry, and 
product, helps us appreciating the relevance to study this concept for both theory and managerial 
practice. Also, it enables us in the next section to explaining the conceptualization of business model 
innovation, the identification of important decisions when launching a business model in the market, 
and why these business model launch decisions are worth investigating given existing research on 
new product launches.  
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2.3.2 Business model innovation and copycats 
The business model is a major focal point of innovation (e.g., Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu 2013; 
Economist Intelligence Unit 2005; Hamel 2000; IBM Global Business Services 2012; Kim and 
Mauborgne 1997; Markides 1997; Mitchell and Coles 2003; Slywotzky 1996; Teece 2010). We define 
a business model innovation as a new-to-the-world business model with -- relative to the closest 
existing business model -- one or more changes in one or more ways in the activity system. One can 
innovate the existing business model by adding novel or deleting standard activities, by linking or 
sequencing activities in novel ways, or by changing one or more parties that perform any of the 
activities (Amit and Zott 2012). The more changes a new business model undergoes relative to the 
closest existing business model, the more innovative a new business model is. However, to qualify as 
a business model innovation, the new business model should materially alter the value creation and 
appropriation logic, and it should be a new-to-the-world business model that is reflected in new 
content, structure, governance, and/or value driver combinations of the activity system (Sorescu et 
al. 2011).  
Although a business model and a product are two different units of analysis, a business model 
innovation changes the value creation logic of the product offer, i.e., it changes the way product 
value is traditionally perceived in the market. A business model innovation emphasizes different 
product attributes to those emphasized by the traditional business model (Markides 2006). For 
example, whereas traditional brokers sell their services on the basis of their research and advice to 
customers, online brokers sell by promoting their price and speed of execution. Similarly, whereas 
the traditional car rental business model emphasizes locations nearby airports and car quality, new 
business models emphasize downtown locations, price, or environmental sustainability. Business 
model innovation is different from technological innovation and also different from radical product 
innovation. The business model complements technology, and technology can be an enabler of the 
business model, rather than that technology is part of the business model concept per se (Zott et al. 
2011). A radical product innovation is defined as a new product that incorporates substantially 
different technology from existing products, and can fulfill key customer needs better than existing 
products (Chandy and Tellis 1998). However, a business model innovation may or may not be linked 
to a technological innovation (Teece 2010), and emphasizes different key customer needs while 
offering new or existing products, rather than performing better on currently stressed key customer 
needs from existing products.  
There is a growing consensus that business model innovation is key to firm performance (Zott et 
al. 2011). Business model innovation may seem less heroic than technological innovation, but 
without the former there may be no reward for technologically pioneering individuals, enterprises, 
industries, and nations (e.g., Chesbrough and Rosenbloom 2002; Doganova and Eyquem-Renault 
2009; Gambardella and McGahan 2010; Teece 2010). History shows that, without an adequate 
business model, technological innovators will fail, even if the innovation is remarkable and later on 
widely adopted by society. Examples include EMI with the CAT scanner, Xerox with the personal 
computer, and Thomas Edison who failed commercially on many fronts. Also, business model 
innovations can establish a competitive advantage without an accompanying technological 
innovation, e.g., Dell in the personal computer industry or Southwest Airlines in the airline industry. 
The business model itself can represent a potential source of competitive advantage (Markides and 
Charitou 2004). Zott and Amit (2008) find that business models emphasizing novelty, i.e., business 
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model innovations, and that are coupled with either differentiation or cost leadership can have a 
positive impact on a firm’s performance.  
However, just like product and process innovations, a business model innovation attracts 
copycats (Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu 2013; Teece 2010). A business model is often copied by 
competitors. Empirical observations show that business model imitation by competitors may be 
successful but it can also lead to failure. For example, in 1998, British Airways launched Go, a 
copycat of Ryanair’s no-frills model, to compete against European low-cost airlines. Also, Ryanair 
started in 1985 with a traditional business model, but changed in 1990 towards a no-frills business 
model, imitated from Southwest Airlines. Moreover, Southwest Airlines, commonly referred to as 
the no-frills business model innovator in the airline industry, even imitated its business model which 
was pioneered by Freddie Laker in the U.K. The innovator Laker Airways eventually failed. Also 
copycats like e.g. People’s Express (U.S.), Continental Lite (U.S.), and Buzz (U.K.) failed. Another 
example involves the online brokerage business model innovation. The innovators of the online 
brokerage business model are not Charles Schwab or E*Trade. They are successful copycats of the 
innovative business model introduced by a joint venture called Net Investor in lanuary 1995 to offer 
Internet-based stock trading. Six years later, the venture was dwarfed by the success of Charles 
Schwab (Charitou and Markides 2003). As of January 2000, more than 150 companies entered the 
online brokerage area, involving retail brokerage incumbents, start-ups, banks and technology 
providers. However, after the dot-com bust, the declining number of retail investors and the 
lowering trading margins fuelled consolidation in the online brokerage industry in the U.S. Year 2005 
and 2006 has seen some major deals, such as E-Trade taking over Harrisdirect, and the merger of TD 
Waterhouse and Ameritrade to form TD Ameritrade. In 2008, the leading online brokers are Fidelity, 
E*Trade, TD Ameritrade, Charles Schwab and Scottrade. It is remarkable that these are all copycats 
and representing both early incumbent movers and dominant new entrants. A business model is also 
copied by the innovator itself in different geographical markets. Sustained performance often 
requires from an innovative firm not just initial innovations, but also exploitation in the form of 
replication in order to maximize value (Szulanski and Jensen 2008; Winter and Szulanski 2001). 
Replication is applied in many industries across many geographic markets. Well-known examples of 
a replication strategy are Intel, McDonald’s, and Starbucks, amongst many others. However, 
replication may also be less successful (Szulanski and Winter 2002). Examples include failed 
replications from free, daily newspaper publisher Metro International in Spain and Croatia, and 
failed attempts by Wal-Mart to replicate its successful business model in Germany and South Korea.  
We define a copycat business model as a business model that is imitated by a competitor or 
replicated by the innovator. Although a copycat business model can be new-to-the-market in which 
it is launched, it is not new-to-the-world and thus not a business model innovation as it copies an 
already existing business model. Empirical observations in the previous paragraph indicate that 
there are wide differences between similar business models in terms of being successful or not. 
Because these business models (cf., the innovator as well as the copycats) are applying the same 
business model with the same business model characteristics in terms of value creation and 
appropriation logic, and the same content, structure, governance, and value driver emphasis of the 
associated activity system, performance differences cannot be linked to these business model 
characteristics. Instead, we argue that the performance differences among similar business models 
depend on decisions taken when launching a particular instance of that business model. Decisions 
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taken at time of market launch are typically referred to as market entry decisions and can have a 
long-lasting effect on performance (Gielens and Dekimpe 2001; Green, Barclay, and Ryans 1995). 
The most important entry decisions identified in the literature that are not defined by the business 
model are market selection, entry timing, scale of entry, strategic control, product adaptation versus 
standardization, and what products to sell (Gielens and Dekimpe 2001; Gielens, Helsen, and 
Dekimpe 2012; Varadarajan 2010; Zott and Amit 2008). From these entry decisions we focus on 
entry timing, scale of entry, product adaptation, and strategic control as these seem to have an 
important impact on the performance potential of the business model and are not already defined 
by the business model. We control for market selection by taking into account characteristics such as 
the market’s attractiveness and its competitive dynamics. Also, at the time of launching a business 
model, the venture’s product offering is often small and focused. Therefore, we focus on product 
adaptation rather than product portfolio characteristics.  
To further defend our choice for these four important market entry decisions ventures have to 
take when launching a business model, we show, based on some empirical observations, how these 
decisions may influence the performance potential of a business model, i.e., how they may influence 
the value drivers of the business model. In table (1) we relate our four market entry decisions to the 
value drivers of the business model, i.e., novelty, lock-in, complementarities, and efficiencies. In the 
next section, where we develop our hypotheses related to these four market entry decisions, we go 
deeper in the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings. First, we argue that entry timing, i.e., 
whether to be a first mover or not, is an important decision when launching a business model. Being 
first is per definition focused on novelty. Besides, it may also enable --albeit sometimes limited-- 
intellectual property protection. Examples of business models with (partial) patent protection 
include Netflix and Nespresso. Also, being first provides a head-start in creating possible network 
effects (e.g., like Amazon did in book-selling), building switching costs (e.g., like Apple did for media 
sales in their iTunes Store), and pre-empting competitors (e.g., like The Warehouse did in New 
Zealand keeping Wal-Mart out). Moreover, entering first in a market gives a venture first access to 
complementary resources such as suppliers and customers that may co-create value together with 
the focal firm. For example, Insites Consulting, an online market research agency, was the first to set 
up an online panel of consumers in Belgium, i.e., supplier co-creation, to provide market insights to 
firms ordering market research studies. Another example includes Chemstation that offers 
customers to customize cleaning solutions. Being first to link to suppliers or customers to co-create 
gives an edge by having access to the most motivated ones and creating switching costs. Being a first 
mover can also add value to a business model focused on efficiencies, because it enables a venture 
to increase learning effects, fine-tune operations, and profit from time compression diseconomies.  
‘Insert table (1) about here’ 
Second, we argue that product adaptation, i.e., whether to enter with differentiated product(s) 
or not, is also a key decision at launch. Product adaptations, offered through the same underlying 
business model, can help adapting to markets (e.g., McDonald’s menu adaptations in India), 
differentiating from competitors (e.g., Apple versus Samsung tablets and smartphones), or 
generating new revenue by diversifying the product portfolio (e.g., McDonald’s Arch Deluxe). 
Particular product features or components can also create value through lock-in (e.g., car radios that 
are linked with airbag warning system or vacuum cleaners that come with specific bags) or switching 
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costs (e.g., Apple and Google apps are very similar but demand for some learning). However, 
product adaptations can also hurt a business model’s value by having or introducing a misfit with the 
associated business model. For example, Ryanair’s changes to its in-flight merchandise resulted in a 
drop in in-flight sales, reducing the commission earned by the airline's flight attendants. As a result 
Ryanair pledged to increase pay levels to offset this fall, but that increased overall costs which is not 
compatible with the business model’s overall goal. Another example includes McDonald’s Arch 
Deluxe that was targeted towards adults with more sophisticated taste, but which was a total misfit 
with the business model that focuses on classics and convenience. Also, product adaptation is seen 
as less efficient compared to product standardization.  
Third, we argue that scale of entry is a key consideration when launching a business model. A 
large scale can enable particular novel activities (e.g., Wal-Mart introducing real-time POS 
information gathering, linking it to inventory, distribution, and marketing activities through its own 
satellite). Also, a larger scale captures network externalities better (e.g., Facebook), creates 
customer and supplier switching costs (e.g., Apple’s App Store), and pre-empts competition. For 
example, Wal-Mart’s U.S. expansion in little one-horse towns excluded competition because the local 
geographic market was too small to support a similarly-sized competitor. Another example is 
McDonald’s that, due to its overall presence, excludes many locations from competitors. Moreover, 
complementarities may occur only when having a certain scale, which was felt by Wal-Mart that 
failed to replicate its low-cost strategy in Germany and South Korea particularly due to the low-scale 
operations they set up there. For example, small scale operations do not lend themselves to install a 
sufficient power base to force suppliers to create more value through lower prices and more 
innovation efforts. Scale of entry can also influence the value of business models focused on 
efficiency. Scale economies are typically translated in efficiencies in business functions such as 
operations (e.g., discounters, no-frills airlines), marketing (e.g., franchising), customer activities (e.g., 
store within store format), etc. 
Fourth, we argue that the level of strategic control, i.e., whether to share control over 
operations across different venture partners or not, is also a key decision at launch. This decision is 
close to what is defined by the business model in terms of governance structure. However, we do 
not focus on what partners are involved in the business model. Rather, we focus on the level of 
strategic control the focal firm can apply across the business model. The level of strategic control 
may influence the business model value drivers as follows. Strong control can avoid leakage of 
unique resources (e.g., Apple’s ability to keep secrecies in-house). Whereas shared control does not 
seem to have an influence on network effects, shared control can create switching costs for both 
parties and pre-empts attracting better partners (e.g., Nokia and Windows’ strategic partnership). 
Also, although partners give access to complementary resources, strong control may still be needed 
to enforce rigid execution to capture the complementarities. For example, Ryanair partners with 
many stakeholders and suppliers, but maintains strong control to enforce a business model totally 
devoted to low-cost operations and to maintain the flexibility to change partners that may be more 
complementary. In a similar vein, Wal-Mart needs strong control to enforce its rigid execution of 
low-cost activities focused on achieving efficiencies.  
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In the next section, we link business model success with the survival of the venture launching the 
business model in a particular geographic area, and develop hypotheses on how the four launch 
decisions can influence survival.  
 
2.3.3 Launch decisions’ influence on business model success 
When launching a business model, we argue that survival is an essential measure of success. 
There are at least three reasons for this. First, launching a business model embodies a high level of 
uncertainty, fuelled by its often disruptive effects on both demand and supply, and its potential for 
industry upheaval. Notwithstanding that the uncertainty may be highest for the business model 
innovator, launching a copycat business model can still be disruptive for many customers as well as 
for firms’ traditional way of doing business in an industry or geographical market. It means that 
several stakeholders have to change behavior before it can be successful which increases 
uncertainty when launching a business model. The more uncertainty and ambiguity there is, the 
more survival is of major concern to firms. For example, when new industries or new technologies 
emerge, uncertainty is high and survival is considered a key performance measure (e.g., Bayus and 
Agarwal 2007; Christensen, Suarez, and Utterback 1998; Dowell and Swaminathan 2006). Second, 
business models are launched through a new venture that is confined within, across or outside firm 
boundaries. Similar to Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002), we consider a new venture as an organization in 
its early years of existence, whether initiated by an independent organization or emerged from an 
established organization. For new ventures, survival is a standard performance measure. Financial 
measures of realized performance are less suitable for assessing new ventures’ performance as 
these ventures often have negative earnings, few tangible assets, and low or even negative book 
values (Zott and Amit 2007). Third, survival is a necessary condition towards competitive advantage, 
growth, and financial performance. That is also the reason why studies explaining firm performance 
other than survival check for survival bias.  
In the previous section, we identified four key decisions, taken at the time when launching a 
business model, that are potential drivers of business model success. We discussed table (1) that 
shows some empirical examples suggesting the influence of important launch decisions such as entry 
timing, offer adaptation, entry scale, and shared control on a business model’s value drivers, i.e., 
novelty, lock-in, complementarities, and efficiencies. In what follows, we hypothesize to what extent 
these launch decisions may influence the survival of a particular instance of the business model.  
2.3.3.1 Entry timing 
The timing to enter a particular geographic market with a business model, i.e., being first mover 
or not, is crucial in terms of survival. Previous research identifies various first-mover advantages and 
disadvantages, and late-mover advantages and disadvantages (For an overview, see, e.g., Kerin, 
Varadarajan, and Peterson 1992; Lieberman and Montgomery 2012; Shankar and Carpenter 2012). 
Most of the empirical support for first-mover advantages is found for market share and to a lesser 
extent for profit. With respect to survival rates empirical findings are mixed, with some reporting 
first-mover survival disadvantages (Golder and Tellis 1993), others identifying first-mover survival 
advantages in terms of reducing operational risk (Yadong and Peng 1998) or tapping into network 
effects (Wang, Chen, and Xie 2010), and various studies showing pioneer survival (dis)advantage 
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under different condition (e.g., Lilien and Yoon 1990; Min, Kalwani, and Robinson 2006; Robinson 
and Min 2002; Srinivasan, Lilien, and Rangaswamy 2004).  
We hypothesize that, when launching a business model, being the first in a particular geographic 
market has important advantages, or similarly, that being a follower has important disadvantages. 
The resource-based view is an appropriate theoretical framework to explain mechanisms by which 
these first-mover advantages can be obtained (Lieberman and Montgomery 1998). First, being first 
puts a venture in the best position to pre-empt important assets such as geographic and perceptual 
space, or build unique resources such as patents or trademarks (Carpenter and Nakamoto 1989; 
Lieberman and Montgomery 1988; Teece 2010). The importance of taking geographic space as a 
business model first mover is illustrated not only by McDonald’s (and many other franchisors) in 
many locations worldwide, but also by e.g., The Warehouse in New Zealand that pre-empted Wal-
Mart. Because a new business model is often disruptive for customers, being the first enables a 
venture to imprint its business model characteristics and its brand in the customer’s mind as 
prototypical (e.g., Nespresso). Also, being first may offer a venture the ability to obtain unique 
resources such as patents or trademarks. Although it is rather exceptional, one can try to protect its 
business model’s intellectual property by patents, e.g., like Netflix and Nespresso did, albeit only 
partial patents on particular aspects of the business model.  
Second, a first mover is first to develop sometimes vital political connections (Frynas, Mellahi, 
and Pigman 2006). Because launching a business model is often disruptive for vested, incumbent 
businesses, political connections can be important for success when trying to launch. Large 
incumbent firms together with their industry organizations often put pressure on legislative 
authorities to put business practices of ventures with unfamiliar and disruptive business models 
under scrutiny. Although a first mover has to invest in developing these political connections or 
fighting incumbent industry allegations, it is sometimes very useful to be offered a broad, public 
forum to repeatedly state your value proposition and business model design. For example, Ryanair 
very much liked being put aside by incumbent airlines and considered a complete industry outsider.  
Third, being first in the market to launch a business model enables a venture to impose 
switching costs on its partners and customers to lock them in, and the first opportunity to create 
possible network effects (e.g., Amazon). Previous research identifies possible network effects as an 
important first-mover advantage (e.g., Lieberman and Montgomery 2012; Wang, Chen, and Xie 
2010). Buyer switching costs can include initial time and financial investments made by the buyer, 
product learning efforts, and contractual switching costs imposed on the buyer. An example of buyer 
switching costs is the advantage Apple’s iTunes Store holds over Google’s Play Store. Also, switching 
costs for customers or suppliers can occur when the business model is focused on customer 
respectively supplier co-creation. For example, online consumer panels developed by market 
research agencies such as Insites Consulting focus on supplier co-creation, i.e., consumers providing 
market insights, to create value for buyers of market research studies. Being first to set up such 
consumer panel gives not only access to consumers that are most motivated to participate (cf., a 
complementary resource), but it also creates switching costs for those consumers to participate in 
other panels.  
Fourth, a lot of ventures that are the first to launch a business model in a particular geographic 
market are not the business model innovator. These first movers may benefit also from particular 
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late-mover advantages such as learning effects and potential spillovers from the original business 
model innovator operating in another geographic market, while enjoying free-rider effects on some 
of the innovator’s investments such as buyer education and new business model development. 
Learning effects could consist of knowledge on how the new business model works, how it can be 
executed successfully, and how customers react and behave. For example, Ryanair’s Michael O’Leary 
went to Southwest Airlines to learn how to copy the business model as detailed as possible. Because 
a business model innovation is sometimes widely covered in both popular and specialized media, 
learning effects are even more likely to occur. It follows that first movers enjoy reduced uncertainty 
among its stakeholders with respect to the viability of the business model that is launched. Also, 
customers could already be acquainted with the new business model so that they barely need to be 
educated. Also, a positive spillover effect may be that customers who already have experience with 
the new business model start asking for the launch of that business model in other geographic 
markets (e.g., Starbucks in Belgium). Based on previous discussion, we hypothesize the following.  
H1: Being the first to launch a business model in a geographic market increases survival chances.  
2.3.3.2 Product adaptation  
When launching a business model, a venture has to decide what product(s) to offer. On the one 
hand, one can exactly copy the product(s) of the business model innovator to make sure that all 
elements of the business model are well aligned with each other and with the product(s) in place. 
On the other hand, product adaptation can create a meaningful differentiation between the 
innovator and copycat without materially altering the business model. Product adaptation can be 
applied to adapt to specific market conditions (e.g., McDonald’s introducing vegetarian burgers in 
India or Best Buy creating more experiential stores in China compared to transactional stores in 
U.S.), to differentiate from competitors in the same geographic market (e.g., Samsung versus Apple 
tablets and smartphones), to extend the current product portfolio (e.g., McDonald’s Arch Deluxe), or 
to create lock-in (e.g., vacuum cleaners that come with particular bags) or switching costs (e.g., 
Google apps that are very similar to Apple apps). However, even small product adaptations can 
create performance difficulties for the business model. For example, Ryanair replaced duty free with 
other merchandise during flights and has seen a drop in in-flight sales, which reduced the 
commission earned by the airline's flight attendants. As a result Ryanair pledged to increase pay 
levels to offset this fall, but that increased overall costs which is not compatible with the business 
model’s overall goal. Another example is McDonald’s Arch Deluxe that was targeted towards adults 
with more sophisticated palates, but was a total misfit with the business model of McDonald’s 
focusing on anything but customer sophistication and inconvenience.  
We hypothesize that product adaptation relative to the original product(s) of the business model 
innovator harms survival chances. Although similar business models can have different products, 
products still need to be aligned with the underlying business model. Indeed, the business model 
also defines how one creates value for the customer which has to be translated in appropriate 
products. As shown in some examples above from McDonald’s and Ryanair, products can be ill-
aligned to the underlying business model or even introduce inconsistencies in the business model. In 
line with a systems theory perspective on business models (Zott et al. 2011) and advice on 
replicating best-practices (Szulanski and Winter 2002), it is common thinking to try to stay as close to 
the original innovator’s business model as possible. Research in the airline industry supports this 
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view by finding that low-cost firms that stick to the original low-cost model seem to be more 
successful (Alamdari and Fagan 2005). Indeed, because of activity interdependencies and 
complementarities, imitating activity systems should not be done  piece-wise (Porter 1996b; Rivkin 
2000). Business model innovation involves a departure from industry practice, represented in not 
just the adoption of a single new practice but by overhauling an entire system. Imitating this 
innovation entails imitation of a complex system, with interdependencies between components. 
Rivkin (2000) conceptualizes a strategy as a set of choices, whose outcome is dependent on each 
other. For example, investments in machines for a complex product line are more valuable if the 
sales force is trained to present these types of products to customers. Thus, the value of each 
individual part of a business model is dependent on the choices made on other parts. This means 
that one should aim at optimizing the combined choice set, not the individual components. In a 
similar vein, Siggelkow (2002) claims that changing just one element in an organizational system is 
not effective because it creates an organization that is not consistent, i.e., there is no fit between 
individual elements. Other elements need to be adapted at the same time. This view of strategy as a 
set of decisions whose usefulness is interdependent shows that it cannot be imitated by changing 
single components. The same result cannot be attained without adopting the whole system. Also, 
launching an already ‘proven’ business model signals better performance prospects and lower 
strategic and operational risk, which attracts both customers and investors. When only including or 
excluding a limited set of activities that does not materially alter the business model, it is difficult to 
assess upfront how coherent the different activities will be and whether there will be significant 
complementarities among activities or not (Porter and Siggelkow 2008). Based on legitimacy theory, 
strategic group research has shown that the performance of solitary firms is lower than the 
performance of companies that conform more to an existing group (McNamara, Deephouse, and 
Luce 2003; Deephouse 1999). Therefore, we expect a negative survival impact from product 
adaptation.  
H2a: Adapting the original product(s) decreases survival chances.  
However, product adaptations can be done specifically to differentiate from competition when 
entering late (Shankar and Carpenter 2012). When being a first mover in a particular geographic 
market, entering with the same underlying business model but a different product compared to the 
original business model innovator operating in another geographic market, cannot be done for 
differentiation purposes as there is no competition yet. When firms are not the first mover in a 
particular geographic market, they may try to differentiate themselves from competition in their 
market by introducing an adapted product. However, as we have already mentioned, product 
adaptations can easily lead to inconsistencies or ill-aligned underlying business models, which 
creates serious difficulties harming survival prospects. These difficulties can arise from causal 
ambiguity with respect to a business model’s actual value drivers, distorted interdependencies and 
complementarities among business model elements, and bad signals when deviating from a strategic 
group that conforms to a particular business model.  
Product adaptation by later entrants not only has the same drawbacks as anyone trying to 
differentiate through product adaptation with the same underlying business model, but it also 
exacerbates some first-mover advantages (or late-mover disadvantages). The research stream on 
customer preference formation initiated by  Carpenter and Nakamoto (1988; 1989) suggests that too 
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much differentiation might not be a good idea for later entrants. Because customers have a specific 
process of forming their preferences, being a first mover can install an important competitive 
advantage. More specifically, initial product experiences will define the relationship of the product 
category to related ones, will define the product attributes that are relevant for decision-making, 
and will define the attribute configuration that is prototypical of the category. That might be 
especially the case for demand-disruptive business model innovation. A first mover thus benefits 
because later entrants have difficulties to differentiate properly. If the product by later entrants is 
too different, it falls outside the category, and, if inside the category, the later entrant faces the 
entrenched customer category perceptions and preferences. Also, trying to adapt the product 
without altering the underlying business model, may result in difficulties to attract the appropriate 
partners that might already be locked-in by the first mover. Moreover, adapting the product without 
changing the value created by the business model may make it difficult to attract customers in case 
of important network effects or buyer switching costs. For example, if there is only a difference in 
value based on the ‘differences’ in apps from Google’s Play Store versus Apple’s App Store,  
customers would not be inclined to make the switch to Google. Also, when adapting the product(s) 
as a later mover, it is more difficult to benefit from late-mover advantages based on learning effects 
and potential spillovers, because that learning and spillover would be based on different products. 
For example, customers would still need to be educated somehow, and could react and behave 
differently towards different products. It follows that product adaptation increases uncertainty 
among stakeholders with respect to the viability of the product(s) introduced. Therefore, we 
hypothesize the following.  
H2b: Product adaptation amplifies the negative impact on survival chances of being a late 
mover.   
2.3.3.3 Entry scale 
We hypothesize that a larger scale of entry can increase the odds of survival for several reasons. 
First, a larger scale of entry creates volume-driven cost advantages (Biggadike 1979). These cost 
advantages through scale can be attributed to learning effects, increased market power, managerial 
specialization, etc. A larger scale can create efficiencies in various business functions, e.g., 
purchasing, finance, marketing, operations, amongst others, that help business models create and 
capture value. There are also business models especially focused on efficiencies. Examples include 
business models focused on efficiencies in operations (e.g., discounters and no-frills airlines), 
efficiencies in marketing expenditures (e.g., franchise chains), efficiencies in customer time spending 
(e.g., store within a store format like Sephora within JC Penney), etc. Moreover, some efficiency-
focused complementarities come only together with a large scale. For example, Wal-Mart needs a 
high number of stores with a high volume sold to support its purchasing power, its distribution 
system through large distribution centers, and its lowest price commitment. In Germany and South 
Korea, Wal-Mart could not replicate its low-cost strategy because it lacked considerable scale 
(Gielens, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2012).  
Second, scale can provide access to and the ability to develop unique assets and resources. A 
larger scale can pre-empt more attractive locations in geographic and perceptual space. For 
example, Wal-Mart pre-empted competition in its U.S. expansion by focusing on geographic 
locations that were just big enough to support only one discounter, i.e., so-called little one-horse 
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towns. Another example is McDonald’s that not only pre-empts geographic locations from its 
competitors by its huge number of locations, but also perceptual space as it is considered to be 
everywhere and ‘always’ (compared to ‘sometimes’ for competitors) an option if need for a fast-
food hamburger option. Also, scale can make it possible to develop unique resources. An example is 
Wal-Mart that was, mainly thanks to its scale, was able to build and efficiently incorporate an own 
satellite system in its activities. Moreover, with a larger scale one is better able to develop and 
capture network externalities, and customer or supplier switching costs. Examples include Facebook 
and eBay that make heavily use of their scale to increase the associated network externalities, and 
Apple’s App store that uses its scale to increase both customer and supplier switching costs.  
Third, a large scale signals irreversibility and managerial commitment deterring competitive 
reactions (Chen and MacMillan 1992; Ghemawat 1991; Sharma and Kesner 1996). It also signals 
managerial belief in the attractiveness of the business model and the willingness for risk-taking 
which decreases the uncertainty surrounding launching the business model. Indeed, entrants 
holding more positive expectations are likely to make larger initial commitments (Caves 1998). Next 
to managerial belief, it also signals the ability to attract enough financial support, which is a proxy 
for future growth potential (Audretsch 1995). Taken together, larger scale of entry creates more 
legitimacy and signals the business model’s value and a venture’s commitment towards important 
stakeholders such as customers and investors, as well as to competitors, which positively adds to its 
survival chances. Previous research defines legitimacy as a “a generalized perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable” (Suchman 1995, p. 574; Higgins and Gulati 2006). 
Increased legitimacy gives access to important resources such as customers, high-quality employees, 
partners, investors, and financial capital (Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002). These resources are vital for a 
venture’s survival. Previous research indicates how legitimacy is important for new ventures in 
emerging industries (e.g., Ashforth and Gibbs 1990; Rao, Chandy, and Prabhu 2008; Suchman 1995; 
Van de Ven, Hudson, and Schroeder 1984; Zajac and Westphal 2004). The more uncertainty and 
ambiguity there is, the more important legitimacy becomes for organizational survival (Dacin 1997; 
Deephouse 1996; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott 1987; Singh, Tucker, and House 1986; Westphal, 
Gulati, and Shortell 1997). A venture’s actions and decisions can signal legitimacy, quality, and 
managerial commitment towards important stakeholders such as customers, employees, partners, 
competitors, etc. (Spence 1973; Stiglitz 2000). For example, previous research shows that strategic 
decisions can signal the value of a firm’s offering towards potential customers (Shane, Shankar, and 
Aravindakshan 2006), that particular information signals can help building a venture’s underlying 
credibility (e.g., Balboa and Marti 2007; Davila, Foster, and Gupta 2003; Janney and Folta 2003; Rao, 
Chandy, and Prabhu 2008) or perceived product quality (e.g., Kirmani and Rao 2000; Milgrom and 
Roberts 1986; Rao, Lu, and Robert 1999), and that ventures take actions that can signal their 
intentions and commitment (e.g., Heil and Robertson 1991; Prabhu and Stewart 2001).  
H3a: The larger a venture’s business model entry scale, the higher its survival chances.  
We argue there is a reinforcing effect between scale of entry and being a first mover. Scale 
effects can enhance first-mover advantages (Kerin, Varadarajan, and Peterson 1992). Combining a 
high scale of entry with being a first mover, increases the entry barriers a first mover can raise and 
increases the effect of scale-related entry barriers and signals because of a less competitive 
environment. A first mover entering large is more effective in terms of pre-empting geographic and 
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perceptual space, reaching minimum efficient scale without over-production, signalling managerial 
commitment and possible growth potential, and raising entry barriers for competition. Moreover, 
being a first mover while having enough scale at entry can both be necessary conditions for 
performing well post entry due to a combination of learning effects, time compression 
diseconomies, and asset mass efficiencies (Nehrt 1996). Being a first mover can provide entering 
ventures with beneficial learning effects (Lieberman 1989; Porter 1980; Spence 1977), while not 
having the disadvantage of potential time compression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool 1989). Time 
compression diseconomies mean that particular tasks simply take some time to accomplish, and that 
diseconomies to the firm result because it spends more resources to accelerate their completion. 
Having a high scale of entry provides entering ventures with asset mass efficiencies (Dierickx and 
Cool 1989). Asset mass efficiencies mean that firms sometimes need a minimum level of investment 
to fully understand the technology, or by extension the business model, and gain from it. Previous 
research suggests there is an interaction effect between scale of entry and order of entry, but 
empirical confirmation is lacking (Gielens and Dekimpe 2001; Gielens, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2012; 
Nehrt 1996; Szymanski, Troy, and Bharadwaj 1995). Based on previous discussion and focusing on 
being a first mover instead of ventures’ order of entry, we expect that a larger scale of entry 
increases the positive survival effect of being a first mover.  
H3b: Being a first mover amplifies the positive impact of a higher scale of entry of the venture’s 
business model on its survival chances.  
2.3.3.4 Strategic control 
The level of strategic control a venture has on its operations when entering a market is an 
important launch decision. Previous research in international market entry indicates that a higher 
level of control by the entering firm on its operations abroad has positive performance implications 
(e.g., Gielens and Dekimpe 2001; Johnson and Tellis 2008). Also, based on two major theoretical 
frameworks, i.e., the resource-based view and transaction cost economics, we can expect positive 
performance implications of higher strategic control in the context of a business model launch. The 
resource-based view argues that as the level of control increases, the firm can deploy key resources 
that are essential to succeed (Gatignon and Anderson 1988; Isobe, Makino, and Montgomery 2000). 
Control over key resources gives a firm the freedom to deploy them flexibly. Also, control safeguards 
key resources such as patents from leakage. Moreover, control over key resources allows for internal 
operational control over the execution of the business model in which key resources are often 
interdependent with other business model elements such as the value proposition, the profit model, 
and important activities. Not fully controlling how activities are performed is from an activity system 
perspective dangerous, because even small changes to an activity system with many 
complementarities can have important negative performance effects (Porter 1996; Porter and 
Siggelkow 2008; Rivkin 2000).  
Transaction cost economics views firms and markets as alternative governance structures that 
differ in their transaction costs (Kim and Hwang 1992; Williamson 1975; Williamson 1981). The level 
of transaction costs depends on the interplay of bounded rationality, opportunistic behavior by the 
partners in the transaction, asset specificity of the assets involved in the transaction, and uncertainty 
surrounding the transaction. Transaction cost analysis suggests that the governance structure and 
performance of an exchange are influenced by the level of the exchange partners’ specific 
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investments and opportunistic behaviors (Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007). A firm’s ability to 
control and monitor their partners’ behavior and output is considered key in successful transactions 
(Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). The transaction cost economics view holds that costs increase with 
increasing control , and that control and commitment are inextricably linked (Luo 2001). High control 
in entry strategies entails high commitment, and the higher the resource commitment and desired 
control, the higher is the cost. In the previous section, we already highlighted the expected positive 
survival implications of higher commitment. Also, when markets would be efficient and competitive, 
market pressure would minimize the need for control. However, in the context of business models, it 
has been argued that business models specifically exist because of market failure and that business 
model launch is embedded in uncertainty and ambiguity. Therefore, when launching a business 
model, we expect that high control becomes more desirable.  
Strategic control is exercised by a single entity or is shared across several partnering entities that 
jointly steer a venture. We focus on survival differences between a venture that consists of only one 
entity with full strategic control versus a venture consisting of several entities with shared strategic 
control over its operations when launching a business model. The latter relates for example to 
shared ownership, joint ventures, or franchises. We argue that shared strategic control decreases 
survival chances when launching a business model. First, in line with our reasoning on the level of 
strategic control above, based on previous findings and both the resource-based view and 
transaction cost economics, we expect that a lower level of strategic control, i.e., shared strategic 
control, negatively impacts survival. Second, although collaboration gives a venture the potential to 
leverage partners’ specific knowledge or other resources (Combs and Ketchen 1999), shared 
strategic control reduces flexibility in resource deployment and in decision-making. Indeed, although 
extensive collaboration is considered the key for successful business model innovation (IBM Global 
Business Services 2012), it does not imply that control should be shared among collaborating 
partners. Moreover, shared control might increase stakeholders’ uncertainty because of the 
negative signals that may occur following low perceived commitment when resources and risk are 
shared among partners. Indeed, sharing resources and risk among partners can be interpreted as a 
low or limited belief in the market’s attractiveness. Third, the overall influence of shared strategic 
control is expected to negatively influence a business model’s value drivers novelty, lock-in, 
complementarities, and efficiencies. Not shared, strong control may avoid leakage of unique 
resources based on for example intellectual property. Shared control creates switching costs for 
both parties and can thus act both positively (cf., when the partner is good) and negatively (cf., when 
there are better partners available) for the focal firm. Network effects substitute shared control to 
lock in partners in the business model. Also, whereas partners can provide access to complementary 
resources, shared control may be less able to enforce rigid execution of the business model and its 
complementarities, leading to lower performance. Similarly, business models focused on efficiencies 
are often strict to execute, which may be difficult to enforce with weaker or shared control.  
H4a: Shared strategic control decreases survival chances.  
However, we expect that shared strategic control decreases survival chances even more for later 
entrants. Previous research indicates that the performance effect of the level of strategic control 
may depend on entry timing (Gielens, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2012). When entering later, it is more 
difficult to reap potential benefits from shared strategic control. A venture entering first can select 
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the best partners available (Szymanski, Troy, and Bharadwaj 1995). Therefore, a later entrant incurs 
higher search costs related to finding appropriate partners to share strategic control while 
potentially ending up with less knowledgeable partners. Also, a first entrant has the opportunity to 
capture a larger market share compared with later entrants in a more competitive environment, 
while a later entrant sharing its strategic control of a venture even has to share the performance 
outcomes of its venture with its partners.  
H4b: Shared strategic control amplifies the negative impact on survival chances of being a late 
mover. 
 
2.4 Context and Methodology 
2.4.1 Context 
Our context involves the newspaper industry in which the free daily newspaper business model 
represents a business model innovation. The main characteristics of the free daily newspaper 
business model are the following. First, customers can take the daily newspaper for free instead of 
paying a subscription or per-issue fee. Ad revenues are the only revenue stream for the publisher. 
Ad agencies are thus a very important (and the only paying) customer for these publishers. Second, 
the free newspaper appears daily, i.e., at least four times a week, and is considered a newspaper, 
i.e., it contains considerably more information content than advertising content. Third, the free daily 
newspaper is mainly distributed in high-traffic commuter zones and in public transportation systems, 
e.g., through self-service racks or by hand distributors in railway, subway and bus stations. Its target 
customers are daily commuters using public transportation.  
To qualify as a business model innovation, the new business model should materially alter the 
existing value creation and appropriation logic, which should be reflected in new activity content, 
structure, governance, and/or value driver combinations of the activity system. First, the value 
creation logic is different. The free daily newspaper business model emphasizes different product 
attributes compared to the existing paid daily newspaper business model, that in se offers the same 
product (cf., a daily newspaper). The free daily newspaper business model emphasizes price (cf., it’s 
free) and convenience (cf., it’s conveniently brought to you through the public transport system) 
towards readers, and a new, younger reader audience towards advertisers. The traditional, paid 
daily newspaper business model emphasizes quality (cf., editorial content) towards readers and an 
older and wealthier audience towards advertisers. To support this new value creation logic, the free 
daily newspaper business model introduces new activities such as distribution through public 
transport or public places, and innovative marketing (e.g., new ways of advertising within the 
newspaper, and campaigns and promotions linked to the newspaper’s distribution), while deleting 
other activities such as subscription-based sales and administration, sales and distribution through 
retail shops and kiosks, and marketing communication campaigns on television and radio. Also, 
partnerships are different in the free daily newspaper business model. For example, printing is often 
outsourced to specific printing facilities, retail shops and kiosks are excluded from the network, 
public transportation authorities are becoming an important partner for distribution purposes, and 
advertising partnerships focus on targeting younger audiences while excluding classified ads.  
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Second, the value appropriation logic is different. The free daily newspaper business model is a 
sponsor-based business model innovation in which a focal firm monetizes its products through 
sponsors rather than by setting prices directly to its customer base. Several reasons make this class 
of business model innovation appealing to study. First, such innovations appear to be increasingly 
prevalent in today’s economy. Second, sponsor-based business model innovations seem particularly 
easy to imitate. Since the purpose of our study is to analyse the competitive effects among business 
model copycats, the case of sponsor-based business models is most relevant. Third, sponsor-based 
business models will become feasible in an ever-increasing number of industries. Also, in terms of 
value appropriation, the public transport authorities take an important place. Whereas the retail and 
kiosks in the traditional paid daily newspaper business model are numerous and less powerful to 
appropriate much of the value created (and making their money mainly on complementary products 
like candy, cigarettes, and drinks), the public transport authorities have a high degree of power 
whether to allow publishers to distribute their free daily newspaper in the public transport system. 
Public transport authorities can appropriate a large part of the value created, by organizing bids 
among free daily newspaper publishers for exclusive distribution through their network.  
Since the first introduction of a free daily newspaper, Metro by Metro International in February, 
1995, both paid newspaper incumbents and new entrants across many countries worldwide entered 
the new market opportunity with the free daily newspaper business model. In the year 2000 there 
were 29 free daily newspapers in 14 European countries with an estimated circulation of 5.5 million 
copies, and in 2005 there existed already 81 free daily newspapers in 24 European countries with an 
estimated circulation of 15.4 million (Bakker 2008). By the end of 2010, free daily newspapers had 
been introduced in 32 European countries. The Metro phenomenon is not restricted to Europe 
though. There were 247 free daily newspapers in 56 countries worldwide with a daily circulation of 
44 million copies at the end of 2007.  
 
2.4.2 Sample 
We sampled 29 countries across Europe and Canada where free daily newspapers have been 
introduced between 1995 and 2010. For these countries we identified a census of 155 free daily 
newspaper ventures. We collected and analysed longitudinal data on these free daily newspaper 
ventures’ launch and survival, market entry decisions, and venture and market characteristics. Data 
sources include websites, newspaper articles, industry organization secondary databases (e.g., from 
WAN-IFRA), and industry expert interviews. Given the public character of the newspaper industry, 
our data set does not suffer from obscured and biased introduction and exit data for this business 
model innovation. Table (3) shows some important descriptive statistics for our sample. To make 
sure our sample uniformly identifies success with survival, we exclude 19 so-called spoiler 
newspapers that are solely intended to make the free daily newspaper market less attractive. We 
identify spoiler newspapers through their own communication of their intentions, or as those 
newspapers that are introduced by paid daily newspaper incumbents to compete head-on with 
existing free daily newspapers and exit the market from the moment competition has exited.  
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2.4.3 Model 
Survival is a key performance measure when launching a business model. We model individual 
ventures’ survival when they launch the free daily newspaper business model in a particular country. 
Therefore, we estimate the individual ventures’ time-to-exit using the Cox Proportional Hazards (PH) 
method. Our unit of analysis is the newspaper-country combination and failure time is measured in 
months from entry till exit or censoring. The Cox PH model is appropriate for studying survival data 
that are right censored, i.e., unobserved failure or non-failure after the sampling end-date. The Cox 
model is a semi-parametric model in which the hazard function of the survival time, i.e., the 
instantaneous risk for failure, is given by the following equation (1), with h() an unspecified 
baseline hazard function, X our vector of covariates, and B the corresponding parameter vector.  
 (|) = h()		exp	(′)                                                (1) 
2.4.4 Measures 
Important independent variables are measures as follows. First, we include a dummy (i.e., FIRST) 
with ‘1’ indicating that the free daily newspaper is that market’s first free daily newspaper. Entry 
timing is captured monthly in our data set. Second, product adaptation (i.e., ADAPT) is a dummy 
with ‘1’ indicating that the focal newspaper deviates from the original Metro newspaper in terms of 
consumption time, distribution model, or content coverage. The original Metro newspaper is a free 
daily newspaper with general information content, distributed in the morning among commuters in 
a subway system. With the entry of several other free daily newspapers, some entrants made 
important changes to this original product. With respect to consumption time, most free daily 
newspapers are distributed in the morning, but some are distributed in the afternoon or in the 
evening to avoid competition with existing free and paid newspapers. Another consumption time 
can have repercussions on content coverage and the distribution model. For example, more 
breaking news can be included and one could still distribute through an underground system, while 
the morning shift might be already allocated to a competitor. With respect to the distribution model, 
most free daily newspapers distribute their papers through a public transport system (in racks or by 
hand), while others try to differentiate by distributing the newspapers from door to door. With 
respect to content coverage, most free daily newspapers spread general news information on a 
variety of topics, while others focus on particular interest domains such as economic news or sports 
coverage. We consider these differences as adaptations at the product level that are not critical 
enough to materially alter the business model of the free daily newspaper to consider it as another 
business model innovation. Third, scale of entry (i.e., SCALE) is measured as the free daily 
newspaper’s circulation at time of entry relative to the total paid circulation in that market. Fourth, 
we include a dummy (i.e., SHARED CONTROL) with ‘1’ showing whether more than one firm has a 
stake of 10% or more in the free daily newspaper.  
We control for important venture and market characteristics. We measure a venture’s lack of 
incumbent industry knowledge and contacts with a dummy (i.e., STARTUP) showing ‘1’ when the 
owner of the free daily newspaper is a start-up company. Incumbents may have different survival 
chances compared to new entrants. Incumbents already have a business model in place which may 
benefit their survival chances (e.g., Tripsas 1997; King and Tucci 2002), or downgrade them (e.g., 
Henderson and Clark 1990; Markides 2006; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997). We could not include 
89 
 
venture size separately from scale of entry and incumbency status. However, as most ventures are 
newly founded they tend to have a similar size; they differ especially in terms of access to knowledge 
and ability for scale which we both include in our estimations. Competitive effects are represented 
by two dummies, i.e., SPOILER and DIRECT. SPOILER indicates with value ‘1’ whether there is a 
spoiler free daily newspaper in the market at time of entry by the focal venture. A spoiler free daily 
newspaper is a free daily newspaper introduced in the market with the sole intention to make the 
market unattractive. We identified spoiler newspapers by their own communication of being a 
spoiler and compared our set of spoiler newspapers with the ones identified by a leading industry 
expert, i.e., professor Piet Bakker. DIRECT measures with value ‘1’ whether the free daily newspaper 
competes in the same cities with already existing free daily newspapers at time of entry by the focal 
venture. It thus measures whether there is direct competition for the focal launch. Finally, market 
attractiveness represents the ability of the country’s advertising market to support a free daily 
newspaper business model. It is measured with the one-year lagged real growth percentage for the 
country’s GDP per capita (i.e., GDP GROWTH), and the percentage of GDP spent on advertising (i.e., 
AD SPEND). Multilingualism or regionalism is not likely to be an issue, because newspaper editions in 
different languages for the same country are often published by one venture (and thus treated as 
one venture as we model at the venture level) and we incorporate possible (non)competition effects 
by our control variable DIRECT. 
 
2.5 Results and Discussion 
2.5.1 Descriptives 
Table (2) gives an overview of the free daily newspaper phenomenon for our sample of 29 
countries across Europe and Canada. The table shows per country the first free daily newspapers 
and their time of entry, the number of free daily newspapers introduced from 1995 till 2010, the 
number of failures in that period, and the number of spoiler newspapers in that market. We make 
the following observations. First, Sweden, Germany, Finland and the Czech Republic are the first 
countries where free daily newspapers were introduced, whereas Slovenia, Luxembourg, Turkey, 
and Bulgaria are late adopters. Second, in a number of countries, i.e., Canada, Denmark, France, 
Ireland, and Turkey, competition is tough and rapid as there is more than one free daily newspaper 
introduced at the start of that country’s free daily newspaper market. Also, we identified 19 free 
daily newspapers, i.e., more than 10 per cent of total number of introductions, as trying to spoil the 
market. Third, overall there were many introductions of free daily newspapers. Not only large 
countries like the UK and Spain had many introductions of free daily newspapers, but also smaller 
countries like Denmark and the Netherlands showed high entrepreneurial activity in this case. 
However, there were also a lot of failures. From the 155 introductions, there were 81 that failed in 
or before end of 2010.  
Figure (1) shows the number of free daily newspapers in a selection of countries throughout the 
observation period. After the start in 1995, we see that the concept of free daily newspapers starts 
picking up in more and more countries as from 1998 with a yearly, gradual growth of new 
introductions from 1998 till 2004. The market is booming between 2004 and 2006, but as from 2007 
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and following years the market is in serious decline till 2009 when the decrease seems to be 
stabilizing. At the end of 2010 there are still 74 free daily newspapers present across Canada and 28 
European countries.  
‘Insert table (2) and figure (1) about here’ 
Table (3) gives an overview of our dependent, independent and control variables’ key descriptive 
statistics and correlations. Multicollinearity seems not to be an issue, because most correlations 
among our covariates are not significant at a level .05 and almost all are well below a correlation 
level of .3.  
Table (4) shows the frequencies of our dummy interactions between FIRST and ADAPT, and 
FIRST and PARTNER. Every combination has observations. We take the combination with the highest 
frequency to be the base level which is also the base level of the main effects of the dummies 
involved. Also, due to identification difficulties when including all interactions in one model because 
of linear dependency and lack of observations, some categories of the interaction between FIRST 
and PARTNER are not included and become base level.  
‘Insert tables (3) and (4) about here’ 
2.5.2 Results 
Table (5) shows the results from our Cox PH regression estimations that measure the effect of 
our covariates on a venture’s instantaneous probability of failure. We report parameter estimates, 
significance levels, standard errors, and model fit for several models. Together with every covariate 
and interaction of interest, we also state the associated hypothesis in bold. Model 1 serves as base 
model and only incorporates our control variables, i.e., STARTUP, SPOILER, DIRECT, GDP GROWTH, 
and AD SPEND. Model 2 includes our control variables together with the main effects of our 
variables of interest, i.e., FIRST, ADAPT, SCALE, and SHARED CONTROL. Models 3 to 5 each report 
one hypothesized interaction in addition to the other variables’ main effects. Model 3 includes the 
interaction between entry timing and product adaptation. Model 4 includes the interaction between 
entry timing and scale of entry. Model 5 includes the interaction between entry timing and shared 
control.  
‘Insert table (5) about here’ 
We find the following. First, from model 2, we observe that the hypothesized main effects of 
being a first mover (H1: -) respectively adapting the product (H2a: +) are significant (at a .05 level). It 
means that being a first mover increases your survival chances, whereas adapting the original 
product decreases them. The hypothesized main effects of scale (H3a: -) and shared control (H4a: +) 
are not confirmed by the results.  
Second, model 3 shows that entering with an adapted product increases the negative survival 
impact of being a late mover, which is in line with hypothesis H2b. Both combinations of being a late 
mover while adapting or being a late mover while not adapting the product are significantly 
decreasing survival chances (at .001 respectively .05 level). However, the parameter estimate of the 
former is significantly higher than the parameter e
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variables’ standard deviations, the same applies. It implies that a potential differentiation advantage 
is less important than possible product-related changes to a proven business model.  
Third, our results confirm our hypothesis that the positive effects of being a first mover are 
increased by the scale of entry (H3b: -). Indeed, from model 4 we observe that the interaction 
between FIRST and SCALE decreases the likelihood of venture failure significantly (at level .10). It is 
important to take the interaction into account, as the AIC value of model 4 with the interaction is 
lower than the AIC of model 2 with only the main effects. When including the interaction, however, 
the main effect of being a first mover disappears and the main effect of scale of entry is still not 
present compared to model 2 with only main effects. These results indicate that scale of entry 
reinforces the positive survival effect of being a first mover, while scale of entry has no effect when 
used by later entrants. Scale of entry is a pure moderator with no direct effect on venture survival, 
but with an influence on survival when used by a first mover. Being a first mover or not is more 
important in influencing survival compared with scale of entry. However, including scale of entry as a 
pure moderator increases the explanatory power of the model. Also, model 4 shows again support 
for the hypothesized main effect of product adaptation and has the best fit across all models.  
Fourth, although model 5 shows that sharing control with partnering firms when entering the 
market increases the negative survival impact of being a late mover, the result does not hold when 
taking into account variables’ standard deviation. Also, although the combinations of being a late 
mover while sharing control or being a late mover while not sharing control are significantly 
decreasing survival chances (both at .05 level), the parameter estimate of the former is not 
significantly different from the parameter estimate of the latter. It means our results do not confirm 
hypothesis H4b. Also, model 5 shows again support for the hypothesized main effect of product 
adaptation.  
Finally, our control variables consistently show that market attractiveness measures such as 
lagged GDP growth and the importance of advertising expenditures in a country’s GDP, increase the 
likelihood of failure. It seems that firms entering in tougher macro-economic times, i.e., lower 
advertising spend and lower economic growth, are more competitive and therefore live longer.  
2.5.3 Robustness checks 
We perform extra analyses to check our results for robustness. First, we measured scale of entry 
as the free daily newspaper’s circulation at time of entry relative to the total paid circulation in that 
market. However, scale can also be expressed in terms of number of newspaper editions that are 
adapted to the regional or even local context. We check our results’ robustness for measuring scale 
of entry as a dummy with value ‘1’ if the number of editions set up when introducing the free daily 
newspaper is small (i.e., less than three editions). We find that our results are robust for this 
alternative measure.  
Second, in our estimations we exclude 19 spoiler newspapers that are solely intended to making 
the free daily newspaper market unattractive. We verify whether including spoiler newspapers does 
change our results meaningfully. We find that our results are robust with respect to excluding spoiler 
newspapers.  
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Third, including the business model innovator itself might influence our results. However, 
excluding the first entry by Metro International in Sweden in February 1995, does not change our 
results. When excluding all entries done by Metro International as initiator or partner, we see that 
entering through shared strategic control increases the likelihood of failure. Therefore, it could be 
the case that the survival implications of shared strategic control are moderated by the type of 
partners involved which is in line with positive or negative signals induced by cooperating with 
particular partners. We analyse the survival effect of shared strategic control when one of the 
partners is Metro International or not. Results show that there is only an increase in likelihood of 
failure when sharing control if Metro International is not included as one of the partners, while we 
do not observe a significant effect of sharing control with Metro International. We caution that these 
results depend upon a small set of observations.  
Fourth, we check for the potential bias that may arise by defining timing in terms of quarters 
instead of months. Our results are robust against this specification.  
Fifth, we controlled for competitive effects using dummies for the presence of spoilers and the 
presence of direct city competition among free daily newspapers. We check for an alternative 
control measure, i.e., the number of free daily newspapers present in the market when entering. We 
find that our results are robust with respect to this extra control measure.  
2.5.4 Discussion 
Across many industries business model innovation consistently scores very high on the corporate 
agenda (IBM Global Business Services 2006; 2012). Thereby, one indicates that firms focusing more 
on business model innovation seem to outperform their peers. Many CEOs believe that a business 
model holds greater promise for differentiation and performance benefits compared to a product. 
Together with the attention for business model innovation and its potential for differentiation and 
growth, comes the importance of entry decisions when launching a business model in the market. 
Without a proper entry strategy, any innovation has difficulties to perform well, and we show in this 
study that it is also the case for business model innovations. However, there is a lack of managerial 
guidance on how to market a business model. This study helps to fill this void by focusing on the 
survival implications of important market entry decisions when launching a business model. In the 
literature, business models are traditionally studied from an e-commerce, strategy, or technology 
and innovation management perspective (Zott et al. 2011). Previous research in those domains 
focuses on several aspects with respect to business models, i.e., defining the business model 
(including why the business model concept is offered and what the business model is not), 
antecedents of the business model, mechanisms through which the business model influences 
outcomes, and outcomes and consequences of business models. With this study we contribute to 
several of these aspects.  
Our empirical results contribute to the literature and offer managerial guidance as follows. First, 
we show that copycatting a business model is an important and viable innovation strategy. We 
observe a large number of copycat business models, i.e., the same business models as the business 
model innovation at hand but introduced by competitors (cf., imitation) or by the innovator (cf., 
replication) after the original business model innovation was first launched. Our results indicate that 
many copycats of the original business model innovation are able to survive while creating and 
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capturing value to their customers, themselves, and their partners. There can indeed only be one 
innovator and we show that it are not always the innovators who benefit the most from their 
innovation. We show it is all right to copycat. Imitation and replication are much-executed practices 
and can provide (sustainable) competitive advantage. Although it is important --like previous 
research did-- to focus on how to arrive at business model innovation while featuring examples of 
inspiring business model innovators, the focus might shift too much towards the importance of 
business model design features for its performance potential. With our novel approach to focus on 
how to commercialize business models instead of inventing them, we make an important shift 
towards better understanding how business models can provide (sustainable) competitive 
advantage in markets not immune from competitive dynamics. For one innovator with a new 
business model there are hundreds of copycats trying to launch that business model in their own 
geographic market. Therefore, knowing how to sustain your advantage as an innovator is key. It also 
shows that ‘good’ business model innovations travel fast. Therefore, business model innovators 
should be aware of the danger of imitation, not only in geographic markets in which they are 
present, but also in unfamiliar territories, because imitation can pre-empt a potential replication 
strategy. Our focus on the importance of copycats also shows that intellectual property protection 
with respect to business model innovation is often lacking. The question whether and how business 
models can be protected by intellectual property right is an important question for policy makers.  
Second, our results show that copycats should be launched with the appropriate launch 
decisions to be viable. We detect four key launch decisions, i.e., entry timing, product adaptation, 
scale of entry, and level of strategic control. We observe important first-mover advantages 
associated with launching a business model, while it is recommended to stay close to the product(s) 
as introduced by the business model innovator. Moreover, we observe that first-mover advantages 
are increased when launching big, i.e., with a large entry scale. Also, results indicate that late-mover 
disadvantages are exacerbated when launching with differentiated products or by sharing control 
among key partners. It is important to note that the influence of the launch decisions on the 
business model’s (sustainable) competitive advantage should be assessed with respect to the launch 
decisions’ impact on the business model’s characteristics such as its logic to create and capture 
value, and its value drivers, while taking into account potential competitive dynamics among 
business models in the appropriate (geographic) market. In this study, we give numerous business 
examples of how particular launch decisions can influence particular business models’ value drivers, 
and consequently, business models’ performance potential. Complementary with previous research 
highlighting design characteristics of successful business models, we thus show the importance of 
entry decisions when launching a business model. Therefore, firms confronted with new, disruptive 
markets and business models or designing them themselves, will be better able to foresee and 
predict success and failure in those new market niches. That can be important for both innovators 
and incumbent firms in order to proactively assess success of entrepreneurial decisions. 
Our conceptual development adds to the literature as well. First, we clearly define the concepts 
of business model and business model innovation, while embedding them in previous contributions 
of the field. We further build on the conceptualization of the business model as a definition of how 
value is created (and delivered) for customers and how value is appropriated for the focal firm and 
its partners. We concur that it is important to keep a system perspective towards the business 
model, i.e., that it consists of interdependent and complementary decisions that need a holistic 
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approach. We show that by modelling and theorizing about the main and interaction effects of 
launch decisions on the business model’s value drivers’ potential to create and appropriate value, 
and the apparent interdependencies among those value drivers themselves. We also devote special 
attention to the important notion that the business model constitutes a separate unit of analysis, 
different from industry, firm, product, or technology. Discussing the definition and the conceptual 
foundations of the business model, and its characteristics as a separate unit of analysis, helps us 
appreciating the relevance to study this concept for both theory and managerial practice. With 
respect to business model innovation, we posit that to qualify as an innovation, a new business 
model should materially alter the value creation and appropriation logic of its closest related 
business model, which is reflected in new content, structure, governance, and/or value driver 
combinations of the associated activity system. In our conceptualization of business model 
innovation, we make the case to clearly distinguish between innovations at the product, technology, 
or business model level. Although they can be linked, they are separate things.  
Second, although we follow previous research stating that a business model is different from a 
product market strategy (Zott and Amit 2008), we provide more information on the conceptual and 
empirical underpinnings of how to better delineate the differences (but also the interplay) between 
both the business model and a product market strategy. Business model innovation has an influence 
on the product market strategy, but product market strategy decision variables also have an 
influence on the (sustainable) competitive advantage associated with a business model. It implies 
that the difference between so-called tactical product market strategy decisions and strategic 
business model decisions is superfluous. What matters is the empirical and theorized impact of a 
decision on the performance potential of the underlying concept at hand, albeit a product or a 
business model. If product market strategy decisions impact (sustainable) competitive advantage of 
a business model, then they are a relevant part of the business model. We show that decisions such 
as entry timing, product adaptation, scale of entry, and level of strategic control, that are 
traditionally only deemed relevant for a product market strategy, have a theorized influence on a 
business model’s value creation, value capture, and combination of value drivers, and an empirically 
validated influence on a business model’s (sustainable) competitive advantage in the form of 
survival. Our results indicate that the business model, apart from the industry, firm, product, or 
technology, can provide value and (sustainable) competitive advantage, thereby claiming once more 
its place in the literature as a separate unit of analysis. Also, with these results and associated 
theorizing we provide more information on how business model mechanisms work to provide value 
and influence outcomes.  
We suggest that the marketing literature could also benefit greatly from taking the business 
model as unit of analysis and complementing it with a more traditional focus on products, 
technologies, firms, or industries. The concept of the business model is in line with the conceptual 
foundations of marketing. The business model defines how and by whom value is created and 
captured in exchanges among the focal firm and its factor providers, customers, and other network 
partners. Exchange is at the foundation of marketing (Bagozzi 1975; Hunt 1983). Also, marketing 
strategy and various strategic marketing issues are focused on both value creation and value 
appropriation (Varadarajan 2010). Apart from the contributions already been mentioned above that 
are also relevant to marketing, this study has another important contribution to the marketing field. 
We add to the literature by studying market entry in the context of launching a business model 
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instead of a traditional focus on new products or new markets. Business models are a new unit of 
analysis, distinct from the product, technology, firm, or industry. Business model innovation is also 
different from other types of innovation. It is often disruptive for both demand and supply side, and 
it borrows characteristics from different types of innovations such as radical product innovation, 
disruptive technological innovation, and architectural innovation. This study shows that the market 
entry literature is also important at the level of the business model. We indicate that market entry 
decisions such as timing, scale, adaptation, and control, do not only play a role when launching new 
products or entering new geographic markets, but also when launching a business model. This can 
offer a new perspective on market entry decisions, also when applied to entering new product or 
geographic markets. Because market entry decisions also have an influence on the underlying 
business model’s performance potential, the underlying business model can influence what the 
outcome will be of particular market entry decisions taken for new product or geographic market 
entry. Therefore, trying to explain winning versus failing product introductions or new market 
entries might be put in a different perspective, when also incorporating the underlying business 
model in the analysis instead of only focusing on product or technology characteristics while not 
taking into account the influence of entry decisions (or product and technology characteristics) on 
that same business model.  
Policy makers and wider society benefit from this study and its subject for several reasons. First, 
policy makers benefit from a better understanding of how new markets and disruptive business 
model innovations operate, spread out and survive. Moreover, with a better understanding of how 
business models create and capture value, policy makers can make more informed decisions 
whether it is appropriate to protect incumbent markets or not in the case of business model 
innovation. For example, considering the case of the free daily newspapers’ competitive animosity in 
the U.K. and Germany, is it acceptable from a society’s point of view to allow incumbents use 
competitive strategies such as introducing spoiler newspapers to derail the market mechanism, or to 
allow incumbents to abuse the legal system to fight competitors? Another example is whether policy 
makers with a complete understanding of how value is created and appropriated in a business 
model like for example that of Amazon and Ryanair, would still focus on the business model’s 
disruptive aspects towards incumbents or on the internal operations of those business models? 
Second, with our focus on the widespread practice of imitating business model innovations, we can 
add to the discussion whether to provide possibilities to protect intellectual property derived from 
the business model. Some firms like Netflix and Nespresso benefit(ed) from partly protection of their 
business model. No protection might add to examples of business model concealment (Casadesus-
Masanell and Zhu 2013) or more ventures applying a strategy of imitation rather than invention, 
while some form of protection could encourage the emergence of more new business models. Also, 
at a basic level, partial protection could already foresee in trying to exclude aforementioned 
strategies of market distortion (cf., the so-called spoiler strategy or abuse of the legal system). 
However, full protection might be impossible, because sometimes parts of a business model 
innovation are imitated across industries by non-competing firms with different products or 
different target customers. For example, the ‘razor-razor blade model’, i.e., pricing razors 
inexpensively while aggressively charging for the consumables (razor blades), is also applied as part 
of the business model of firms like GE and Rolls Royce with respect to jet engines for commercial 
aircraft that are sold relatively inexpensively while maintenance and parts are the main income 
sources. Another example is the ‘freemium model’, i.e., a proprietary product or service provided for 
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free, while charging for advanced features, functionality, or virtual goods. The freemium model is 
being applied by Adobe, Skype, LinkedIn, MySpace, amongst many others. Third, given our study’s 
specific context in the media industry which is a very important industry from a policy perspective 
because of its democratizing character and powerful public information channel, more intelligence 
on disruptive forces within the media industry are of key informative value to public policy bodies 
and the general public. The media industry already suffered from several radical changes in recent 
history, including the advent of online --often free-- content provision, free classified ad websites 
(e.g., Craigslist), and convergence of various media, internet and telecom players. However, the 
industry still struggles how to respond adequately to these threats to their existing business. 
 
2.6 Conclusion and Limitations 
We conclude by identifying some limitations of our study that offer future research 
opportunities. First, although the focus of our research required in-depth study of entry and exit 
dynamics within a particular industry and the free newspaper market is a major industry as 
evidenced by its rapid international growth, its ability to attract high entrepreneurial activity, and its 
power to address a large and very different newspaper readership audience, such a focus comes at 
the cost of loss of generalizability. Future research should therefore replicate the current study in 
other industries. Also, because we focus on the entry decisions related to a single business model, 
we could not theorize about possible entry timing effects from business model characteristics like 
level of appropriability, customer lock-in, and network effects that might be important influencers of 
post-entry performance. However, we win in terms of limiting across-industry biases. We stimulate 
further research across industries on this topic to verify whether our main and interaction effects 
among strategic market entry decisions are applicable across different business models and sectors.  
Second, although crucial, survival is only one aspect of firm performance. Moreover, there might 
be a potential trade-off between legitimacy and performance (Barreto and Baden-Fuller 2006). On 
the one hand, legitimacy-seeking activities, e.g., peer imitation, can increase an organization’s 
survival probability (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977), while, on the other hand, 
the likelihood of survival can be obtained at the expense of performance (Henderson 1999). 
Therefore, it would be great to have trustworthy information on other performance criteria such as 
circulation throughout time, and advertising revenues and profit from individual newspaper titles. 
However, these data are very hard to get and difficult to break down at business model level. 
Overall, survival is seen as a good performance indicator for new ventures. If the new venture is not 
profitable within a relevant time period (often three years), one will let the venture go, i.e., non-
survival. A situation where the venture is not profitable, but one is determined to go through only to 
hurt competition, is taken into account and controlled for by means of a spoiler dummy. Future 
research can also further explore whether spoiler tactics are a widespread competitive weapon.  
Third, although it has been acknowledged that market entry decisions can have long-lasting 
performance implications, future research focus might shift towards dynamic managerial decision-
making during a launch process, i.e., whether and how managers update their decisions over time 
after the launch. For example, how can entrepreneurial firms dynamically adapt their strategic 
decisions such as business model design, scale and strategic control, to improve the odds for success 
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instead of only focusing on decisions at time of entry. In addition, to get a full grasp of its 
performance impact, it makes sense to split the effect of market attractiveness across decisions 
related to market entry, market exit, and the exact timing of these decisions as it could well be that 
market entry decisions are taken for example three years before actual market entry.  
Finally, by focusing on launching strategies, we can stimulate another underexplored aspect of 
business model innovation, i.e., its diffusion among consumers and across countries, and the 
potential drivers of that diffusion. Examples include research whether business model innovation 
differs from other types of innovation in its diffusion characteristics and drivers. Also, are there are 
financial and/or media bubbles associated with business model innovations and their diffusion. The 
general enthusiasm on this type of innovation and many market entries (and exits in for example the 
free newspaper market) suggest there might be some kind of irrational enthusiasm surrounding 
certain business model innovations. 
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2.8 Tables 
Table 1: launch decisions’ effect on business models’ value drivers 
 Novelty Lock-in Complementarities Efficiency 
T
i
m
i
n
g
 
Being first is per definition 
focusing on novelty. It may 
also enable (limited) IP 
protection (e.g., Netflix, 
Nespresso). 
Being first enables starting to 
create network effects (e.g., 
Amazon) and switching costs (e.g., 
iTunes versus Play Store), and pre-
empt competition (e.g., The 
Warehouse versus Wal-Mart).  
First access to 
complementary resources 
such as supplier and 
customer co-creators (e.g., 
Insites Consulting, 
Chemstation).  
Being first enables to 
increase learning effects, 
fine-tune operations, and 
profit from time compression 
diseconomies.  
A
d
a
p
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
Adaptations help to adapt to 
markets (e.g., McDonald’s 
India), to differentiate (e.g., 
Apple versus Samsung), or to 
diversify (e.g., McDonald’s 
Arch Deluxe).  
Particular product features or 
components can create lock-in 
(e.g., car radios, vacuum cleaners) 
or switching costs (e.g., Apple 
versus Google apps). 
Even small adaptations can 
be a total misfit with highly 
complementary systems 
(e.g., Ryanair in-flight 
merchandise, McDonald’s 
Arch Deluxe).  
Adaptation (versus 
standardization) is per 
definition negatively 
associated with efficiency.  
S
c
a
l
e
 
Scale can enable particular 
novel activities (e.g., Wal-
Mart introducing real-time 
POS information gathering, 
linking it to inventory, 
distribution, and marketing 
activities through own 
satellite).  
Scale captures network 
externalities (e.g., Facebook), 
creates customer and supplier 
switching costs (e.g., Apple’s App 
store), and pre-empts competition 
(e.g., Wal-Mart’s U.S. expansion in 
little one-horse towns, 
McDonald’s).  
Complementarities may 
occur only when having a 
certain scale (e.g., Wal-
Mart failing to replicate its 
strategy in Germany and 
South Korea). 
Scale economies translated in 
efficiencies in operations 
(e.g., discounters, no-frills 
airlines), marketing (e.g., 
franchising), customer 
activities (e.g., store within 
store format), etc. 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
Strong control avoids 
leakage of unique resources 
(e.g., Apple).  
Network effects substitute shared 
control to lock in partners. Shared 
control creates switching costs for 
both parties and pre-empts 
attracting better partners (e.g., 
Nokia and Windows). 
Partners give access to 
complementary resources, 
but strong control enables 
rigid execution to capture 
complementarities (e.g., 
Ryanair).  
Strong control enforces rigid 
execution towards strict 
activity system (e.g., Wal-
Mart).  
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Table 2: free daily newspapers across Europe and Canada 
Country Timing 
first title(s) 
First title(s) Total entries  
by end 2010 
Total exits  
by end 2010 
Spoilers 
Austria Mar-01 U-Express 8 4 2 
Belgium Oct-00 Metro 1 0 0 
Bulgaria Sep-08 19' 3 2 0 
Canada Jun-00 Metro; FYI 
Toronto; GTA 
Today 
11 5 0 
Croatia Apr-06 24 sata 2 1 0 
Czech 
Republic 
Jul-97 Metro 5 3 0 
Denmark Sep-01 MetroXpress; 
Urban 
11 8 5 
Finland Apr-97 Uutislehti 100 2 1 0 
France Feb-02 Metro; Plus 5 0 2 
Germany Oct-95 Handelsblatt News 
am Abend 
10 9 2 
Greece Nov-00 Metro 4 0 0 
Hungary Sep-98 Metro 2 1 0 
Iceland Apr-01 Frettabladid 3 2 0 
Ireland Oct-05 Herald AM; Metro 3 2 0 
Italy Jul-00 Metro 10 2 1 
Latvia Aug-05 5min 1 0 0 
Lithuania Sep-05 15min 1 1 0 
Luxembourg Oct-07 L'essentiel 2 0 0 
Macedonia May-06 Sphic 1 0 0 
Netherlands Jun-99 Sp!ts 7 3 0 
Poland Nov-00 Metropol 2 1 0 
Portugal Nov-04 Destak 7 3 0 
Romania Jun-05 Expres 5 2 1 
Serbia Sep-06 24 sata 1 0 0 
Slovenia Sep-07 Zurnal24 1 0 0 
Spain Feb-00 Madrid y Mas 13 7 0 
Sweden Feb-95 Metro 6 3 0 
Switzerland Dec-99 20 
Minuten/Minutes 
9 6 1 
Turkey Feb-08 Gaste; 20dk 2 2 1 
UK Mar-99 Metro 13 9 4 
Ukraine Jun-06 15min 4 4 0 
 
  
 
Table 3: descriptives 
 Variables: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 TIME TO EXIT 1           
2 CENSORING DUMMY .567* 1          
3 FIRST .467* .202* 1         
4 ADAPT -.263* -.193* -.262* 1        
5 SCALE -.009 -.003 .077 .109 1       
6 SHARED CONTROL .071 .102 .098 -.080 .051 1      
7 STARTUP .156 .161 .158 -.066 .021 -.014 1     
8 SPOILER -.249* -.094 -.189* .260* -.105 -.147 .032 1    
9 DIRECT -.243* -.162 -.432* .221* -.018 .052 -.060 .228* 1   
10 GDP GROWTH .006 -.117 .271* -.211* .140 -.203* .062 -.157 -.018 1  
11 AD SPEND -.065 -.131 .067 -.004 .183 -.025 .048 -.066 -.034 .362* 1 
 Key statistics:            
 N 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 134 
 MEAN 52.441 .485 .257 .287 .097 .118 .331 .140 .684 2.820 .874 
 STD 42.283 .502 .439 .454 .171 .323 .472 .348 .467 2.417 .334 
 MIN 3 0 0 0 .000 0 0 0 0 -6.062 .310 
 MAX 190 1 1 1 1.250 1 1 1 1 9.252 2.160 
Significance level: *.05 
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Table 4: frequency tables 
FIRST ADAPT Frequency Percent 
0 0 65 47.79 
0 1 36 26.47 
1 0 32 23.53 
1 1 3 2.21 
  136 100 
FIRST SHARED CONTROL Frequency Percent 
0 0 91 66.91 
0 1 10 7.35 
1 0 29 21.32 
1 1 6 4.41 
  136 100 
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Table 5: results Cox PH models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Variables:  PE SE PE SE PE SE PE SE PE SE 
FIRST (H1: -)   -1.047** .011   -.098 .587   
ADAPT (H2a: +)   .564** .047   .515* .287 .590** .283 
SCALE (H3a: -)   -.305 .646 -.297 .657 -.035 .644 -.339 .674 
SHARED CONTROL (H4a: +)   .133 .772 .133 .455 .095 .465   
LATE&ADAPT (H2b)     1.656**** .493     
LATE&NOT ADAPT (H2b)     .968** .412     
FIRST*SCALE (H3b: -)       -13.597* 7.545   
LATE&SHARED CONTROL (H4b)         1.408** .625 
LATE&NO SHARED CONTROL (H4b)         1.010** .410 
STARTUP -.532* .278 -.390 .165 -.377 .281 -.306 .281 -.372 .283 
SPOILER .653* .340 .342 .340 .295 .360 .397 .361 .358 .359 
DIRECT .638** .296 .127 .712 .064 .347 .033 .336 .113 .341 
GDP GROWTH .081 .065 .131** .045 .127* .065 .134** .067 .135** .065 
AD SPEND .781** .398 .764* .059 .803** .409 .827** .416 .739* .404 
Fit statistics:       
AIC 608.143 604.508 603.294 601.712 604.000 
Likelihood ratio 18.407*** 30.042**** 31.2561**** 34.8377**** 30.5500**** 
PE: parameter estimate; SE: standard error; Significance level (two-sided tests): *.10 ; **.05; ***.01; ****<.001 
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2.9 Figures 
Figure 1: Free daily newspapers across Europe and Canada 
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Study 3  Learning and Signals Across Firms and Markets: 
Identifying Entry Spillover Types and Moderators 
Bart Devoldere*, Vlerick Business School 
Marion Debruyne, Vlerick Business School 
Ruud Frambach, VU Amsterdam 
3.1 Abstract 
Marketers have to anticipate and respond adequately and timely in increasingly complex and 
fast-paced markets. Therefore, they need to scan their environment for market and competitive 
information. However, relevant information can be very scarce and often not readily available, 
especially in times of market upheaval. In such situations of high uncertainty, firms can only learn 
from own, previous experiences or rely on information signals from other firms’ behavior. We study 
learning and signals across firms and markets in a context of high uncertainty for incumbents. In our 
study’s context, the incumbents are paid daily newspaper publishers across 14 European countries 
who need to decide when to enter a new market niche, i.e., the free daily newspaper market niche. 
We model entry spillover, i.e., previous market niche entries that influence a focal market niche 
entry decision. We identify different types and moderators of entry spillover. We model incumbents’ 
time to enter the new market niche using a Bayesian hazard model that accounts for non-monotonic 
event rates, non-linear, heterogeneous, and asymmetric spillover effects, and a permanent survival 
fraction. We estimate our model through a Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo procedure using Metropolis-
Hastings algorithms. We find that incumbents’ entry timing is not only influenced by entry spillover 
across competing firms, but also by entry spillover across non-competing firms in different markets. 
Also, we show that entry spillover is non-linear, heterogeneous, and asymmetric while being 
moderated by important firm and market characteristics. We discuss important contributions for 
both managerial theory and practice.  
Key words: Bayesian, hazard, niche entry, scanning, spillover 
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3.2 Introduction 
Innovative business ideas and technologies creating new market niches in an industry are 
increasingly occurring. These market niches can pose significant threats for complacent and passive 
incumbents. Random examples include mobile payment solutions by Simple and Google Wallet 
competing with traditional banking payment systems, and call services over the Internet by Skype 
and Google Voice threatening traditional telecom fixed-line carriers. Deciding when to enter such a 
new market niche is far from easy for incumbents. Entry timing can have important short- and long-
term performance implications (Gielens and Dekimpe 2001; Green, Barclay, and Ryans 1995). 
However, incumbents face severe financial and managerial risks related to a lack of information on 
the new market niche. Often, there is a lack of information with respect to the rewards of the new 
market niche, its potential cannibalization of existing revenue streams and disruption of the existing 
customer base, retaliations from incumbent competitors when entering the new market niche, etc. 
However, with the Internet, smartphone, and social media use everywhere, geographically dispersed 
information is increasingly and instantly available. On the one hand, it can help managers finding the 
appropriate information in a timely manner to take good decisions. On the other hand, it creates an 
instant and uncontrollable wealth of information signals that might be appropriate, but also 
inappropriate, for the decision at hand. Managers need to structure all possible information signals 
to capture the essence.  
Therefore, firms --now, more than ever -- need to adequately scan their environment to actively 
search and especially structure information to prepare, guide and defend their decisions. 
Environmental scanning is the means through which managers perceive external events and trends 
(Culnan 1983; Hambrick 1982). It has the task of reducing perceived strategic uncertainty (Daft, 
Sormunen, and Parks 1988). Various literature streams suggest that environmental scanning is 
important for firms to create and sustain a competitive advantage. Previous research on market 
orientation (Hult, Ketchen, and Slater 2005; Kohli and Jaworski 1990), absorptive capacity (Cohen 
and Levinthal 1990), dynamic capabilities (Teece 2007), and organizational vigilance (Day and 
Schoemaker 2006; Fiol and O'Connor 2003; Levinthal and Rerup 2006) all suggest that firms should 
actively scan their environment to identify, anticipate, and respond adequately to market 
opportunities or threats. Also, scanning can provide a firm with an information advantage based on 
the firm’s ability to perceive important signals in its environment before competitors do (Dutton and 
Freedman 1984). Moreover, scanning is also gaining importance because there are more and more 
situations where there are problems of data overload and accelerated market complexity (Day 
2011).  
Previous research on scanning focuses on developing and managing an adequate scanning 
system, describing scanning activities based on scanning mode, frequency, scope, and top 
management involvement, and studying the alignment between environmental characteristics and a 
firm’s scanning system design (e.g., Aaker 1983; Aguilar 1967; Culnan 1983; Daft et al.1988; Elenkov 
1997; Hambrick 1982; Hambrick and Mason 1984; Yasai-Ardekani and Nystrom 1996). However, 
there are two important remaining gaps in the literature that make it difficult for firms to adequately 
scan their environment, especially when the information is geographically dispersed and firms lack 
time and money to conduct extensive scanning activities. First, previous research on scanning seems 
to assume that the relevant environmental boundaries coincide with the product-geographic scope 
of the firm (Yasai-Ardekani and Nystrom 1996) or with the perceived impact of events on a firm’s 
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own performance (Aaker 1983; Daft et al. 1988; Pfeffer 1978). However, with increasingly global 
competition and blurring industry boundaries, a firm’s relevant threats and opportunities also come 
from outside its current product-geographic scope. It implies that the relevant geographic 
environment to scan might be much broader than what initially is expected. Second, whereas 
previous research focuses on listing all possible information sources and stressing the importance of 
applying a broad scanning scope with high frequency when uncertainty is high, little is known on 
what information sources are actually influencing firms’ decisions. Consequently, previous research 
provides little help for firms how to grasp what information signals in its environment are most 
relevant, especially when these firms have limited resources but ever increasing data dispersion and 
complexity.  
Therefore, instead of merely focusing on a firm’s currently served product-geographic 
environment and on signals’ potential influence on firm decisions, we study what information signals 
actually influence a focal industry incumbent’s decision when to enter a new market niche and how 
these signals influence that decision, while taking into account signals from both served and non-
served geographic environments. We focus on information signals related to previous market niche 
entries. We define entry spillover as signals related to a previous market niche entry by a particular 
firm in a particular market that influence the focal firm’s decision on when to enter that market 
niche in a focal market. Scanning here involves gathering and monitoring information on previous 
market niche entries. A market niche entry is done by a particular firm in a particular market. 
Therefore, we can relate information signals from previous market niche entries to both firms and 
markets, and their respective characteristics.  
Previous research suggests there is entry spillover that takes place within firms across markets, 
and entry spillover that takes place across firms within markets. Firms can search within their firm 
boundaries for information and own experiences with the new market niche in other markets. For 
example, firms use entry experiences in similar markets to guide focal entry decisions (Mitra and 
Golder 2002). The theory on multinational enterprises specifically states that firms active in multiple 
markets build one organization in order to transfer knowledge more efficiently across markets 
(Kogut and Zander 1993; 2003). However, it can be hard to transfer knowledge internally (Aaker 
2008; Szulanski 1996). Also, previous experience is often not available in case of early-stage market 
niche development and only focusing on internal knowledge can seriously bias a firm’s market 
assessment. However, firms can also look outside their firm boundaries for information related to 
market niche entries. Previous research suggests that firms look at competitors’ entries as signals of 
market attractiveness to guide a focal market entry decision (Bowman and Gatignon 1995; Gielens 
and Dekimpe 2007; King and Tucci 2002). Also, so-called fad theorists claim that information about 
how many adopters there are and who specifically has adopted the innovation, rather than 
information about the innovation itself, generates social pressure for a firm’s decision-makers to 
conform to imitation behavior (Abrahamson 1991; Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Fiol and O’Connor 2003).  
However, there are at least two important research gaps remaining which impedes a more 
elaborate understanding of entry spillover. First, previous research only identifies entry spillover 
within firms across markets (cf., internal knowledge transfer of own, previous niche entries in other 
markets) and entry spillover across firms within markets (cf., competitive imitation behavior). 
However, why would there not be a third type of entry spillover that takes place across firms across 
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markets? Neglecting information signals from other firms in other-than-focal markets might harm 
and slow down a firm’s entry decision, because it leaves out potentially important and early 
information while also focusing too much on knowledge about current markets and competition. 
Also, previous research does not study different types of entry spillover together. That can introduce 
a bias in terms of the importance and effect of the different types of entry spillover on the focal 
entry decision. Second, previous research indicates that entry spillover can differ in strength. For 
example, firms can transfer knowledge more easily across similar markets (Gielens and Dekimpe 
2007; Mitra and Golder 2002) and firms are more inclined to imitate similar firms (Debruyne and 
Reibstein 2005). However, there can be other dimensions than similarity that moderate entry 
spillover. For example, spillover strength could differ also depending on characteristics of the sender 
and the receiver of the information signal, which is a common assumption in the signaling literature. 
It implies that other firm and market characteristics could simultaneously influence entry spillover. 
Also, it implies that entry spillover might not be -- as often assumed -- symmetric, i.e., that the 
influence of firm A on firm B is not equal to the influence of firm B on firm A. Neglecting other 
spillover dimensions, possible asymmetry of spillover effects, and not simultaneously taking into 
account different firm and market characteristics that could moderate entry spillover, can introduce 
a bias when modelling entry spillover.  
In sum, the following research questions are remaining. First, what are the different types of 
entry spillover and do they influence entry timing differently? Second, how do different types of 
entry spillover influence entry timing? Third, what firm and market characteristics moderate entry 
spillover across firms respectively markets? We address these literature gaps and research questions 
as follows. Based on theoretical and practical observations, we present a conceptual and empirical 
model to identify different types of entry spillover and different market and firm characteristics that 
moderate entry spillover. We model when incumbents enter a new market niche based on previous 
market niche entries. Our Bayesian hazard model accounts for a possibly non-monotonic event rate, 
a permanent survivor fraction, and potentially asymmetric spillover effects. We estimate the model 
using a flexible Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method known as the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) 
algorithm. This algorithm allows us to generate samples from the posterior distribution without the 
form of the posterior density being known analytically. The context involves incumbent publishers of 
paid daily newspapers that are confronted with a new market niche, i.e., the free daily commuter 
newspaper market (e.g., Metro, 20 Minutes). We collected data on 163 incumbent newspaper 
publishers in 14 European markets for the period 1995-2010. The unit of analysis is the incumbent 
publisher-market combination.  
Our study contributes to managerial theory and practice. We add to various literature streams. 
First, we contribute to the literature on scanning by showing which information signals actually 
(instead of potentially) influence a firm’s decision while taking into account signals from both served 
and non-served geographic environments. Thereby, we shift the attention from the scanning system, 
its characteristics, and its usage, towards the possible impact of a scanning system in firms’ decision-
making. Second, we extend signaling theory by identifying the co-existence of both direct and 
indirect signals related to market entry. Direct signals are tied to the market of interest or direct 
competitors, whereas indirect signals are tied to non-focal markets or non-competing firms. Prior 
research on signaling focuses on direct signals. Market entry spillover across firms across markets 
suggests that indirect signals can still be meaningful, i.e., that these indirect signals can still influence 
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firm decision-making. Moreover, we detect firm and market characteristics that increase signal 
strength and we model the influence of signals on firm behavior more realistically taking into 
account characteristics of signal senders and receivers. Third, our hazard model has several 
characteristics to create more realistic models for empirical research on market entry timing. We 
allow for non-monotonic event rates to allow for models closer to empirical settings, asymmetric 
effects to include more realistic spillover models, and permanent survivor fractions that follow 
common sense that not all incumbents always enter new market niches. Moreover, our model is 
highly flexible and uses publicly accessible data.  
We add to managerial practice by identifying relevant dimensions of firm scanning activities and 
how these can influence firm decisions in a complex and uncertain market context. Thereby, we 
develop a framework helping firms to detect not only strong signals from close competitors, but also 
relevant, weak signals on the periphery of a firm’s scanning activities. It implies that firms 
confronted with new market niches will be better able to foresee and predict whether, when and 
where incumbents will react. That can be important for both innovators and incumbent firms in 
order to proactively assess competitive behavior and evolutions in the industry. Also, our results on 
what firm and market characteristics are driving entry spillover, will benefit managers through 
knowing better how to organize scanning activities and gather industry intelligence in terms of what 
markets and firms to watch for competitive and industry-specific information, without creating data 
overload. 
Our paper proceeds as follows. First, we develop our conceptual framework and hypotheses. 
Second, we specify our study context. Third, we clarify our model specification and estimation 
procedure. Fourth, we show our data collection and variable operationalization. Fifth, we report 
results and discuss our findings. We conclude with some limitations of this study and opportunities 
for future research.  
 
3.3 Conceptual development 
3.3.1 Scanning and entry spillover 
Firms need to identify, anticipate and respond to market opportunities and threats to build and 
sustain a competitive advantage. Environmental scanning is used by managers to identify and 
capture information on external events and trends that can lead to a market opportunity or threat 
for a firm (Culnan 1983; Hambrick 1982). Scanning has the task of reducing perceived strategic 
uncertainty with respect to these external events and trends (Daft et al. 1988). Also, scanning can 
provide a firm with an information advantage when it lets a firm perceive important information 
signals in its environment before competitors do (Dutton and Freedman 1984). Moreover, with 
accelerated market complexity in many industries and problems of data overload, scanning can 
serve a firm by enabling it to cope with uncertainty and change (Day 2011). Scanning activities 
underlie particular firm capabilities that are considered key for long-term organizational 
performance and survival. For example, scanning is an essential part of a firm’s market orientation 
(Hult et al. 2005; Kohli and Jaworski 1990), absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990), and 
117 
 
dynamic capability (Teece 2007). Market-oriented firms are expected to have increased short-and 
long-term performance (e.g., Kumar et al. 2011). Increased absorptive capacity enhances a firm’s 
capability to identify and appreciate market opportunities. It enhances a firm’s capability to enter 
new markets (Danneels 2008) and its profitability (Narasimhan, Rajiv, and Dutta 2006). A firm’s 
dynamic capability has been related to a firm’s long-term performance and survival, especially when 
a firm’s environment is in serious upheaval (e.g., Helfat et al. 2007; Teece 2007; Teece, Pisano, and 
Shuen 1997).  
Firms build a scanning system to adequately identify and capture information signals related to 
external events or trends (e.g., Aaker 1983). Important decisions firms need to take are how they 
build and manage their scanning system. For example, firms differ with respect to scanning mode or 
information sources, scanning frequency and scope, and top management involvement (e.g., Aaker 
1983; Aguilar 1967; Culnan 1983; Daft et al. 1988; Elenkov 1997; Hambrick 1982; Hambrick and 
Mason 1984; Yasai-Ardekani and Nystrom 1996). Firms focus in their scanning activities on 
environmental events or trends that have an impact on their own performance (Aaker 1983; Daft et 
al. 1988; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Otherwise, scanning activities could become far too expensive 
and difficult to manage. However, because of this focus on events or trends with an impact on the 
own performance, firms could define their relevant environment, in which they scan for information 
signals, narrowly, i.e., coinciding with the product-geographic scope of the firm (Yasai-Ardekani and 
Nystrom 1996). However, when a new market niche in an industry has been created, such a 
narrowly defined environment could be harmful. With the advent of a new market niche, 
incumbents’ uncertainty is high. There is high uncertainty with respect to the new market niche’s 
revenue potential, possible cannibalization, disruption likelihood of the existing customer base, 
retaliations from incumbent competitors towards firms entering the new market niche, etc. 
However, a new market niche can originate from anywhere so that information on the new market 
niche is often not readily and easily available within a firm’s product-geographic scope. Waiting for 
information signals within its environment that can have a performance impact can be harmful. For 
example, when there are important first-mover advantages related to the new market niche. Also, 
indirect competitors outside a firm’s current product-geographic market scope can turn into direct 
competitors in the future, especially with increasing globalization. 
Therefore, we argue that firms broaden the scope of their scanning activities when there is a 
new market niche in the industry. Scanning then involves gathering and monitoring information 
related to all previous entries in the new market niche, both in- and outside the firm’s current 
product-geographic market scope. Entry spillover occurs when signals from a previous market niche 
entry by a particular firm in a particular market influence the focal firm’s market niche entry decision 
in a focal market. Such spillover effect takes place because firms use information on previous market 
niche entries to reduce the uncertainty and risk involved with their own possible market niche entry. 
Whereas scanning refers to information gathering and monitoring with a potential effect on firm 
decision-making, spillover refers to actual effects of information signals on firm decisions.  
We suggest there are three different types of entry spillover based on the two main information 
dimensions firms relate to a market niche entry, i.e., information tied to the entering firm and 
information tied to the market. First, there can be entry spillover within firms across markets. Firms 
can search within their organization for information and experiences related to own, previous 
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entries in that market niche in other markets. Previous market niche entries by the firm add to its 
learning and knowledge about that specific market niche and how to enter market niches in general. 
A firm’s capabilities, also market entry capabilities, are built through learning by doing (Helfat and 
Lieberman 2002; Levitt and March 1988; Zollo and Winter 2002). Also, once a firm built valuable 
resources to adequately perform a capability (e.g., technological and customer knowhow to be used 
in a market entry capability), a firm can re-use these resources when redeploying that capability in a 
related situation (e.g., Danneels 2007; Penrose 1959).  It implies that firms actively apply knowledge 
on previous market niche entries for subsequent entries. For example, entry experiences in markets 
culturally, economically and geographically close to a focal market can speed up entry in that focal 
market (e.g., Gielens and Dekimpe 2007; Mitra and Golder 2002). Also, once incumbents are 
convinced to enter a new market niche in one market, they need less time to decide on a 
subsequent market niche entry in another market, because they have more information and 
knowledge on potential financial and managerial risks involved. Moreover, a firm organizes itself 
across market borders in one enterprise to transfer knowledge more efficiently across markets 
(Kogut and Zander 1993; 2003). It implies that there are knowledge streams within firms across 
markets that can influence subsequent firm decisions. This learning behavior within firms across 
markets related to market niche entry decisions reflects a first type of market entry spillover.  
Second, there can be entry spillover across firms within markets. Firms look outside their firm 
boundaries for information, because it can be hard to transfer knowledge internally (Aaker 2008; 
Szulanski 1996), and because own previous experience is often not yet available in case of early-
stage market development. Under uncertainty, decision makers may turn to others’ behavior as a 
signal of the value of an action (Gilbert and Lieberman 1987). Market entries by competitors signal 
market attractiveness which can lead to contagion or imitation behavior among firms (Kennedy 
2002). Also, market niche entries by competitors create social pressure among managers to also 
enter. In a similar vein, information about how many adopters there are and who specifically has 
adopted the innovation, rather than information about the innovation itself, generates social 
pressure for a firm’s decision-makers to conform to imitation behavior (Abrahamson 1991; Aldrich 
and Fiol 1994; Fiol and O’Connor 2003). In the process of contagion, each adoption of a new practice 
or product makes the subsequent adoption from a potential adopter more likely (Burt 1987). At an 
aggregate market level, population growth models claim that increased entry into a new market 
attracts new entry in turn (Gort and Konakayama 1982; Hannan and Freeman 1977; Lambkin and 
Day 1989). Besides contagion of managerial decisions across firms, contagion has also been 
documented extensively as a dynamic behind the diffusion of new products (Bass 1969; Rogers 
1995). It suggests that firms tend to look at competitors’ entries to guide a focal entry decision 
(Bowman and Gatignon 1995; King and Tucci 2002). Such entry imitation behavior among firms 
reflects entry spillover across firms within markets. Prior empirical research shows the existence of 
such entry spillover with respect to entry timing (e.g., Debruyne and Reibstein 2005; Gielens and 
Dekimpe 2007).  
Third, whereas previous research focuses on direct entry spillover, i.e., spillover within firms 
across markets or spillover across firms within markets, we argue there can also be indirect entry 
spillover across firms across markets. Both empirical and theoretical observations suggest the 
existence of such indirect entry spillover across firms across markets. Organizational theory 
establishes that firms learn from own experiences and other firms’ experiences (Levitt and March 
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1988). It has been suggested that the ability of firms to learn from each other is not noticeably 
restricted by national markets (Baldwin and Krugman 1988), i.e., that international inter-
organizational learning networks might exist (Tregaskis 2003). Indeed, if knowledge transfers exists 
across firms within markets, it is hard to imagine there can be no such transfers across firms across 
markets. Especially, when there are more and more cultural exchanges, and increasing trade and 
better communication across markets. For example, prior research at aggregate market level shows 
contagion effects across different markets with respect to the adoption of organizational practices 
such as ISO certifications (Albuquerque, Bronnenberg, and Corbett 2007). Research in the 
semiconductor industry even indicates that learning spills over just as much between firms in 
different markets as between firms in a given market (Irwin and Klenow 1994). Although ‘local’ 
spillover still seems more important than ‘distant’ spillover, previous empirical studies in economics 
show a substantial amount of evidence of knowledge spillover across markets (Keller 2002).  
Also, increasingly, firms become internationally active in multiple markets. Not only firms from 
developed economies, but also distant firms born in emerging economies enter different markets 
worldwide. For example, over the past decade, the number of parent companies from emerging 
economies, such as Brazil, China, and India, increased from less than 3,000 to more than 13,000 
(UNCTAD 2006). Therefore, incumbents should anticipate market entries by firms that are yet 
unknown because operating in different markets, and start monitoring them. Also, higher 
international presence implies that competitors are finding themselves more and more in 
overlapping markets (Gielens, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2012). The higher the number of overlapping 
markets between competitors, the more multimarket competition and the more competitive effects 
across markets can occur. Multimarket competition refers to situations in which the same firms 
compete against each other in multiple markets (Jayachandran, Gimeno, and Varadarajan 1999). 
Moreover, increased multimarket contact between two firms implies that these firms become more 
interdependent, which means that the outcome of one firm’s actions becomes more contingent 
upon competitive actions and reactions of the other firm. Also, when firms collect information on 
competitors, competitors encountered in multiple markets are likely to receive more attention than 
those encountered in fewer markets, even for information from those markets that are not yet 
overlapping. Whether multimarket contact leads to more (Porter 1980), less (Bernheim and 
Whinston 1990; Feinberg 1985), or more strategic competition (Kang, Bayus, and Balasubramanian 
2010), all outcomes imply that firms monitor multimarket competitors more than other competitors.  
We hypothesize the following.  
H1a: Entry spillover within firms across markets decreases entry timing.  
H1b: Entry spillover across firms within markets decreases entry timing.  
H1c: Entry spillover across firms across markets decreases entry timing. 
3.3.2 Moderators of entry spillover 
When firms scan previous market niche entries, they need to structure all these information 
signals to capture the essence. We argue that firms focus on information signals from particular 
firms in particular markets more than from other firms or markets. We suggest that entry spillover is 
heterogeneously distributed across firms and markets. Heterogeneous entry spillover means that 
entries by firm F1 (in market M1) have more or less influence on subsequent entries by other firms 
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(in other markets), than entries by firm F2 (in market M2). Also, we suggest that entry spillover is 
asymmetric. Asymmetric spillover means that entries by firm F1 (in market M1) can have more or 
less influence on entries by firm F2 (in market M2), than that entries by firm F2 (in market M2) have 
on entries by firm F1 (in market M1).  
There are several theoretical and empirical arguments to suggest heterogeneous and 
asymmetric entry spillover. First, heterogeneous and asymmetric entry spillover is in line with 
signaling theory. It states that signals can have different strength (Lampel and Shamsie 2000; 
Sorescu, Shankar, and Kushwaha 2007). Signal strength depends on the signaling environment 
(Janney and Folta 2006; Park and Mezias 2005) and on sender characteristics such as being 
observable and credible (Busenitz, Fiet, and Moesel 2005; Certo 2003; Lampel and Shamsie 2000; 
Ramaswami et al. 2010; Warner, Fairbank, and Steensma 2006). Moreover, different receivers 
process signals differently (Fischer and Reuber 2007; Gulati and Higgins 2003). Second, research in 
competitive strategy suggests that spillover effects across firms are not homogeneously distributed. 
A firm’s decision makers construct mental models of their industry in which they categorize 
competitors in different groups (Porac and Thomas 1990). Firms in the same competitive group as 
the focal firm get more attention and are more subject to imitation from the focal firm’s decision 
makers than firms outside that group. Moreover, the more uncertainty surrounds a decision, the 
more peer comparison becomes a guide (Haunschild and Miner 1997). For example, research in the 
U.S. online brokerage industry shows that firms are more inclined to imitate market niche entries by 
competitors that are similar in size and resources (Debruyne and Reibstein 2005). Also, firms seem 
more likely to imitate competitors that are successful in terms of profits or size (Haveman 1993). 
Moreover, previous research shows that competitive rivalry is asymmetric, i.e., a given pair of firms 
may not pose an equal threat to each other (e.g., Chen 1996; Gielens et al. 2008). Third, spillover 
effects across markets seem heterogeneously and asymmetrically distributed for at least two 
reasons. First, a firm’s local knowledge is said to be sticky, i.e., difficult to transfer within the firm 
across markets (Jensen and Szulanski 2004; Szulanski 1996). However, local knowledge and 
experiences are easier to transfer to markets close in terms of culture, demography, economy and 
geography (e.g., Gielens and Dekimpie 2007; Mitra and Golder 2002). Second, innovations diffuse 
not homogeneously across markets (Dekimpe, Parker, and Sarvary 2000; Ganesh and Kumar 1996). 
For example, spillover effects across markets with respect to the probability for new product takeoff, 
suggests that these spillover effects are heterogeneous and asymmetric based on markets’ 
demographic, economic and geographic characteristics (van Everdingen, Fok, and Stremersch 2009).  
To structure entry spillover’s heterogeneity and asymmetry, we split a spillover process in three 
main dimensions. For every spillover, there is a source, a receiver, and a distance to overcome. The 
source firm is the firm that enters the new market niche previous to a focal firm’s decision and the 
source market is the market in which that source firm enters that new market niche. The receiver 
firm is the focal firm and the receiver market is the market in which the focal firm might enter the 
new market niche. The distance to overcome is the physical or mental distance between source and 
receiver firm, or between source and receiver market. The spillover dimension related to the source 
is ‘sphere of influence’ of the source towards potential receivers. Sphere of influence embodies how 
well senders of information are able to capture the attention of potential receivers with respect to 
the information that is conveyed. The spillover dimension related to the receiver is ‘receptivity’ of 
the receiver towards external information. Receptivity embodies how well potential receivers of 
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information are able or open to capturing information. The spillover dimension related to distance 
to overcome is the ‘proximity’ between senders and receivers. We argue that sphere of influence, 
proximity and receptivity enhance entry spillover and decrease a focal incumbent’s time to enter the 
new market niche.  
We identify several firm characteristics that can influence firms’ proximity, sphere of influence, 
or receptivity. First, we argue that familiarity and similarity between a pair of firms increase their 
proximity. We relate market contact and resource similarity to firms’ familiarity respectively 
similarity. Firms are familiar with each other through market contact in one or more markets. Firms 
watch familiar firms’ actions more closely than those of less familiar firms. For example, firms with 
heavily overlapping market presence are often found in situations with increased imitation of 
product introductions (Kang et al. 2010; Young et al. 2000). Also, in case of multimarket contact, 
foreign competitors can influence local firms’ entry behavior (Kang et al. 2010). With respect to 
similarity, firms can be similar through their resource bundles in terms of both size and type (Chen 
1996). Firms are likely to watch actions of firms with similar resources more closely (Porac and 
Thomas 1990). Previous research indeed shows that firms are more likely to imitate competitors 
with similar resources when entering new market niches (Debruyne and Reibstein 2005). Also, fellow 
incumbents are more likely to watch other incumbents not only due to similar resource bundles, but 
also because of shared history and possible competitive interactions. Moreover, previous research 
indicates that incumbents’ performance in a new market niche is more related to other incumbents’ 
entry order, rather than to the overall entry order (Mitchell 1991; Narasimhan and Zhang 2000). 
Second, market leaders have a higher sphere of influence towards other firms. Market leaders are 
more easily observable and socially prominent which makes their market entries more likely to be 
watched and hence imitated (Greve 2000). Also, market leaders have the power to signal what the 
direction of the industry should be and what behavior of other industry participants is expected 
(D'Aveni 1999). Moreover, established firms and especially market leaders who enter a particular 
new market create substantial legitimacy for that new market (Navis and Glynn 2010; Rao, Chandy, 
and Prabhu 2008). Third, a firm’s receptivity to being influenced by other firms’ actions depends on 
its ability to capture signals and its ability to respond. We relate firm size to a firm’s ability to capture 
signals and its ability to respond. Receivers’ attention is linked to the intensity of their scanning 
activities (Connelly et al. 2011; Gulati and Higgins 2003; Janney and Folta 2006). Firm size has a 
positive influence on the frequency of scanning activities (Yasai-Ardekani and Nystrom 1996). A 
higher frequency of scanning the environment increases a firm’s ability to capture signals and 
develop more knowledge. A firm’s ability to respond refers to the capacity of its available resource 
bundle to react appropriately. Larger firms typically have more resources to react. Previous research 
shows that in a context of destabilization of current business, a larger size of the incumbent firm 
results in a higher ability to react (Aboulnasr et al. 2008). However, larger firms might also take their 
time to react because of structural inertia (Hannan and Freeman 1984; Kuester, Homburg, and 
Robertson 1999) or because they have a higher capacity to withstand a threat (Gielens et al. 2008). 
Therefore, we hypothesize the following.  
H2a: Firms’ proximity amplifies market entry spillover across firms.  
H2b: A firm’s sphere of influence amplifies market entry spillover across firms.  
H2c: A firm’s receptivity amplifies market entry spillover across firms.  
122 
 
We identify several market characteristics that can influence markets’ proximity, sphere of 
influence, and receptivity. We focus on economic, demographic, cultural and geographic market 
characteristics. First, we expect that cultural similarity, language similarity, geographic proximity, 
and economic similarity increase the proximity between a pair of markets. Previous research shows 
that influences across markets can be moderated by market similarity and economic relations 
(Albuquerque, Bronnenberg, and Corbett 2007). Also, people with similar cultural values and a 
similar language will be more inclined to speak to each other, read about the other and exchange 
information. People communicate more easily when they share a common cultural background 
(Ganesh, Kumar, and Subramaniam 1997; Kumar and Krishnan 2002; Rogers 1995; Takada and Jain 
1991). Moreover, we expect that the more geographically distant markets are, the weaker the 
international spillover is between them. Geographical proximity of rivals facilitates transfer of ideas 
and imitation (Albuquerque et al. 2007), and is shown to be linked to knowledge spillover, innovative 
activity, and firm development (Audretsch and Feldman 1996). There are also stronger networking 
possibilities between firms within geographic clusters.  For example, previous research finds so-
called neighborhood effects (Mahajan et al. 1979) and spatial clusters in adoption phenomena 
(Garber et al. 2004). Second, we expect that the larger a market’s GDP, export size, and population 
size are, the larger the market’s sphere of influence is. Markets with a lot of inhabitants, large GDP 
or important export activities such as the U.S.A. and China, have a high visibility and economic 
power towards other markets in the world. Trends and evolutions in these important markets are 
being watched and followed more closely from abroad. Also, people in more open, export- or 
import-oriented economies, are better able to share information with foreigners relative to people 
from more closed economies, thanks to more relationship heuristics they developed (Wuyts et al. 
2004), e.g., the way to conduct business with a market (Beise 2004). Third, we expect a larger 
market susceptibility when a market has a smaller GDP, larger import activities, and higher 
population density. Economic smaller markets and open, import-oriented markets are less self-
centered, and more depending upon (and thus more inclined to watch) what happens in other 
markets. Foreign information can more easily penetrate the social system in densely populated 
markets (Lemmens, Croux, and Dekimpe 2007; Mitra and Golder 2002). Also, people in dense 
markets are close to each other physically, which may stimulate them to communicate. Therefore, 
we hypothesize the following.  
H3a: Markets’ proximity amplifies market entry spillover across markets.  
H3b: A market’s sphere of influence amplifies market entry spillover across markets.  
H3c: A market’s receptivity amplifies market entry spillover across markets.  
 
3.3.3 Control variables 
We control for several other factors that can explain entry timing. First, we control for firm size. 
Firm size is often treated both as a proxy for market power and structural inertia. Firm size has been 
associated with market power in both domestic and international contexts (Vibha, Yigang, and 
Gerardo 2002). Large firms may be less financially restricted and more influential towards local 
authorities for obtaining access to unique distribution facilities (e.g., subway stations). Also, more 
financial resources provide a buffer against the risk of entering a new market niche. However, 
bureaucratic tendencies from greater structural complexity and formalization can lead to increased 
inertia which negatively affects a firm’s ability to react swiftly to new opportunities. Therefore, 
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although it is important to control for firm size, it is difficult to predict its impact on market entry 
timing (Gielens and Dekimpe 2007).  
Second, we control for previous failures in the new market niche. The perception of risk to enter 
a market niche is closely related to previous failures in that market niche. The underlying reasons of 
those failures (e.g., competitive rivalry, inefficient operations, etc.) are often unknown to other than 
the failed firm itself and are thus hard to disentangle. We consider previous failures in the new 
market niche as flow signals at aggregate market level that are important to signal the quality of a 
possible entry. In a similar vein, Dekinder and Kohli (2008) showed that flow signals at firm level, i.e., 
a pattern of signals over multiple periods, can be important signals for the quality of start-up firms. 
The more market niche entries that failed to survive, the riskier a market niche entry seems, and the 
longer an incumbent will want to wait before entering.  
Third, we control for a focal market’s attractiveness that is expected to increase the incumbent’s 
time till entering the market niche. Market attractiveness is related to various economic and 
demographic characteristics such as economic wealth and growth, and market potential. It seems 
counterintuitive to expect a positive effect between market attractiveness and entry timing. 
However, given that market attractiveness is positive for both the incumbent market and the new 
market niche, and the complex and potentially grave effects of market niche entry on the incumbent 
business, incumbents are expected to adopt a wait-and-see approach when market attractiveness is 
high.  
Figure 1 summarizes our conceptual framework. We model how previous market niche entries 
influence a focal market niche entry by a particular firm in a particular market. Thereby, we 
distinguish between different types of entry spillover and include different moderators of entry 
spillover. 
 
3.4 Context 
The context of our study is the advent of a new market niche in the incumbent daily newspaper 
industry. An innovative business idea by Metro International in Stockholm (Sweden) leads in 
February 1995 to a new type of daily newspaper which is the start of a new market niche in the daily 
newspaper industry. The main characteristics of the innovative newspaper are the following. First, 
consumers can take the daily newspaper for free instead of paying a subscription or per-issue fee. 
The newspaper is ad-sponsored which means that ad revenues are the only revenue stream for the 
publisher. Second, the free newspaper appears daily, i.e., at least four times a week. It is also 
considered a newspaper, i.e., it contains considerably more information content than advertising 
content. Third, the free newspaper is mainly distributed in high-traffic commuter zones and in public 
transportation systems, e.g., through self-service racks or by hand distributors in railway, subway, 
and bus stations. Its target consumers are daily commuters using public transportation.  
We study whether and how entries in the new market niche by both paid newspaper 
incumbents and new entrants in the industry influence the entry timing of incumbent publishers of 
paid newspapers in the new market niche of free daily newspapers. In many European countries 
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both paid newspaper incumbents and new entrants enter this new market niche opportunity. In 
2000, there are 29 free daily newspapers in 14 European countries with an estimated circulation of 
5.5 million copies, and in 2005, there are already 81 free daily newspapers in 24 European countries 
with an estimated circulation of 15.4 million (Bakker 2008). The Metro phenomenon is not restricted 
to Europe though. Since January 2000, Metro is also distributed in Philadelphia, Boston and New 
York, and since June 2000, Metro appears in Canada. Moreover, free daily newspapers are present in 
Latin America, Asia, Australia and Africa. Bakker (Bakker 2008) counts 247 free daily newspapers in 
56 countries worldwide with a daily circulation of 44 million copies at the end of 2007. 
This context is interesting and appropriate for several reasons. First, ad-sponsored market niches 
like the free daily newspaper market niche are highly visible, relatively easy to imitate, and with low 
entry barriers. Therefore, incumbents’ entry is based on strategic considerations rather than tied to 
technological capabilities. Second, the free daily newspaper idea creates much fear and uncertainty 
among incumbent paid daily newspaper publishers about its impact on incumbent revenue streams 
and about its own viability for long-term survival. It also contains important first-mover advantages 
in distribution. First-movers can use the railway system to display their free daily newspapers in 
racks in stations thanks to often exclusive agreements with public transportation authorities, 
whereas late-movers need to use people who hand out the free daily newspapers in the street, are 
forced to distribute in alternative locations with less traffic (e.g., racks in office or apartment 
buildings), or have to deliver the newspaper to people’s homes. Moreover, the idea of free daily 
newspapers expands internationally in a relatively short period of time. Third, low-cost formats have 
important social, competitive, and economic impacts (Gatignon and Anderson 2001; Singh, Hansen, 
and Blattberg 2006). The advent of free daily newspapers concerns many different stakeholders. 
There are the media companies that already suffered from several radical changes in recent history, 
including the advent of online -- often free -- content provision, free classified ad websites (e.g., 
Craigslist), and convergence of various media, internet, and telecom players. There are also powerful 
industry organizations like WAN-IFRA, and policy makers monitoring the media industry because of 
its democratizing character and important public information channel.  
 
3.5 Methodology 
3.5.1 Model specification 
Our model specification is based on our conceptual framework in figure 1 and follows Congdon 
(2008). We develop a hazard model specifying the influence of all previous market niche entries by 
any firm in any market, on a focal incumbent’s time to enter the new market niche in a focal market. 
We model previous market niche entries by both industry new entrants and industry incumbents. 
Time-to-entry is denoted by variable T. Our unit of analysis is the incumbent firm-market 
combination. In our context, market borders are coinciding with country borders.  
Our hazard model accounts for a permanent survivor fraction, a possibly non-monotonic event 
rate, and non-linear and asymmetric spillover effects. Traditional survival models assume a survivor 
function tending to be zero in the limit, i.e., that all incumbents would enter the new market niche in 
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the end. However, in line with previous research on split-hazard models (e.g., Sinha and 
Chandrashekaran 1992; Dekimpe et al. 1998), it is more realistic to include a permanent survivor 
fraction which assumes that not all incumbents will enter the new market niche. It is highly unlikely 
that all incumbents will be convinced to pursue a purely ad-sponsored business concept which 
would easily turn into an unwanted Bertrand competition (Casadesus-Masanell and Feng 2011). 
Also, it is unlikely that the free daily newspaper market will totally overtake the paid daily 
newspaper market. Comparable free or low-cost initiatives in other industries such as the airline and 
banking industry, are also not completely overtaking, but rather living next to, paid businesses, 
serving different customer segments. Also, we assume (and test) that the event-rate will be non-
monotonic. It means that the rate first increases but after reaching a peak it tails off again. It follows 
from our assumption of a permanent survivor fraction and our hypotheses on important first-mover 
advantages. A non-linear event rate is also in line with previous research stating that two opposing 
forces, i.e., legitimization and deterrence effects, can shape the entry rate in a given market such 
that there would be an inverted U-form relationship between entry rate and a market’s competitive 
density (Carroll and Hannan 2000). Rival entry initially facilitates a process of legitimization attracting 
other players to enter the market. However, as competitive investments increase in certain markets, 
the best market space becomes pre-empted creating a deterrence effect that eventually can 
dominate the legitimization effect (Hannan and Freeman 1977). A log-logistic distribution is a 
parametric model accommodating for such a non-monotonic event rate.  
Let v be a partially unobservable binary indicator and n be an observation from an incumbent 
firm i in a particular market c in which the incumbent firm i publishes a paid daily newspaper in 
February 1995 (n = 1,2,…,N; i = 1,2,…,I; c=1,2,…C). An incumbent firm thus refers to a newspaper 
publisher who is publishing a paid daily newspaper at the time the free daily newspaper market 
niche started in February 1995. An incumbent firm can either enter the free daily newspaper market 
in the market where it already offers a paid newspaper (with v=1 and Pr(v=1)=	d), or not (with v=0 and Pr(v=0)=1-	d). Observing whether a firm enters or not depends on the censoring time. 
For firms observed to enter (denoted by a binary, censoring indicator 	d=1), v=1 and their 
likelihood contribution is Pr(v=1) f() =	df() with f() the time-to-entry density function. 
Censored firms (with 	d=0) either enter never (i.e., permanent survivor) or enter after our 
observation period that runs from February 1995 till December 2010. Censored firms’ likelihood 
contribution is then Pr(v=0) + Pr(v=1) f(T>) = (1-	d) + 	dS() with S() the time-to-entry 
survival function. Following a log-logistic distribution for T, the hazard function f(t) and survival 
function S(t) have the following form with α, λ and t >0 (See equations 1 and 2). If 0<a<=1, we have a 
unimodal distribution. If, as we would expect, a>1, then there is non-monotonicity. The overall 
likelihood of all N observations is specified in equation 3.   
(1) f(t) = 
WWW−1(1+()W)2 
(2) S(t) = (1 + ()W)−1 
(3) L(	,	d) = ∏  α	W−11+	()W	2
 (1 − ) + 1+()W
1−
		 			y=1    
 shows the probability to enter which we assume to be .27 based on a maximum likelihood 
grid search. We are interested in  which models the timing of an incumbent’s market niche entry 
126 
 
(See equation 4). Important parts of equation 4 are the following. First, we model the different types 
of entry spillover that can influence entry timing. Therefore, we include vectors "′ and u′ that 
consist of two dummy variables each ("′ = "′; "′′; u′ = u′; u′′). "′ 
indicates with a value ‘1’ an entry by firm f’ in market c by time t, i.e., entry spillover across firms 
within market on focal firm i in focal market c. u′′ indicates with a value ‘1’ an entry by firm f’ in 
market c’ by time t, i.e., entry spillover across firm across market on focal firm i in focal market c. 
The other dummies have similar interpretations. The corresponding parameter vectors related to 
the cumulative sum of "′ and u′ entry spillover dummies are 1 = 1,ℎ	, 1, ¡¢££	 
respectively 2 = 2,ℎ	, 2, ¡¢££	. Second, we include firm and country characteristics that 
could moderate entry spillover through proximity, sphere of influence, and receptivity. Therefore, 
we use FPROX, FSPHERE, and FRECEPT to model moderation of spillover across firms and CPROX, 
CSPHERE, and CRECEPT to model moderation of spillover across markets. Corresponding parameter 
vectors related to spillover moderators are then Κ[1x3] and Ξ[1x3]. Third, we include an intercept 
and control variables (cf., CONTROL) with the corresponding parameter vector Γ1¥4.  
By modeling spillover like this, we account for different types of entry spillover, and also for 
possible non-linear and asymmetric spillover effects. The extent to which spillover occurs depends 
on the specific pair of firms respectively markets studied and their characteristics. Table 1 gives an 
overview of all concepts, variables and corresponding parameters that are used in our model.  
(4)  =
	exp §Γ	uqyspqz +
1 	∑ §		 exp¨©1"!pq′ª∑ exp(©1"!pq«)"«=1;«≠ 	exp ­®2"¯!tvpv′° exp(®3"pvuv!s) 	"′²	"′=1′≠ +
	2∑ 		 exp­³1u!pq′°∑ exp´³1u!pqµ¶uµ=1;µ≠ 	exp´³2u¯!tvpv′¶ exp´³3upvuv!s¶ 	u′	u′=1′≠ ² 
3.5.2 Estimation 
We estimate our model using a combination of Metropolis-Hastings (MH) updating algorithms 
that are a family of Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation methods. Direct, closed 
estimation of our non-linear model is also possible, but is less preferred as we want to maintain 
maximum model flexibility, e.g., when trying to include heterogeneity through random effects in 
future applications. MH algorithms are useful for drawing samples from Bayesian posterior 
distributions when not knowing exactly the functional form of those posterior distributions. 
Therefore, we use an MH algorithm for every parameter of interest to approach its posterior 
distribution. Our estimation procedure is in line with prescriptions by Gelman et al. (2004) and Hoff 
(2009).  
The MH algorithm is an adaptation of a random walk using an acceptance/rejection rule to 
converge to a specified target distribution, i.e., a posterior distribution for a parameter of interest. 
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We run an MH algorithm for each parameter of interest. For example, the MH algorithm works as 
follows for parameter ·1.  
• Step 0: We start from an informed prior. Our start value for parameter ·1 is based on 
the highest likelihood density in parameter space for ·1. For every parameter, including 
the probability to enter , we include a prior value through a grid search based on the 
highest likelihood density in parameter space.  
• For sequence s (with s=1,2,…,S), we update ·1£−1 to ·1£ as follows:  
o Step 1: we sample a proposal ·1∗ from a proposal distribution ¹£(·1∗|·1£−1). We 
allow our proposal distribution to be asymmetric, i.e., there is no requirement that 
¹£(º |º») 	 ≡ 	 ¹£(º»|º ). An asymmetric proposal distribution can increase the 
speed of convergence of the simulation.  
o Step 2: we calculate the ratio of densities r = 
½´·1∗|¾¶¹£(·1∗|·1£−1)½´·1£−1|¾¶¹£(·1£−1|·1∗)
 , with y our data set.  
o Step 3: we update our parameter value for ·1as follows. We set ·1£ to ·1∗ with 
probability min(r,1); we set ·1£ to ·1£−1 otherwise.  
It is important to note that we have a MH algorithm for every parameter of interest we want to 
have a posterior distribution from. For example, for a simulation in which we would only include the 
4 control variables (including intercept), every sequence s in our simulation shows the following set 
of updates.  
• For sequence s (with s=1,2,…,S):  
o Update ·1£−1 to ·1£ based on ·2£−1, ·3£−1, and ·4£−1 
o Update ·2£−1 to ·2£ based on ·1£, ·3£−1, and ·4£−1 
o Update ·3£−1 to ·3£ based on ·1£, ·2£, and ·4£−1 
o Update ·4£−1 to ·4£ based on ·1£, ·2£, and ·3£ 
Our estimation procedure has also other important characteristics. First, we conduct three main 
simulations in a hierarchical set-up. The first simulation only includes control variables. The second 
simulation includes both control variables and types of entry spillover. The third simulation includes 
all variables, i.e., control variables, entry spillover types, and entry spillover moderators. Second, 
each simulation with in total 60,000 iterations starts with adaptive updating (for s from 1 to 10,000) 
to find the most appropriate updating step for each MH algorithm which renders an acceptance 
ratio between 0.2 and 0.5. The acceptance ratio is the number of accepted proposals relative to the 
number of proposals made in a number of simulation iterations. Adaptive updating means that, 
based on the acceptance ratio, we change the jump with which a proposal distribution proposes a 
new parameter value based on the last updated value of that parameter. We assess the acceptance 
ratio every 500 sequences so that we have a maximum of 20 adaptations to the updating step. Third, 
after the initial adaptive updating sequences, each simulation sequence runs for another 50,000 
iterations with a fixed jump (being the final jump obtained after adaptive updating). We use the 
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adaptive updating sequence as burn-in, i.e., disregard it in our final results, and a thinning of 250 to 
decrease autocorrelation in our fixed jump sequences. Thinning by 250 means that we only keep 
every 250th iteration. It follows that, from our total simulation of 60,000 iterations, we base our 
posterior analyses on a simulation sample size of 201 observations.  
 
3.6 Data and measures 
3.6.1 Data collection 
We collect data on both paid and free daily newspaper publishers for 14 European markets in 
the period 1995-2010. We collect firm level data such as market niche entry decisions for the free 
daily newspaper market niche and firm resource characteristics. Our information sources include 
industry organization reports and databases, industry expert websites and interviews,  company 
reports, and newspaper articles. We also collect information on markets’ economic, demographic, 
geographic and cultural characteristics through various public data sets such as CEPII on geographic 
distances, the CIA World Fact Book, the Economist Intelligence Unit, the International Monetary 
Fund, Hofstede’s website on cultural dimensions, and the World Bank.  
Our data set is appropriate for several reasons. First, our sample is representative for the paid 
daily newspaper incumbent industry. We identify paid daily newspaper incumbents through the 
WAN-IFRA World Press Trends yearbooks and the United Nations’ 1995 World Media Handbook. 
Using these reference information sources makes us confident to have sampled all relevant paid 
daily newspapers that were in business in 1995. Second, our sample is representative for the free 
daily newspaper market niche. Our data set includes 95 free daily newspapers in 14 European 
countries on a total number of 134 across the continent and Canada that are introduced in or before 
2010. Also, our sample covers both early adopting countries of free daily newspapers like Sweden, 
Finland and the Czech Republic, and late adopters like Austria, Denmark, and France. Third, our 
sample is representative for the economic, demographic, geographic, and cultural diversity in 
Europe. We sample across important economic and demographic countries like Germany and 
France, but also smaller countries like Belgium and Denmark. Our sample includes Nordic countries 
like Sweden and Finland, middle countries like the Netherlands and Switzerland, Southern countries 
like France, and Eastern countries like Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Croatia. Fourth, our 
data set does not suffer from an inherent survivor bias and fuzzy identification of adoption timing 
which sometimes hinders research on entry timing. Introduction dates for free daily newspapers are 
not that difficult to obtain and not biased. On the contrary, there are often difficulties in identifying 
the exact year of introduction of new products in a particular market and most databases include a 
product only when it has achieved non-trivial sales creating an inherent survivor bias 
(Chandrasekaran and Tellis 2008).  
3.6.2 Measures 
Our dependent variable is the incumbent’s time to enter the free daily newspaper market niche 
in its incumbent market where it publishes a paid daily newspaper. A paid daily newspaper publisher 
is considered an incumbent when offering a paid daily newspaper in the focal market in February 
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1995. We measure time-to-entry as the number of months between the entry of the focal 
incumbent in the focal market and February 1995, i.e., the moment when Metro International 
introduced the free newspaper niche in Sweden. 
The previous entries in the free daily newspaper market niche are measured using dummy 
variables and split in the model based on their possible spillover across firms or markets. Previous 
entries that create possible spillover across firms are captured by "′ = "′; "′′. Previous 
entries that create possible spillover across markets are captured by u′ = u′; u′′.  
Different firm characteristics are measured as follows. First, with respect to firms’ proximity, we 
measure market contact, that represents firm familiarity, as a dummy with value ‘1’ if two firms 
have one or more overlapping markets. We measure a pair of firms’ resource similarity as the firms’ 
absolute difference of the log of their total paid daily newspaper circulation across all markets. 
Second, with respect to a firm’s sphere of influence, we measure market leadership with a dummy 
having value ‘1’ if the firm has the highest paid daily circulation in its market. Third, with respect to a 
firm’s receptivity, we measure firm size as the log of the incumbent’s total paid daily newspaper 
circulation across all markets.  
Different market characteristics are measured as follows. First, with respect to markets’ 
proximity, we build a compound, standardized measure including cultural distance (Kogut and Singh 
1988), a dummy with value ‘1’ if two markets have an official language in common, the geographic 
distance between two markets’ capitals, and the one-year lagged absolute difference of the log of 
the markets’ GDP. Second, with respect to a market’s sphere of influence, we construct a compound, 
standardized measure including the one-year lagged log of GDP, the one-year lagged percentage of 
total export in a market’s GDP (both logged), and a market’s population in millions. Third, with 
respect to a market’s receptivity, we develop a compound, standardized measure including the one-
year lagged log of GDP, the one-year lagged percentage of total import in a market’s GDP (both 
logged), and the market’s population density.  
We include various control variables. First, we control for an incumbent’s baseline size, i.e., the 
incumbent’s log of total paid daily newspaper circulation across all markets in the year 1995. Second, 
we measure risk as the number of free daily newspapers that previously existed but already exited 
from the focal market. Because of the inherent time lag in the way we measure risk, we exclude 
endogeneity concerns for that measure. Also, because it is hard to get to know the underlying 
reasons for these entry failures without respondent bias, we use this relatively straightforward count 
measure for measuring risk. Third, we use a compound, standardized measure for focal market 
attractiveness consisting of the one-year lagged total ad expenditures as percentage of a market’s 
GDP, the one-year lagged log of a market’s GDP per capita, the log of total number of inhabitants 
older than 14 years, and the urbanization percentage.  
The time dependency of our variables is not likely to introduce a bias in our results for at least 
two reasons. First, there is no danger of reverse causation because of the time lag we applied in our 
measures and the interpretation of our variables. There would be reverse causation when the time-
dependent variable is effected by the likelihood of an event, instead of the other way around. 
Second, our data changes over time and it is important our measures take that into account. 
Moreover, key data like the number of cumulative entries in the new market niche, are simply not 
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present at baseline which makes it better to include them as time-dependent measures. Table 1 
gives an overview of all measures used for the different variables included in our model.  
 
3.7 Results 
3.7.1 Descriptives 
From table 2 we see that our sample covers 95 free daily newspapers introduced across 14 
European markets in the period 1995-2010. Sweden and Germany were the first markets to find free 
daily newspapers (both in 1995), whereas Bulgaria (2008) and Croatia (2006) were late adopters. 
However, markets with a rather late first introduction of free daily newspapers, could still see a lot 
of free daily newspapers entering the market. For example, France (2002) and Denmark (2001) had 
their first free daily newspaper rather late, i.e., in 2002 respectively 2001, but at the end of 2010 
already 9 respectively 11 free daily newspapers were introduced. In total, there were 99 free daily 
newspaper niche entries by firms: 55 by new entrants and 44 by paid daily newspaper incumbents. 
We collected data on 163 incumbents. The smallest incumbent had a total paid daily newspaper 
circulation in 1995 of 24,000 and the largest incumbent a total paid daily newspaper circulation of 
5,712,370. The number of free daily newspapers introduced in this 16-year period differs per 
market, ranging from only 1 free daily newspaper introduction in Belgium to 12 free daily 
newspapers introduced in Spain. We observe that smaller markets like Switzerland and Denmark can 
also have a high number of free daily newspapers introduced, i.e., 10 respectively 11. However, 
there were also a high number of failures in the free daily newspaper market niche. In total, there 
were at the end of 2010 56 failures across all 14 markets ranging from zero failures in Belgium to 9 
failures in Denmark and Germany, and on average of almost 4 failures per market.  
Tables 3, 4, and 5 show the correlation tables for our control variables, and the firm and market 
characteristics that moderate entry spillover. There is a high correlation of firm similarity with 
market leadership (.48) and ability to respond (.98) which is driven because we develop all these 
measures on the basis of firm size. Because of this high correlation and the fact that we still have 
firm familiarity to relate with firms’ proximity dimension, we leave out firm similarity from our 
estimations. The high correlation between firm leadership and ability to respond (.51) is less of a 
problem, because both measures cannot occur together when relating to the same firm (cf., ′ ≠  
in equation 4). The high correlation between country proximity and country receptivity (.56) is 
driven by a shared variable, i.e., GDP. When leaving out GDP from country proximity, correlation 
between country proximity and receptivity decreases to .20, but the correlation between proximity 
and sphere of influence increases to .54 (although there is not a particular reason for this). We check 
for our results’ robustness when leaving out GDP from country proximity.  
3.7.2 Model fit 
There are two important steps to assess our model fit. In a first step we need to identify whether 
our MCMC simulation results are likely to have reached convergence. To assess the convergence of 
our sequences for each parameter of interest, we look at both the adaptive and fixed jump part of 
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our simulation. Iterations 1 to 10,000 run with an adaptive algorithm in which the jump with which a 
new parameter value is proposed can change every 500 iterations based on the parameter 
proposal’s acceptance ratio. A proposal acceptance ratio, ideally between .2 and .5, is calculated to 
have an idea on how well the MCMC sequence of iterations is mixing. With a sequence length of 
10,000 iterations and a possible change every 500th iteration, there can be maximum 20 changes. A 
first step towards convergence is when the number of changes is well below 20 for a particular 
parameter simulation, which means the updating step provides good mixing. From table 6 in 
columns ‘Adapt CD’ we can observe that the number of proposal step changes is for every 
parameter lower than 16 (and for most it is lower than 6) on a maximum of 20, which means that 
the proposal step jump quickly converges to a particular value that is good enough for mixing 
purposes. Iterations 10,001 to 60,000 run with a fixed jump algorithm, with the proposal step jump 
being the final proposal step jump from the adaptive part. Table 6 shows the final proposal step 
jump under columns ‘Adapt D’. For example, for the parameter of firm proximity we have a final 
proposal step of 2.563. It means that for iteration s, our proposal ³1∗ is generated from a proposal 
distribution ¹£(³1∗|³1£−1) with ¹£	~	y(³1£−1; 2.563).  
For our fixed jump algorithm, we assess convergence through statistical diagnostic tests such as 
the effective sample size (Kass et al. 1998) and the Geweke diagnostic (Geweke 1992). We also use 
trace plots as visual tests of convergence. Although trace plots are not recommended as sole tool to 
assess convergence, they are still useful to assess mixing and identify the trends in the simulated 
data (Gelman et al. 2004). To reach acceptable convergence, we should have limited autocorrelation 
and good mixing in our simulated parameter sequences.  A large discrepancy between the effective 
sample size and the simulation sample size indicates poor mixing and high autocorrelation. Our 
simulation sample size is 201, given we have 50,000 iterations in our fixed jump algorithm (cf., 
adaptive part serves as burn-in) and a thinning by 250. The Geweke diagnostic compares values in 
the early part of the Markov chain (first 10%) to those in the latter part of the chain (last 50%) in 
order to detect failure of convergence. It tests whether the mean estimates of those two parts in the 
chain have converged by comparing means from the early and latter part of the Markov chain. It is a 
two-sided test based on a z-score statistic. Large absolute z values (>1.96) indicate rejection of 
convergence.  
In table 6 we can observe the effective sample sizes and Geweke diagnostic test values for the 
different models we estimate. We see that all sequences in step 3 (cf., the full model) seem to 
converge with an absolute Geweke test value well below 1.96 and effective sample sizes that are 
often close to the simulation sample size of 201. Closer inspection of autocorrelation functions and 
trace plots (in tables 7 and 8) of the sequences in step 3 that have lower effective sample sizes than 
201 indicates that all sequences are well-mixed and indeed seem to converge around a particular 
value, and that autocorrelation is acceptable. Moreover, the overall model converges based on the 
Geweke diagnostic of the log likelihood value and its effective sample size. Also for our step 1 and 
step 2 models, we see in table 6 overall model convergence based on the Geweke test value and the 
effective sample size of the log likelihood. Nevertheless, there are two variables in step 1 (cf., 
intercept and firm base size) and one variable in step 2 (cf., market attractiveness) that seem not to 
converge based on their Geweke test value. However, their non-convergence does not affect overall 
model convergence. Moreover, these control variables’ parameter values (in table 9) are in line with 
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the output of the model in step 3 that does converge. Also, we test the robustness of the models in 
step 1 and 2 using a closed estimation procedure.  
In a second step we assess model fit by looking at the log-likelihood and Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC) of our different models (Dixit and Chintagunta 2007). Models with lower values of BIC 
are preferred. Table 9 shows the log-likelihood and BIC values of our models per estimation step. 
Our step 1 model only includes control variables. Our step 2 model includes both control variables 
and types of entry spillover. The step 3 model includes all variables, i.e., control variables, entry 
spillover types, and entry spillover moderators. We observe that our model in step 3, including all 
variables, is preferred over the other models in step 1 and 2. Our model in step 3 has the lowest BIC 
value (-326.226), compared to our model in step 1 (-311.314) and step 2 (-303.769). Also, we see 
that when taking market niche entry spillover into account, we also need to consider that there can 
be firm and market characteristics that moderate entry spillover. Indeed, modeling market niche 
entry spillover types without its moderators (step 2) gives lower model fit than including both entry 
spillover types and moderators (step 3).  
3.7.3 Parameter estimates 
Table 9 shows the mean, the 95% confidence interval, and the standard error of the posterior 
distribution of our parameter values per different model step. From table 9 we observe the 
following. First, we see that there are two different types of entry spillover influencing incumbents’ 
entry timing, i.e., entry spillover across firms within markets (H1b: 1,ℎ	), and entry spillover 
across firms across markets (H1c: 1, ¡¢££	, 2, ¡¢££	). We thus confirm previous research on 
imitation behavior of firms within the same market and we identify a previously unknown entry 
spillover type across firms that are not directly competing in different markets. Due to a limited 
number of firms that are active in different markets in the context of newspaper publishing, our 
results do not reflect that entry timing may be influenced by entry spillover within firms across 
markets (H1a: 2,ℎ	). In line with our hypotheses H1b and H1c, both the entry spillover types 
across firms within markets and across firms across markets have a negative influence on entry 
timing, i.e., the more previous market niche entries there are the faster incumbents want to enter 
the new market niche. It shows that incumbents use the information signals from previous market 
niche entries to inform and speed up their own market niche entry decision. From table 9 we see 
that these results are consistent across estimation steps 2 and 3. 
Second, our results show that a firm’s sphere of influence related to incumbent market 
leadership (H2b: ®2) is the only moderator having an impact on market niche entry spillover across 
firms. However, instead of the expected amplified effect on spillover, market leadership rather 
decreases the spillover effect across firms. It implies that, when a particular incumbent market 
leader enters the new market niche, other incumbents, in whatever market they are, reduce their 
time to enter less than when a non-market leader would have entered. It suggests that the deterring 
effect of a market leader entering the new market niche is stronger than the legitimizing effect. 
Other hypothesized firm-related moderators, i.e., firms’ proximity in terms of market familiarity 
(H2a: ®1) and firm’s receptivity on market niche entry spillover (H2c: ®3), have no effects that are 
meaningfully different from zero.  
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Third, we observe that markets’ proximity amplifies market niche entry spillover across markets 
as hypothesized by H3a (³1). Our compounded measure for market proximity based on markets’ 
cultural, demographic, and economic proximity converges around a strongly positive value (cf., 
mean of 100). It implies that whenever a firm in a market different from the focal market, enters the 
new market niche, incumbents in the focal market reduce their time to enter more the closer the 
market in which that entry was, is. It suggests that the deterring effect of a ‘close’ market niche 
entry is weaker than the legitimizing effect. We do not find support that a market’s sphere of 
influence (H3a: ³2) or a market’s receptivity (H3a: ³3) may influence market niche entry spillover 
across markets.  
Fourth, we expected our log-logistic parameter α to be >1 which would indicate we have non-
monotonicity in our event rates. Consistent across all simulation steps and the associated models, 
our results strongly support that α >1.  
Fifth, with respect to our control variables we see consistently across all simulation steps, that 
there is a negative intercept (·1<0) and a negative effect of market risk (·3<0) on an incumbent’s 
market niche entry timing. It implies that the risk of entering the new market niche in the focal 
market, which incumbents can observe through previous failures in that new market niche in the 
focal market, has a decreasing effect on incumbents’ entry timing. We see no effects of a firm’s base 
size (·2) nor a market’s attractiveness (·4), that are meaningfully different from zero.  
We conduct two robustness checks. First, we check for a closed estimation approach in step 1 
and 2 reaching convergence (because some variables did not converge in our MCMC estimation 
approach). From table 10 we see that the closed Cox Proportional Hazards estimation gives similar 
results as what is reported in table 9 for steps 1 and 2. Second, we checked our MCMC results’ 
robustness when leaving out GDP from market proximity and it gave no meaningfully different 
results. 
3.8 Discussion 
The main findings of our results are the following. We identify different types and moderators of 
market niche entry spillover that influence an incumbent’s entry timing decision into a new market 
niche. We find that incumbents’ entry timing is influenced by two main types of entry spillover. First, 
in line with previous research on contagion, we observe entry spillover across firms within markets, 
i.e., imitation behavior among direct competitors. Second, we identify a previously unknown type of 
entry spillover across firms across markets, i.e., indirect learning across markets in which a focal 
incumbent is not active and imitation across firms that are not directly competing in the same 
market. Also, we show that market niche entry spillover is non-linear, heterogeneous, and 
asymmetric while being moderated by important firm and market characteristics. More specifically, 
we detect markets’ proximity in terms of culture, geography, and economy, as an amplifier of 
market niche entry spillover across markets, whereas the entry of an incumbent market leader in a 
new market niche delays other incumbents’ market niche entry.  
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3.8.1 Implications for marketing theory 
Our findings hold important implications for marketing theory. First, we contribute to the 
literature on scanning by showing which information signals actually (instead of potentially) 
influence a firm’s decision while taking into account signals from both served and non-served 
geographic environments. Thereby, we shift the attention from the scanning system, its 
characteristics, and its usage, towards the possible impact of a scanning system in firms’ decision-
making. By linking scanning activities more closely to firm decision-making, we also add to previous 
research’ claims that environmental scanning is important for long-term performance enhancing 
capabilities such as market orientation, absorptive capacity, dynamic capability, and organizational 
vigilance. Second, we extend signaling theory by identifying the co-existence of both direct and 
indirect signals related to market entry. Direct signals are tied to the market of interest or direct 
competitors, whereas indirect signals are tied to non-focal markets or indirectly competing firms. 
Prior research on signaling focuses on direct signals. Market entry spillover across firms across 
markets suggests that indirect signals can still be meaningful, i.e., that these indirect signals can still 
influence firm decision-making. Moreover, we detect firm and market characteristics that increase 
signal strength and we model the influence of signals on firm behavior more realistically taking into 
account characteristics of signal senders and receivers. Third, our hazard model has several 
characteristics to create more realistic models for empirical research on market entry timing. We 
allow for non-monotonic event rates to allow for models closer to empirical settings, asymmetric 
effects to include more realistic spillover models, and permanent survivor fractions that follow 
common sense that not all incumbents always enter new market niches. Moreover, our model is 
highly flexible and uses publicly accessible data.  
3.8.2 Implications for marketing practice 
Our findings also hold some important implications for marketing practice. We identify relevant 
dimensions of firm scanning activities and how these can influence a firm’s market niche entry 
timing decision in a complex and uncertain market context. Business environments are becoming 
increasingly fast-paced and complex. New business ideas and technological evolutions creating new 
market opportunities, but also threats, are in many industries the only constant. Incumbent firms 
struggle how to deal appropriately with these market opportunities and threats. They face severe 
financial and managerial risks related to a lack of information on the new market niche. Therefore, 
firms scan their environment searching for information related to a new market niche. Although 
scanning activities are considered very important in underlying a firm’s capabilities on how to deal 
with change, previous research on scanning focused merely on its potential -- and not actual -- 
impact on firm decisions. The scanning literature offers insights in how firms can develop and use a 
scanning system focusing on system features such as scope and frequency, and top management 
support. However, with respect to sensing and capturing weak information signals, structuring 
instant and geographically dispersed information, and identifying the relevant information signals 
for fast and effective decision-making, previous scanning research falls short.  
Our study helps managers to structure their scanning process by identifying potentially relevant 
sources of information signals that occur simultaneously in an incumbent’s close but also distant 
environment. We do not only identify internal organizational learning and direct competitive 
imitation as relevant influencers of incumbents’ entry timing decision. Also, weak signals outside a 
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firm’s geographic environment have an influence on their decision making. Moreover, we indicate to 
managers that being influenced by particular information signals depends on the sender of that 
signal (e.g., a market leader) and the distance the signal has to overcome (e.g., signals across similar 
markets). Our results on what firm and market characteristics are moderating entry spillover, will 
benefit managers through knowing better how to organize scanning activities and gather industry 
intelligence in terms of what markets and firms to watch for competitive and industry-specific 
information, without creating data overload. With this study, firms confronted with new market 
niches will be better able to foresee and predict whether, when and where incumbents will react. 
That can be important for both innovators and incumbent firms in order to proactively assess 
competitive behavior and evolutions in the industry.  
 
3.9 Conclusion and future research 
In this study, we discuss how firms learn and capture information signals across firms and 
markets. We do that in a context of high uncertainty for incumbents who need to decide when to 
enter a new market niche. We model entry spillover, i.e., previous market niche entries that 
influence a focal niche entry decision. We identify different types and moderators of market niche 
entry spillover that influence an incumbent’s market niche entry timing. We find that incumbents’ 
entry timing is influenced by both direct and indirect entry spillover. Also, entry spillover is non-
linear, heterogeneous, and asymmetric while being moderated by important firm and market 
characteristics. We model incumbents’ time to enter the new market niche using a Bayesian hazard 
model that accounts for non-monotonic event rates, non-linear, heterogeneous, and asymmetric 
spillover effects, and a permanent survival fraction. We estimate our model through a Markov-Chain 
Monte-Carlo procedure using Metropolis-Hastings algorithms. Our study has important 
contributions for conceptual theory, methodology, and managerial practice.  
However, our work also has limitations that offer future research opportunities. First, our unit of 
analysis is the incumbent-market combination with the market defined on country level. On the one 
hand, our market could be defined too narrowly. However, the newspaper market is not a European 
market, but is competed for at country level. For example, only 7 out of 149 of our paid daily 
newspaper incumbents has paid daily newspaper operations in more than one country. On the other 
hand, our market definition could be too wide. Country-level data instead of regional or city-level 
data loses some potential for more fine-grained analysis. However, our results can be seen as 
conservative, i.e., showing less easily significant results, relative to analyses with regional or city-
level data. Also, competition within countries often takes place in the country’s capital or in a limited 
set of large cities which implies that competition within a country resembles head-on competition. 
Finally, regional or city-level data for all variables concerned is not available for such an extensive 
time period in all countries. Second, we studied the relationship from market insights (cf., 
information signals related to previous market niche entries) towards marketing capabilities (cf., 
capturing and interpreting  information signals to enter a new market niche). However, some 
suggest this relationship is reciprocal, i.e., that there is also an influence from marketing capabilities 
on market insights (Day 2011). We partly covered this limitation by including free failures as control 
variable market risk, without making our dependent variable endogenous. However, future research 
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could further explore the reciprocity between market insights and marketing capabilities by 
estimating them simultaneously. Third, the context of our study is a single industry. It implies there 
is less room for missing important variables or having to include too many. Country and firm 
characteristics that moderate market niche entry spillover can also be industry-specific which would 
make it very difficult to have the same depth and complexity in an multi-industry analysis with 
enough appropriate data. However, further research across industries is needed to appraise our 
findings’ relevance in different settings.  
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3.11  Tables 
Table 1: overview of measures 
Concept Variable Measure Data source Parameters 
Types of entry 
spillover 
Types of entry 
spillover 
Count measures based on summation of dummies 
indicating entries in the free newspaper niche. 
Different dummies indicate different types of 
spillover across firms or markets.  
Desk research 1, 2 
Firm proximity Market 
familiarity 
1 if two firms are both present in one or more 
markets; else 0 
Desk research ®1 
Firm sphere of 
influence 
Market 
leadership 
1 if highest paid circulation in a market; else 0 WPT/desk research ®2 
Firm receptivity Firm size Standardized total paid daily newspaper circulation 
across all markets 
WPT/desk research ®3 
Market 
proximity 
Cultural, 
geographic, and 
economic 
proximity 
Compound measure (standardized measures 
transformed towards proximity), based on:  
• Cultural distance based on Kogut and Singh 
(1988) 
• 1 if overlap among official languages; 0 else 
• Distance between two markets’ capitals 
• One-year lagged absolute difference of log of 
GDP between two markets 
Hofstede values 
CIA 
CEPII 
Worldbank 
³1 
Market sphere 
of influence 
GDP 
Export 
Population 
Compound measure (standardized measures): 
• Log of GDP (one-year lagged) 
• Lag 1 of Log of total export / log of total GDP 
• Population in million 
Worldbank 
EIU 
³2 
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Concept Variable Measure Data source Parameters 
Market 
receptivity 
GDP 
Import 
Population 
density 
Compound measure (standardized measures): 
• Log of GDP (one-year lagged) 
• Log of total import / log of  total GDP (one-
year lagged) 
• Population/km² 
Worldbank 
CIA/EIU ³3 
Control 
variables 
Firm base size Log of total paid daily newspaper circulation across all 
markets for firm i in year 1995 
WPT/desk research ·2* 
 
Market risk Number of free dailies exited previously from the 
market 
desk research ·3 
 
Market 
attractiveness 
Compound measure (standardized measures):  
• Ad spend as % of GDP (one-year lagged) 
• GDP per  capita (one-year lagged) 
• Number of inhabitants >14 year 
• Urbanization (%) 
WPT 
Worldbank 
EIU 
·4 
WPT=World Press Trends data base; IMF=International Monetary Fund; EIU=Economist Intelligence Unit; *: ·1 is the intercept.  
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Table 2: free newspapers in Europe 
Country 1st introduction of 
free newspaper 
Incumbents 
censored 
Incumbents 
entered 
Incumbents 
total 
New 
entrants 
Cumulative # of firms entered 
the free newspaper niche by 
end 2010 
# Free newspapers 
set up by end 2010 
Austria 2001 6 3 9 4 7 8 
Belgium 2000 4 2 6 0 2 1 
Bulgaria 2008 5 1 6 2 3 3 
Croatia 2006 4 1 5 2 3 2 
Czech 
Republic 
1997 3 2 5 
2 4 
5 
Denmark 2001 7 4 11 4 8 11 
Finland 1997 5 1 6 2 3 2 
France 2002 16 4 20 7 11 9 
Germany 1995 13 5 18 4 9 10 
Netherlands 1999 6 3 9 3 6 7 
Spain 2000 17 4 21 12 16 12 
Sweden 1995 12 4 16 5 9 6 
Switzerland 1999 7 4 11 3 7 10 
UK 1999 14 6 20 5 11 9 
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Table 3: correlation table control variables 
 Firm base size Market risk Market attractiveness 
Firm base size 1   
Market risk -0.1120254 1  
Market attractiveness 0.3258719 0.3128484 1 
Table 4: correlation table firm-related moderators of entry spillover 
 Familiarity Similarity Leadership Ability to respond 
Familiarity 1    
Similarity 0.1140169 1   
Leadership 0.2845392 0.4781161 1  
Ability to respond 0.1595235 0.9848833 0.5151123 1 
Table 5: correlation table market-related moderators of entry spillover 
 Proximity Sphere of influence Receptivity 
Proximity 1   
Sphere of influence 0.004464288   1  
Receptivity 0.558912719 -0.186863037   1 
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Table 6: convergence and model fit 
Variables Parameters Step 1 
   
Step 2 
   
Step 3 
   
  
Adapt  Adapt  Fix Fix Adapt  Adapt Fix Fix Adapt Adapt Fix Fix 
  CD D ESS |G| CD D ESS |G| CD D ESS |G| 
Log Likelihood    201 1.011   136 .123   122 .641 
Log-logistic 
parameter 
α 15 1.460 201 .546 13 1.946 201 .153 13 1.946 139 .297 
Intercept ·1 3 .338 31 3.073 4 .169 24 .643 4 .169 24 .812 
Firm base size ·2 4 .019 30 2.794 4 .019 35 .700 4 .019 35 .549 
Market risk ·3 4 .169 201 1.122 4 .056 151 .446 3 .113 101 .773 
Market 
attractiveness 
·4 4 .506 201 1.352 4 .506 201 3.191 4 .506 201 .470 
Across F within M* 1,ℎ	     4 .169 201 .287 3 .338 201 .055 
Within F across M* 2,ℎ	     5 .759 201 1.236 5 .759 201 1.028 
Across F across M* 1, ¡¢££	     4 .169 59 .013 5 .253 31 1.299 
Across F across M* 2, ¡¢££	         4 .169 121 1.340 
Firm proximity ®1         8 2.563 104 1.49 
Firm sphere of 
influence 
®2         8 2.563 201 .945 
Firm receptivity ®3         2 .075 92 .696 
Market proximity ³1         8 2.563 201 1.447 
Market sphere of 
Influence 
³2         12 1.442 235 1.349 
Market receptivity ³3         7 .570 201 .694 
Adapt=adaptive algorithm (N=10,000); Fix=fixed-step algorithm (N=50,000); CD = # changes in proposal step (with a potential maximum of 20); D=final 
proposal step also used in fixed algorithm; ESS: effective sample size gives a MCMC’s sample size adjusted for autocorrelation, i.e., the number of 
statistically independent observations in a MCMC (of 201 observations in our case); G=Geweke test statistic: standard normal test statistic testing for 
convergence (H0: convergence). Significance at level .05 is indicated in bold format. 
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Table 7: trace plots full model 
Log-logistic 
parameter 
 
α 
 
Across F within 
M* 
 1,ℎ	 
 
Intercept 
 ·1 
 
Within F across 
M* 
 2,ℎ	 
 
Firm base size 
 ·2 
 
Across F across 
M* 
 1, ¡¢££	 
 
Market risk 
 ·3 
 
Across F across 
M* 
 2, ¡¢££	 
 
Market 
attractiveness 
 
 ·4 
 
Firm familiarity 
 ®1 
 
Market leadership 
 ®2 
 
Ability to respond 
 ®3 
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Market proximity 
 ³1 
 
Market sphere of 
Influence 
 ³2 
 
Market receptivity 
 ³3 
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Table 8: autocorrelation functions full model 
Log-logistic 
parameter 
 
α 
 
Across F within M* 
 1,ℎ	 
 
Intercept 
 ·1 
 
Within F across 
M* 
 2,ℎ	 
 
Firm base size 
 ·2 
 
Across F across M* 
 1, ¡¢££	 
 
Market risk 
 ·3 
 
Across F across M* 
 2, ¡¢££	 
 
Market 
attractiveness 
 
 ·4 
 
Firm familiarity 
 ®1 
 
Market leadership 
 ®2 
 
Ability to respond 
 ®3 
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Market proximity 
 ³1 
 
Market sphere of 
Influence 
 ³2 
 
Market receptivity 
 ³3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 9: parameter estimates Bayesian hazard MCMC approach 
Variables Parameters Step 1: controls only Step 2: controls and types of 
spillover 
Step 3: all 
  
Mean CI (.025;.975) SE Mean CI (.025;.975) SE Mean CI (.025;.975) SE 
Log-logistic parameter α 4.923 3.676; 6.167 .046 6.431 4.887; 8.123 .066 5.875 3.988; 7.458 .079 
Intercept ·1 -5.251 -6.376; -4.227 .101 -2.701 -3.923; -1.576 .123 -2.913 -4.346; -1.650 .140 
Firm base size ·2 .048 -.039; .139 .008 .096 .0326; .166 .006 .046 -.049;  .155 .009 
Market risk ·3 -.202 -.277; -.136 .003 -.090 -.146; -.047 .002 -.121 -.184; -.076 .003 
Market attractiveness ·4 .386 .162; .637 .010 .168 -.031;  .392 .008 .071 -.272;  .399 .012 
Across F within M* 1,ℎ	    -.650 -.942; -.384 .010 -.594 -.984; -.302 .012 
Within F across M* 2,ℎ	    -.095 -.497;  .263 .014 -.128 -.610;  .204 .015 
Across F across M* 1, ¡¢££	    -3.154 -4.153; -1.983 .073 -2.497 -3.531; -.669 .116 
Across F across M* 2, ¡¢££	       -.055 -.617;  .303 .018 
Firm proximity ®1       -.157 -2.603;  1.243 .106 
Firm sphere of influence ®2       -5.992 -7.794; -4.173 .065 
Firm receptivity ®3       -.027 -.131;  .014 .005 
Market proximity ³1       100.041 98.322; 
101.937 
.069 
Market sphere of Influence ³2       -.347 -1.853;  .860 .045 
Market receptivity ³3       .356 -1.123;  1.690 .051 
           
Model fit: log likelihood  -298.056 -300.798;  
-294.230 
1.615 -282.556 -287.467;  
-277.737 
.798 -289.103 -297.082;  
-280.269 
.988 
Model fit: BIC  -311.314   -303.769   -326.226   
*F: firms; M: markets; SE: standard error is calculated as the standard deviation of the posterior sample divided by √v¯¯ . The Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC) is given as LL – .5 × k × ln(n), where LL is the log-likelihood of the model, k the number of parameters, and n the number of observations. 
Models with lower values of BIC are preferred.   
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Table 10: parameter estimates Cox PH closed estimation check 
 
 
Model 1: controls only  Model 2: controls and 
types of spillover  
Variables: Corresponding with: PE SE PE SE 
Firm base size ·2 .612**** .159 .555*** .173 
Market risk ·3 -.501**** .098 -.518**** .096 
Market attractiveness ·4 .687 .490 .853* .438 
Across F within M* 1,ℎ	   -.271**** .063 
Within F across M* 2,ℎ	   .984 .791 
Across F across M* 1, ¡¢££	   -.093**** .025 
Fit statistics:      
AIC  343.123 309.926 
Likelihood ratio  76.8**** 116**** 
PE: parameter estimate; SE: standard error; Significance level (two-sided tests): *.10 ; **.05; ***.01; ****<.001 
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3.12  Figures 
Figure 1: conceptual framework  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Significant effects (at level .05) in our empirical analyses 
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Conclusion 
This dissertation bundles three different studies related to strategic industry factors and 
strategic industry factor innovation. In the first study I theorize and empirically model how the 
overlap between a firm’s resource bundle and the industry’s strategic factors related to product 
markets drives a firm’s growth performance in the context of within-industry product market 
diversification. Thereby I pay special attention to the effects and internal workings of deploying a 
dynamic capability to create and leverage resources when diversifying. In the second part of this 
dissertation, I focus on a particular type of strategic industry factor innovation, i.e., new business 
models. In the second study I offer empirical and theoretical guidance on how ventures can survive 
when launching a business model. I focus on four market entry decisions, i.e., entry timing, product 
adaptation, scale of entry, and strategic control, and how they can influence the business model’s 
value drivers and ability to create and capture value. In the third study I empirically model how 
different firms imitate each other in terms of entering a new market niche related to a new business 
model. I empirically model what type of information signals related to previous market entries 
influence an incumbent’s entry timing decision and how these signals influence that decision.  
In what follows I discuss the main findings for each study, their theoretical and methodological 
contributions, and their implications for managerial practice. Also, I elaborate on future research 
opportunities based on this dissertation’s main findings and limitations.  
 
Main findings 
Study 1 argues that firms can grow through within-industry diversification across product 
markets, while deploying their dynamic capability to create resources to add to the firm’s resource 
bundle, leverage resources to share existing resources across product markets, and configure 
resources to create fit among the firm’s resources. Results indicate that both resource creation and 
resource fit have a direct, positive influence on firm growth. It empirically confirms theory on 
strategic industry factors stating that firm performance is derived from the overlap between an 
industry’s strategic factors and a firm’s individual resource bundle. Moreover, the study’s outcomes 
identify a core paradox that is taking place when deploying a dynamic capability, i.e., a paradox 
between creating and leveraging resources. I empirically show a simultaneous, negative reciprocity 
between resource creation and resource leverage which has an indirect, negative impact on firm 
growth. This negative reciprocity denotes a paradox at the heart of the dynamic capability concept. I 
suggest and discuss learning, managerial and organizational constraints in a firm as the basis for this 
negative reciprocity. Firms that can cope with this paradox find a way for growth through a dynamic 
capability. Some firms are affected more by this paradox than others. It implies that a firm’s dynamic 
capability is heterogeneous.  
Study 2 addresses the lack of empirical and theoretical guidance on how ventures can succeed 
when launching a business model. I focus on four market entry decisions, i.e., entry timing, product 
adaptation, scale of entry, and strategic control, that can influence the business model’s value 
drivers and ability to create and capture value. I find important main and interaction effects on the 
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survival of the launched business model of a venture’s entry timing, product adaptation, and scale of 
entry. Study 2 empirically describes how a business model innovation, i.e., the free daily newspaper 
business model, is launched across many countries by different ventures with different entry 
strategies leading to different survival outcomes. It provides a new viewpoint of looking at business 
model innovation, i.e., one that is not focused on the innovator and the business model 
development process, but one that is focused on the innovation and how it is adopted by different 
ventures. Also, study 2 shows an interesting type of competitive behavior, i.e., a strategy of ‘spoiling’ 
the market for everyone with the intention of keeping an innovation out. I conceptualize the 
business model as a separate unit of analysis, different from industry, firm, product, or technology. 
Moreover, I theoretically and empirically show that there are not only differences but also an 
interplay between the business model and a product market strategy, which holds important 
consequences for the market entry and strategy literature.  
In study 3, I model how market entries spill over across firms and markets in a context of high 
uncertainty for incumbents who need to decide when to enter a new market niche that results from 
a business model innovation. Entry spillover is previous market niche entries influencing a focal 
market niche entry decision. I argue that incumbents’ entry timing can be influenced by three 
different types of entry spillover. Results confirm the existence of entry spillover across firms within 
markets, and show the existence of a neglected type of entry spillover across firms across markets. 
Spillover across firms across markets embodies an indirect effect among non-directly competing 
firms across different markets. Also, I model and find particular firm and market characteristics that 
moderate entry spillover across firms respectively markets. Results imply that entry spillover is non-
linear, heterogeneous, and asymmetric. Moreover, study 3 finds a flexible approach to estimate an 
entry timing hazard model based on Bayesian statistics and Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo simulation 
techniques which can complement existing closed-form estimation techniques.  
Theoretical and methodological contributions 
This dissertation makes some important theoretical and methodological contributions. Study 1 
contributes to different literature streams. First, there are contributions to the diversification 
literature. Study 1 adds theoretical and empirical arguments for a link between within-industry 
diversification and growth performance. Study 1 contributes by distinguishing between both static 
and dynamic aspects of diversification, i.e., diversification level and activity, and linking them to 
underlying resource mechanisms such as resource creation, leverage, and configuration to explain 
firm growth. Although there is already an intensive body of research on the link between 
diversification and performance based on RBV arguments, study 1 specifically contributes by 
pointing towards the importance of the bundled nature of resources, the endogeneity between 
resources and relatedness, an inherent tension between different resource mechanisms, and a 
relatedness measure making it possible to take these considerations into account. Study 1 not only 
offers theoretical arguments, but also empirical tests by developing a fine-grained relatedness 
measure that can link the different aspects of diversification with the underlying theoretical resource 
logic to explain the outcomes of diversification. Thereby, I take into account business activities and 
social processes to delineate market boundaries and their relatedness in a less artificial manner than 
it is often the case in research on diversification across industries. Moreover, the theoretical and 
empirical arguments of study 1 might also be translated and applied in a cross-industry 
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diversification context. For example, an indirect relatedness measure has been applied across 
industries (Bryce and Winter 2009), and RBV arguments related to diversification based on the link 
between products and resources, resource fungibility, and resource bundle characteristics such as its 
relevance seem not bounded by industry borders. Also, study 1 adds to the diversification literature 
by empirically confirming the presence of market structuration and theoretically clarifying its role 
with respect to a firm’s resource bundle. Results show that market structuration has not only an 
effect on firm profitability as in Li and Greenwood (2004), but also on firm growth. Moreover, study 
1 elaborates on how market structuration has important implications for complementarities in a 
firm’s resource bundle. Confirming the presence of market structuration implies that resource 
complementarities are not only formed internally through for example process or organizational 
linkages and efforts by middle managers (Taylor and Helfat 2009), but also externally through 
evolutions in aggregated firm behavior and support structures (Li and Greenwood 2004). Moreover, 
instead of focusing on the disruptive effects of environmental shocks or events on resource 
complementarities (e.g., Lee et al. 2010; Siggelkow 2001), the results on market structuration 
indicate that external evolutions can also bring a supportive contribution to resource 
complementarities. 
Second, study 1 contributes to the dynamic capability literature, more specifically that research 
domain’s call for more empirical work and its link with growth performance (Barreto 2010; Helfat et 
al. 2007). Study 1 offers a way to empirically grasp dynamic capability deployment by 
operationalizing resource mechanisms such as resource creation, leverage, and configuration 
without relying too heavily on the context or individual resources, which contributes to making 
dynamic capability decisions more tangible, measurable, and applicable. The main findings of study 1 
help identifying how a dynamic capability can lead to growth and what the possible pitfalls are. 
Results indicate that resource creation and resource fit can help firms grow, but that firms should be 
aware of a tradeoff between creating new resources and leveraging existing ones. A key contribution 
of study 1 is that it theoretically argues and empirically identifies a core paradox that is taking place 
when deploying a dynamic capability, i.e., a paradox between creating and leveraging resources. 
Therefore, study 1 complements and adds to recent research efforts that try to clarify the internal 
workings of dynamic capability by focusing on the different resource mechanisms (Danneels 2011; 
Sirmon et al. 2011) and the internal processes (Eisenhardt, Furr, and Bingham 2010; Teece 2007) 
taking place when deploying a dynamic capability. The results from study 1 show that a key aspect of 
deploying a dynamic capability is to manage an inherent tension between creating something new 
and leveraging what already exists. It means that a comprehensive list of underlying 
microfoundations of a dynamic capability should consist of both processes related to individual 
resource mechanisms (Teece 2007) and processes related to managing tensions across different 
resource mechanisms (Eisenhardt et al. 2010; Helfat et al. 2007).  
Third, study 1 contributes to the RBV literature. Study 1 further develops both conceptually and 
methodologically the close link between a firm’s resources and products; a link that has been 
acknowledged since the origins of the RBV, especially by Wernerfelt (1984), but has been treated 
limitedly in the literature later on. Extending the work by Lee (2008), study 1 shows how a firm’s 
product market choices can help to reveal information on its resource bundle and resource 
mechanisms related to diversification, and link it with firm growth. An indirect method based on a 
firm’s product market portfolio and the aggregated product market presence of all firms in the 
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industry, is applied to measure product market relatedness and reveal information on an individual 
firm’s resource bundle. It makes measuring a firm’s resource bundle more tangible while 
acknowledging the bundled nature of a firm’s resources. Also, it draws the attention to possibilities 
for studying the performance potential of a firm based on resource bundle characteristics such as 
relevance (Lee 2008) in addition to traditional individual resource characteristics such as value, 
rareness, in-imitability, non-substitutability, and appropriability (Barney 1991). Therefore, study 1 
sheds a new light on the potential to study the RBV based on Rumelt’s (1984) resource bundle 
perspective. Study 1 not only indicates that it is possible to empirically study resource bundles and 
their performance effects, but also that a firm’s decisions at the level of the resource bundle, besides 
decisions at the level of individual resources, can have important implications for both performance 
and decisions related to developing the resource bundle. Also, the main findings of study 1 are in 
line with the theory on strategic industry factors (Amit and Schoemaker 1993) implying that a firm 
needs both an outward focus (towards strategic industry factors) and an inward focus (towards the 
individual resource bundle) to build and sustain a competitive advantage. Study 1 adds to the 
literature not only an empirical translation of this theory, but also an integration with the theory on 
dynamic capability that focuses on purposefully adapting a firm’s resource bundle to stay aligned 
with a possibly changing external environment, while maintaining resource fit within the firm’s 
individual resource bundle.  
Studies 2 and 3 add to the literature as follows. First, study 2 contributes to the literature on 
business models. Study 2 sets clear definitions of the concepts ‘business model’ and ‘business model 
innovation’, while embedding them in previous contributions of the field in order to contribute to a 
convergence in conceptual language which is in line with and extends earlier efforts by Zott, Amit, 
and Massa (2011). More conceptual clarity gives current and future research also more background 
with respect to the added value and usefulness of studying and applying the concepts ‘business 
model’ or ‘business model innovation’ in a particular study. Thereby, study 2 devotes special 
attention to further elaborate on the important notion that the business model constitutes a 
separate unit of analysis, different from a firm, product, technology, or industry, that can provide 
value and a (sustainable) competitive advantage. However, in line with previous research by Zott 
and Amit (2008), results from study 2 indicate that the potential of a business model to create and 
capture value also depends on a firm’s product market strategy. Study 2 extends Zott and Amit 
(2008) not only by providing more information on the conceptual and empirical underpinnings of 
how to better delineate the differences between a business model and a product market strategy, 
but also by indicating there is an interplay between both such that a business model influences a 
product market strategy and vice versa which influences survival.  
Second, studies 2 and 3 add to the literature on market entry. An important contribution of 
study 2 is showing that market entry decisions such as entry timing, product adaptation, and entry 
scale, impact the survival chances of a newly launched business model. It implies that a business 
model is not always able to create and appropriate value in and out of itself, but should be 
accompanied by an appropriate market entry strategy. Also, study 2 makes an important 
contribution by indicating that the influence of the launch decisions on the business model’s 
(sustainable) competitive advantage should be assessed with respect to the launch decisions’ impact 
on the business model’s characteristics such as its logic to create and capture value, and its value 
drivers, while taking into account potential competitive dynamics among business models in the 
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appropriate (geographic) market. Moreover, study 2 indicates that market entry decisions do not 
only play a role when launching new products or entering new geographic markets, but also when 
launching a business model. This offers a new perspective on market entry decisions and their 
outcome, also when applied to entering new product or geographic markets. Because market entry 
decisions also have an influence on the underlying business model’s performance potential, the 
underlying business model can influence what the outcome will be of particular market entry 
decisions taken for new product or geographic market entry. Therefore, trying to explain winning 
versus failing product introductions or new geographic market entries might be put in a different 
perspective, when also incorporating in the analysis the underlying business model and the influence 
of entry decisions (or product and technology characteristics) on that same business model instead 
of only focusing on product or technology characteristics. Study 3 contributes to the market entry 
literature by conceptualizing and empirically identifying a new type of market entry imitation 
behavior, i.e., imitation of market entries among non-competing firms in different geographic 
markets. It adds a third market entry spillover type besides the two already identified in previous 
research, i.e., cross firm within market and within firm cross market entry spillover. It implies that 
firms scanning the environment for interesting ideas are not restricted by national borders nor the 
current competitive landscape. Study 3 shows the co-existence of both direct and indirect signals 
related to market entry. Another contribution of study 3 is that if offers a hazard model with several 
characteristics to create more realistic models for empirical research on market entry timing. The 
model allows for non-monotonic event rates to enable models to connect more closely with 
empirical settings, asymmetric effects to include more realistic spillover models, and permanent 
survivor fractions that follow common sense that not all incumbents always enter new market 
niches. Moreover, the model could easily be extended with various random and non-linear effects.  
Third, studies 2 and 3 add to the innovation literature. They show that copycatting, i.e., imitation 
or replication of an innovation, is a much-executed practice when a business model innovation 
occurs. Study 2 shows that copycatting is a viable innovation strategy. Results indicate that many 
copycats of the original business model innovation are able to survive while creating and capturing 
value to their customers, themselves, and their partners. Although business model design is 
important, the approach of study 2 to focus on how to commercialize business models instead of 
inventing them, makes an important contribution towards better understanding how business 
models can provide (sustainable) competitive advantage in markets not immune from competitive 
dynamics. Knowing as a business model innovator that to build and sustain your advantage you also 
need an appropriate launching strategy is important. Moreover, from an industry perspective, it is 
also important knowing that one can successfully copycat a business model innovation so that 
copycats can help fuelling an emerging business. Also, study 3 shows that business model innovation 
ideas travel fast in both known and unknown territories. Business model innovators should be aware 
of the danger of imitation, not only in geographic markets in which they are present, but also in 
unfamiliar territories, because imitation can pre-empt a potential replication strategy. Moreover, 
results indicate that business model ideas seem to travel more often across firm rather than within 
firm boundaries, which seems to imply that firms are not always making appropriate use of own 
data already available to them. Another contribution to the innovation literature is that the high 
incidence of copycat business models (and their success) shows that intellectual property protection 
with respect to business model innovation is lacking. However, empirical results show that being a 
first mover has important survival advantages and being a first mover in all relevant territories 
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seems to be an even more difficult strategy when launching a business model compared to 
launching a new product. Therefore, the question whether and how business models can be 
protected by intellectual property right is an important question for policy makers, innovators, and 
copycats. 
Contributions to managerial practice 
This dissertation holds some important managerial contributions. Study 1 provides insights on 
how to grow in a relatively ‘safe’ within-industry environment. Managers benefit from more 
conceptual and empirical knowledge on how dynamic capability and particular resource mechanisms 
such as resource creation, leverage, and configuration can be deployed to grow when entering new 
product markets.  Especially valuable to practitioners is the finding that managers can capture 
growth opportunities through diversification and dynamic capability deployment, but that they 
should be aware of frictions between dynamic capability’s different resource mechanisms when 
developing the resource bundle. Study 1 helps managers identifying possible causes for these 
tensions in the form of different constraints at different levels within the organization, related to 
organizational learning, managerial capacity, and organizational structure. Also, the indirect method 
to gain insights in a firm’s product market relatedness and associated resource bundle 
characteristics such as fit and relevance, are valuable to managerial practice because the 
methodology is convenient and easily replicable across firms, countries, or industries. To replicate 
this method, a firm only needs information on competitors’ presence in particular product markets 
which is often considerably easy to obtain from websites or brochures, industry organization 
databases, or trade journals, at least when focusing on cross-sectional data analyses. Moreover, the 
methodology makes discussions and decisions with respect to a firm’s resource bundle more 
tangible, transparent, and controllable, whereas previous discussions on a firm’s resources and its 
dynamic capability were considered a black box.  
Studies 2 and 3 show that copycatting a business model is a much-practiced and viable strategy 
that is not restricted by geographic borders. It offers ventures the possibility to grow with a new 
business model without necessarily being the innovator inventing the new business model. 
However, it also warns business model innovators that their innovation is difficult to protect, that 
many other ventures are likely to copy their invention, and that copy behavior is not restricted by 
geographic borders. The results from study 2 also indicate that business models should be launched 
with the appropriate market entry decisions to be viable. There are three key launch decisions, i.e., 
entry timing, product adaptation, and entry scale, that impact the survival of a business model. It 
should help both incumbents and new entrants that are confronted with new, disruptive markets 
and business models or designing them themselves, to be better able to foresee and predict success 
and failure in those new market niches. Policy makers benefit from a better understanding of how 
new markets and disruptive business model innovations operate, spread out and survive, in order to 
make more informed decisions whether it is appropriate to protect incumbent markets or not in the 
case of business model innovation. Also, studies 2 and 3 add to the discussion whether it would be 
suitable to provide possibilities to protect intellectual property derived from the business model. 
Moreover, the specific context of our studies, the media industry, is a very important industry from a 
policy perspective because of its democratizing character and powerful public information channel. 
Another contribution of study 3 to managerial practice is that it identifies relevant dimensions of 
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firm scanning activities and how these can influence firm decisions in a complex and uncertain 
market context. It helps firms to detect not only strong signals from close competitors, but also weak 
signals on the periphery. It implies that firms confronted with new market niches will be better able 
to foresee and predict whether, when and where incumbents will react. Also, the results on what 
firm and market characteristics are moderating entry spillover, will benefit managers through 
knowing better how to organize scanning activities and gather industry intelligence in terms of what 
markets and firms to watch for competitive and industry-specific information, without creating data 
overload. 
Limitations and future research opportunities 
Based on this dissertation’s limitations and main findings, there are some compelling future 
research opportunities. First, study 1 is limited to market entries, i.e., product market portfolio 
additions and the associated portfolio breadth, to study resource creation, leverage, and fit, and 
their impact on firm growth. That neglects other decisions with respect to a firm’s product market 
portfolio that might be considered simultaneously with market entries, e.g., market exits or a focus 
on portfolio depth instead of breadth, which could impact firm growth. It also neglects other types 
of resource mechanisms such as deleting resources or accessing external resources, that can change 
a resource bundle with a possible impact on firm growth. Integrating simultaneous firm decisions on 
product market entries, exits, and depth, and the associated resource bundle decisions such as 
resource creation, leverage, deletion, and fit leaves ample room for further research to enhance our 
understanding of the close interconnectedness between resources and products, and the 
mechanisms with which firms can change their resource bundles. Also, it is interesting for future 
research to both conceptually and empirically study whether dynamic capability deployment differs 
substantially when focusing on market entry, exit, or specialization, i.e., changing a firm’s product 
market portfolio breadth or depth. Thereby not only the type of deployed resource mechanisms can 
differ, but also the type of ‘frictions’ arising between resource mechanisms might change. For 
example, just like particular combinations of breadth and depth of innovation and customer assets 
can be complementary or detrimental (Fang, Palmatier, and Grewal 2011), future research on 
dynamic capability deployment can investigate whether particular combinations of resource 
mechanisms are more likely to create complementarities or frictions.  
Second, study 1 is focused on further developing and using an indirect method for measuring a 
firm’s resource bundle based on information from the firm’s product market portfolio. However, an 
indirect method cannot measure individual resources and their characteristics, and has the 
disadvantage of not being able to exactly pinpointing what it measures. Future research combining 
both an indirect and direct method for measuring a firm’s resource bundle could add significantly to 
advancing both the indirect and direct methodologies (e.g., insights in each method’s blindspots and 
how both methods converge or diverge in their measurements), and to increasing our understanding 
of the internal workings, characteristics, and management of a firm’s resource bundle. Moreover, it 
could clarify the heterogeneity of firms with respect to their dynamic capability. In line with Zott’s 
(2003) simulation of dynamic capability heterogeneity linked with cost, learning, and timing of 
deployment, study 1 tries to uncover some of dynamic capability’s heterogeneity related to firm 
scope, age, and specialist focus. However, more work is needed on dynamic capability’s 
heterogeneity to get a better picture of its contribution to firm performance. Also, combining an 
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indirect and direct measurement method would help capturing more fully the performance 
implications of a resource bundle by distinguishing between the performance impact of 
characteristics of individual resources such as value and rareness amongst others, i.e., the 
‘traditional’ viewpoint propagated in the RBV (e.g., Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993), and characteristics 
of the resource bundle such as relevance and fit, i.e., a viewpoint initiated by Rumelt (1984), further 
developed by research on dynamic capability (e.g., Helfat et al. 2007), and advanced by Lee (2008) 
using the indirect method.  
Third, in study 1, controls for environmental fixed effects related to time and place only have a 
limited impact on firm growth. Moreover, decisions such as resource creation and leverage that are 
not related to the environment and under control of an individual firm have important growth 
implications. These results broaden the application domain of the dynamic capability concept by 
questioning the traditionally accepted statement that dynamic capability is only relevant in a 
dynamic environment. Studying dynamic capability in a dynamic environment is at the foundational 
core of dynamic capability (e.g., Helfat et al. 2007; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997). Previous 
research identifies different environmental dimensions such as velocity, complexity, ambiguity, and 
unpredictability (Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham 2009). However, the empirical identification and 
large growth consequences of market structuration in study 1 imply that market structuration is an 
environmental dimension that also needs to be taken into account when assessing performance 
implications of dynamic capability and make that market structuration deserves further attention in 
future studies. In its naming, market structuration seems to imply more structure and thus a less 
dynamic environment. However, market structuration relates also to changes in the environment 
and seems to impact other dimensions of the environment such as complexity, ambiguity, and 
unpredictability. It would add to the literature to assess how market structuration can be clearly 
conceptualized and how market structuration relates to and differs from other environmental 
dimensions. Moreover, given market structuration’s importance for growth, future research should 
extend Li and Greenwood (2004) by focusing on the underlying drivers of market structuration (e.g., 
type of drivers, empirical identification of drivers, relative importance of drivers). Also, dynamic 
capability literature would benefit when assessing dynamic capability deployment and performance 
implications in various environments that differ along the previously mentioned dimensions.  
Fourth, study 2 is limited towards decisions at the time of market launch of the business model 
and does not consider changes over time of important decisions such as scale, product adaptation, 
and strategic control. Therefore, future research might shift the focus towards dynamic managerial 
decision-making during a launch process. For example, how can entrepreneurial firms dynamically 
adapt their market entry decisions such as product characteristics, scale and strategic control, to 
improve the odds for success? Also, how do business model and market entry decisions at time of 
entry influence business model and market entry decisions in a later stage, and are there any path 
dependencies to observe? And similarly, are there performance feedback loops to observe, i.e., an 
impact of incurred performance on business model and market entry decisions in later stages, after 
the time of entry? Moreover, to get a full grasp of its performance impact, it makes sense to split the 
effect of market attractiveness across decisions related to market entry, market exit, and the exact 
timing of these decisions. Also, study 2 operationalizes many variables using a dummy approach. 
Although a dummy approach is defensible given the hypotheses and data at hand, e.g., we are 
interested in identifying first-mover advantages or not rather than entry order effects, a search for a 
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more continuous operationalization might create insights through more fine-grained main and non-
linear effects. Moreover, a continuous multi-dimensional measure for product adaptation along 
several key aspects of a product (e.g., consumption experience in terms of place, time, content) can 
also give more insights in how ventures can create differentiation with or without influencing the 
underlying business model.  
Fifth, considering a business model as a separate unit of analysis creates a number of interesting 
future research opportunities. To have a better idea on the relative importance of different units of 
analysis such as the firm, industry, business model, and even product and technology, future 
research can try to decompose different dimensions of (sustainable) performance into parts 
influenced by a particular unit of analysis. Previous research trying to decompose inter-firm 
performance differences focuses on the firm, the industry, and sometimes strategic groups as main 
units of analysis (e.g., McGahan and Porter 1997; Rumelt 1991; Short et al. 2007). More information 
on the units of analysis’ relative importance not only gives an indication of the value of research 
done on these units of analysis, but also informs future research to focus on research topics with 
more impact. Another interesting research opportunity is conducting more research on business 
model innovation and its importance (e.g., resources devoted to business model innovation), 
innovation process (e.g., similarities, differences, and interactions with new product development 
process), performance impact (e.g., impact on innovating firm, existing firms and business models), 
characteristics (e.g., its similarities and differences with radical, disruptive, and architectural 
innovation), and diffusion (e.g., diffusion process characteristics and possible differences across 
adopting populations such as entrepreneurs, consumers, and countries; innovation and imitation 
drivers and inhibitors; differences with diffusion of other innovation types). Also, are there financial 
and/or media bubbles associated with business model innovations and their diffusion? The general 
enthusiasm on this type of innovation together with many entries (and exits in for example the free 
daily newspaper market) suggest there might be some kind of irrational enthusiasm. 
Sixth, study 3 studies the relationship from market insights (cf., information signals related to 
previous market niche entries) towards marketing capabilities (cf., capturing and interpreting  
information signals to enter a new market niche). Therefore, study 3 seems to relate to a dynamic 
capability in the sense that the dynamic capability is undergirded by systematic sensing and scanning 
processes leading to market entry and associated resource bundle adaptations to enter the market 
niche appropriately (Day 2011; Teece 2007). However, the main finding in study 3 that there is a 
market entry spillover across firms across markets suggests that firms may possess a capability that 
enables for anticipation and appropriate response. Therefore, study 3 seems also in line with what 
some suggest as being the reciprocal relationship between market insights and marketing 
capabilities, i.e., that there is also an influence from marketing capabilities on market insights, 
leading to so-called adaptive marketing capabilities (Day 2011). Future research could further 
explore the reciprocity between market insights and marketing capabilities by estimating them 
simultaneously. Moreover, future research could further clarify how dynamic capability and adaptive 
capability are similar and/or different, especially in an empirical setting. Another limitation of study 
3 is the limited use of the flexibility the mathematical model offers. Future research can make more 
use of that flexibility by e.g., introducing random firm and market effects and modeling the 
probability of entry in line with a split hazard approach.  
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Glossary 
Asset: a useful or valuable thing, person, or quality 
Business model: defines how a focal firm creates value for customers and how that value is 
appropriated across itself and its partners. A business model can be represented by a system of 
interconnected and interdependent activities that transcends the focal firm. 
Business model innovation: a new-to-the-world business model with -- relative to the closest existing 
business model -- one or more changes in one or more ways in the activity system so that the 
existing business model’s value creation and appropriation logic is materially altered 
Capability: a complex bundle of skills and accumulated knowledge, exercised through organizational 
processes that enables a firm to coordinate activities and make use of its assets 
Dynamic capability: a firm’s capability to change its resource bundle purposefully 
Entry spillover: the influence of a previous market niche entry by a particular firm in a particular 
market on a focal firm’s market niche entry in a focal market 
MCMC: Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo 
MH: Metropolis-Hastings 
RBV: resource-based view 
Resource bundle: a firm’s set of assets, resources, and capabilities 
Resources: stocks of available assets that are owned or controlled by the firm 
Strategic industry factors: a set of resources and capabilities that have become the prime 
determinants of firm performance in an industry 
Strategic industry factor innovation: introduction of new resources and capabilities or a new 
combination of existing resources and capabilities that become the prime determinants of firm 
performance in an industry  
 
